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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the Sherman Act was passed, the federal antitrust laws have cycled 
through extreme positions on the relationship between competition policy and 
the patent system. Initially came a period of extreme deference, in which the 
Supreme Court rejected every antitrust challenge to a patent practice. The 
Court approved product price fixing in patent licenses,1 patent ties,2 and 
refusals to license externally acquired and unused patents.3 A single mention 
of patents in the 1914 Clayton Antitrust Act abruptly changed that.4 The 
Supreme Court began an aggressive campaign against patent “misuse” that 
placed severe limitations on patent practices.5 Under Thurman Arnold’s 
                                                                                                                     
 1 See, e.g., Bement v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 91 (1902) (“[T]he general rule 
is absolute freedom in the use or sale of rights under the patent laws of the United States. 
The very object of these laws is monopoly . . . .”). 
 2 See Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 49 (1912). 
 3 See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908); see also 
CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: 
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 295–98 (2012). 
 4 See 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2012) (prohibiting anticompetitive tying or exclusive dealing in 
goods, “whether patented or unpatented”). For a historical perspective, see HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, 1870‒
1970, at 185–205 (2015). 
 5 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917) 
(overruling Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912)). On the rise and fall of the patent 
“misuse” doctrine, see BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 258–89.  
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leadership of the Antitrust Division in the late 1930s and 1940s, these 
concerns migrated into antitrust law.6 At the same time, the Court invalidated 
an ever-increasing number of patents under a restrictive “inventive genius” 
test, prompting Justice Jackson to complain that “the only patent that is valid is 
one which this Court has not been able to get its hands on.”7 
The Supreme Court also developed the “leverage” theory, initially in 
patent misuse doctrine8 and later in antitrust law.9 Under that doctrine, a patent 
owner behaved anticompetitively when it adopted a practice that was thought 
to extend its power “beyond the scope” of the patent itself.10 For example, 
International Salt, Co. v. United States condemned a firm’s tying of salt to its 
patented salt-injecting machine.11 The Court did not go so far as to say that 
such ties were condemned per se, without any showing of market power. It did 
what amounted to the same thing, however, by declaring that ownership of a 
patent created a presumption of sufficient power to make a patent tie 
unlawful.12 That presumption stood for nearly sixty years until it was 
overruled in 2006.13 During its life, this presumption became the basis for 
many attacks on restrictions in patent licensees.14 
The Supreme Court was hardly the sole instigator of hostility toward 
patents. It also came from the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. 
The Antitrust Division was largely responsible for spreading competition 
doctrine from patent “misuse,” a set of judge-made rules that arose exclusively 
in private patent litigation, into government enforced antitrust policy. The high 
point of patent aggressiveness was around 1970, when the Antitrust Division 
articulated its “nine no nos” of patenting, virtually guaranteed to produce an 
antitrust challenge. This list included: 
                                                                                                                     
 6 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 200–03. 
 7 Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 566, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting) (applying the “inventive genius” standard and finding a lack of invention in 
combination of a well-known mold process and a well-known process of using centrifugal 
force to press melted wax into the mold; the process had been widely used with metals in 
the jewelry industry). 
 8 See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, 
684 (1944) (refusing to enforce tie accomplished via a combination patent); Carbice Corp. 
of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 34–35 (1931) (refusing to enforce patent 
tie). 
 9 United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 254 (1942) (condemning RPM of 
lens blanks for bifocal glasses); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 457–
59 (1940) (condemning resale price maintenance of gasoline containing the appellant’s 
“antiknock” compound). The extensive case law is discussed in 8 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1621a (3d ed. 2010). 
 10 See 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶ 1621a. 
 11 Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947). 
 12 Id. at 395–96, 403–04 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part). 
 13 Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45–46 (2006). 
 14 See 10 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶¶ 1781–1782. 
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1. Tying the purchase of unpatented materials as a condition of the 
license; 
2. Requiring a licensee to assign back subsequent patents; 
3. Restricting the resale right of a product’s purchasers; 
4. Restricting a licensee’s ability to deal in products outside the 
scope of the patent; 
5. Prohibiting a licensor from granting further licenses; 
6. Requiring mandatory package licensing; 
7. Requiring, as a condition of the license, royalties not reasonably 
related to the licensee’s sales of products covered by the patent; 
8. Restricting a licensee’s use of a product made by a patented 
process; and 
9. Setting minimum resale price provisions for licensed products.15 
Most of the “nine no nos” described vertical practices, although “no no” 
number nine encompassed both horizontal price fixing and resale price 
maintenance. In a perverse turn, the decision in Bement v. National Harrow 
Co. and United States v. General Electric, Co. (GE) twice rejected challenges 
to horizontal price fixing of patented products if the price fix clause was part 
of a patent license.16 Congress attempted repeatedly to overturn this “GE 
rule,” but without success17—a point that three dissenting Justices emphasized 
in the 1947 United States v. Line Materials Co. decision.18 There, a majority 
condemned a market wide price fixing agreement contained in patent cross-
licenses.19 The antitrust enforcement agencies today largely ignore Bement and 
GE,20 even though they have never been overruled. In the 2013 FTC v. 
Actavis, Inc. decision, however, dicta in the majority opinion restricted their 
application to agreements between a “single patentee” and a “single 
                                                                                                                     
 15 Bruce B. Wilson, Patent and Know-How License Agreements: Field of Use, 
Territorial, Price and Quantity Restrictions, in ANTITRUST PRIMER: PATENTS, 
FRANCHISING, TREBLE DAMAGE SUITS 11, 11–21 (Sara-Ann Sanders ed., 1970). 
 16 See United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 490 (1926); Bement v. Nat’l 
Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 93–95 (1902); see also infra text accompanying note 249. 
 17 See TEMP. NAT’L ECON. COMM. (TNEC), INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF 
ECONOMIC POWER, S. DOC. NO. 76-95, at 16–18 (1939); see also Grant W. Kelleher, Price-
Fixing Under Patent License Agreements, 3 MONT. L. REV. 5, 19–25 (1942). For harsh 
criticism of the Temporary National Economic Committee proposals on patents, see 
generally GEORGE E. FOLK, PATENTS AND INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS (1942). 
 18 United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 362–63 & n.30 (1948) (Burton, 
J., dissenting). 
 19 Id. at 314 (majority opinion). 
 20 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES 
FOR THE LICENSING AND ACQUISITION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.2 (1995) 
[hereinafter IP ANTITRUST GUIDELINES], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public 
/guidelines/0558.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/QMX2-M4DA (citing GE only as a 
qualifier to its then-existing position that resale price maintenance is unlawful but never 
citing Bement). 
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licensee.”21 In 1913 and 1917, however, the Court twice applied antitrust law’s 
per se rule to purely vertical price maintenance provisions in license 
agreements with dealers in patented products.22 The result was that for nearly 
a century purely vertical agreements on the pricing of patented goods were 
treated with greater hostility than agreements among competitors. 
By the time the “nine no nos” were articulated, patent and antitrust 
doctrine had already come under blistering attack—particularly antitrust law’s 
hostility toward patent ties,23 as well as its presumption that antitrust-imposed 
restrictions on patents would advance either competition or innovation.24 
Today we are inclined to see patent tying arrangements as competitively 
benign in most cases.25 None of the “nine no nos” remains unlawful per se as a 
general matter. That includes number nine when applied to resale price 
maintenance, which was placed under the rule of reason in 2007 by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Leegin Creative Products, Inc. v. PSKS Inc.26 
Market wide product price fixing among competitors is or should be an 
exception.27 Further, the presumption of market power is gone, and today 
patents are regarded in most cases as no more indicative of monopoly power 
than are land titles or other tangible property interests. 
Both antitrust policy and patent policy are properly concerned with 
economic welfare, although the concerns are articulated more clearly in 
antitrust than in patent law. At the atmospheric level, antitrust focuses on the 
short run, including such things as immediate pricing and output, while patent 
law is concerned with long run issues relating to innovation. But upon 
inspection this dichotomy quickly breaks down. In fact, antitrust policy has 
always been concerned with performance over both the short and long runs 
and often considers effects on innovation. 
                                                                                                                     
 21 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2232 (2013). The limitation is suggested in 
12 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2041b (3d ed. 2012) (discussing Newburgh 
Moire Co. v. Superior Moire Co., 237 F.2d 283, 291–94 (3d Cir. 1956)). 
 22 See Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490, 501 (1917); Bauer & Cie v. 
O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 17 (1913). 
 23 See, e.g., Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 
YALE L.J. 19, 20 (1957). 
 24 See WARD S. BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 239–56 (1973); William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on 
Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 312–13 
(1966); see also John L. Murchison, Jr., Patent Acquisitions and the Antitrust Laws, 45 
TEX. L. REV. 663, 663 (1967). 
 25 See 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶¶ 1711–1717; Erik Hovenkamp & 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMPETITION POLICY (Daniel Sokol & Roger D. Blair eds., 2015); Erik Hovenkamp & 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Harm, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 926 
(2010). 
 26 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907 (2007). 
 27 See infra notes 273‒77 and accompanying text. 
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Previous studies of antitrust law and the patent system have generally 
assumed that issued patents are valid, discrete, and generally of high quality in 
the sense that they further innovation. As a result, increasing the returns to 
patenting increases the incentive to do socially valuable innovation, whose 
gains must be traded off against the losses from patent exclusion. Ward 
Bowman addressed this tradeoff problem by presenting the patent as a kind of 
walled garden, protecting everything inside from antitrust scrutiny—provided 
that the activity remained inside the patent’s lawful scope. He concluded: 
[E]valuating whether certain patent licensing practices should be sanctioned 
will involve the proper scope of the legal monopoly. Is more being 
monopolized than what the patent grants, or is the practice merely 
maximizing the reward attributable to the competitive advantage afforded by 
a patent?28 
In the mid-1980s, Louis Kaplow proposed a “ratio test” that assessed 
antitrust practices by balancing “patentee reward” against “monopoly loss.”29 
Kaplow himself recognized that the challenges in applying such a test are both 
“formidable” and “controversial.”30 Indeed, the relevant measurements 
required information about the optimal term of a patent.31 Not only is this term 
impossible to compute in litigation, it also varies considerably from industry to 
industry.32 
                                                                                                                     
 28 BOWMAN, JR., supra note 24, at 8–9 (emphasis added). In the process, Bowman 
dismissed Chicago economist Frank Knight’s suggestion that the patent process 
undervalued those who did pure creative research and gave the reward to the one “who 
adds a detail or finishing touch that makes an idea practicable where the real work of 
pioneering and exploration has been done by others.” FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, 
UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 372 (1921); see also THORSTEN KÄSEBERG, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY, ANTITRUST AND CUMULATIVE INNOVATION IN THE EU AND THE US 31‒32 
(2012); Amedeo Arena et al., Two Bodies of Law Separated by a Common Mission: 
Unilateral Conduct by Dominant Firms at the IP/Antitrust Intersection in the EU and the 
US, 9 EUR. COMPETITION J. 623, 623–24 (2013); Baxter, supra note 24, at 312; Michael A. 
Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 762–65 (2002); 
Thomas K. Cheng, A Developmental Approach to the Patent-Antitrust Interface, 33 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 3–5 (2012); Thomas Cheng, Putting Innovation Incentives Back in the 
Patent-Antitrust Interface, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 385, 386–93 (2013); Gerald R. 
Gibbons, Price Fixing in Patent Licenses and the Antitrust Laws, 51 VA. L. REV. 273, 273–
78 (1965). See generally Robin Feldman, Patent and Antitrust: Differing Shades of 
Meaning, VA. J.L. & TECH., Spring 2008, at 3 (arguing that much of the problem is 
semantic because the two systems use the same words to mean different things). 
 29 Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 
1813, 1831 (1984). Professor Kaplow explained: “In this ratio, ‘patentee reward’ and 
‘monopoly loss’ refer, respectively, to the incremental reward and loss resulting from the 
practice in question. In general, the higher the ratio, the more desirable the practice.” Id. 
 30 Id. at 1833. 
 31 Id. at 1831. 
 32 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294–300 (2003). On the question of different optimal 
periods in different industries, see Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in 
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If a patent or patent practice does nothing to further innovation, however, 
then any amount of social loss from increased monopoly is harmful. In that 
case, there is no additional benefit from innovation down the road. Because 
only a subset of patents are worthless, this naturally invites the question 
whether considerations of patent social value are a reasonable element of 
competition policy. 
 Two premises drive the approach taken here. First, any resolution of 
patent/antitrust conflicts must be capable of judicial administration, although 
legislation can provide the relevant framework. This places the “patent social 
value” question out of bounds in most cases because it simply cannot be 
answered. Second, both antitrust and patent law are “regulatory” institutions, 
which respond to political as well as economic pressures. An approach to 
harmonization that assumes that patent law always “gets it right” will lead to 
significant errors, just as much as an approach that makes the same assumption 
about antitrust. Courts need to play the hands they are dealt, which are 
complex statutes that at least at the verbal level have surprisingly few 
inconsistencies. Further, judicial statutory construction is always subject to 
further congressional revision, as the history of both statutory regimes amply 
indicates. For example, in 1914, Congress responded with § 3 of the Clayton 
Act to what it viewed as an irrational lack of judicial concern about patent 
ties.33 It also responded to Supreme Court merger decisions in 1950 with 
expansions of the merger law.34 For its part, patent law was amended in 1952 
in order to counter what Congress perceived as overly restrictive rules on 
patent issuance and excessively quick findings of misuse. It further limited 
misuse claims in 1988.35 
In the current state of the law, antitrust is doing a better job of addressing 
the concerns within its domain than patent law is at addressing its concerns. 
Indeed, antitrust law is often a more effective promoter of innovation than our 
current patent system is. To be sure, at various points in their history both 
antitrust law and patent law have engaged in considerable overreaching. 
Beginning in the late 1970s, however, antitrust law went through a lengthy and 
still ongoing process of court-imposed discipline that has brought its rules 
more closely into alignment with its stated concern, which is increasing 
consumer welfare by promoting competition. Today, antitrust cases are far 
more difficult to win, the per se rule is less frequently used, and we have 
                                                                                                                     
Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1576–78 (2003); Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, 
Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J. ECON. 106, 106–07 (1990); Robert P. 
Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. 
REV. 839, 840 (1990). Important earlier literature includes WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, 
INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL 
CHANGE (1969); F. M. Scherer, Nordhaus’ Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric 
Reinterpretation, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 422 (1972). 
 33 See 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2012). 
 34 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
 35 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)–(5) (2012). 
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considerably heightened the requirements of allegation and economic proof.36 
By contrast, patent law has continued on an expansion course that is only now 
showing some signs of abating. Patent law still awaits the consumer welfare 
revolution that to a large extent has already occurred in antitrust doctrine. 
Writing in the mid-sixties, Ward S. Bowman and Robert H. Bork warned of a 
“crisis in antitrust,” presaging the significant reform that was to follow.37 
Today we are facing a similar crisis in patent law. 
This Article first examines antitrust and patent law as regulatory 
institutions with legislative authority to manage their given areas, but subject 
to limitations that all regulatory institutions face—namely, high cost, 
imperfect information, and special interest capture. One failed approach to this 
regulatory enterprise was the view that the patentee acts improperly when it 
engages in activity “beyond the scope” of the patent. The flip side is that 
activity that is not “beyond the scope” is permissible.38 A more sensible way 
to view the interaction between the patent and antitrust regulatory systems is to 
divide patent activity into two parts: pre-issuance and post-issuance conduct. 
Secondly, one must look for explicit statutory authorization of the conduct in 
question. Post-issuance conduct that is not statutorily authorized is generally 
amenable to antitrust scrutiny.39 Next, we examine the antitrust and patent 
systems as regulatory institutions, finding that today the presence of special 
interest capture is far stronger in the patent system than the antitrust system, 
although that may not always have been the case.40 
After that, we turn to the very different ways that antitrust and the patent 
system approach economic policy and innovation. The antitrust system is 
empirical, market based, and acutely sensitive to the differences that exist 
among markets. In sharp contrast, the patent system is dominated by a much 
more myopic set of queries concerned with the boundaries of individual 
property rights and largely indifferent to market performance and diversity. If 
one thinks of the antitrust system and the patent system as tools for promoting 
economic growth and consumer welfare, antitrust has distinct institutional 
advantages.41 
                                                                                                                     
 36 See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 33–59; infra notes 291–94 and 
accompanying text. The specific antitrust doctrines that gave effect to these changes are 
discussed in 2 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶¶ 306–309 (discussing jury trial, 
complaint and summary judgment, and expert testimony); 2A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, 
supra note 9, ¶¶ 335–338 (discussing plaintiff standing, causation, and antitrust injury). 
 37 Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, FORTUNE, Dec. 
1963, at 138, reprinted in 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 363–66 (1965). 
 38 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason and the Scope of the Patent, 52 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 1); see also infra notes 45–66 and 
accompanying text. 
 39 See infra notes 67–82 and accompanying text. 
 40 See infra notes 83–116 and accompanying text. 
 41 See infra notes 135–63 and accompanying text. 
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Finally, we develop a set of rules for evaluating specific disputes that 
implicate both antitrust and the patent system, focusing mainly on the 
difference between pre-issuance patent conduct, which is intensely regulated, 
and post-issuance conduct, as well as the differences between practices that are 
expressly authorized by the Patent Act and those that are not. Given the level 
of producer capture exhibited by the Patent Act, the search for express 
authorization is particularly important. A regulatory statute must be followed, 
even when it bargains away the public interest, but silence and ambiguity 
should be construed against the interests in control of the legislative process. 
These principles are applied to a number of practices, including price fixing in 
patent licenses, vertical practices, pay-for-delay settlements and other naked 
market division agreements, and improper patent enforcement actions.42 
II. ANTITRUST AND PATENT LAW AS REGULATORS 
Both the antitrust and patent systems are regulatory institutions, calling for 
government intervention in market trading. Antitrust law’s principal purpose is 
to correct market failures brought about by lack of competition or to discipline 
activities that seek to limit it. The patent system is intended to correct market 
failures that result when inventors cannot effectively appropriate the returns to 
their inventions. 
Stating the concerns in this way exaggerates their separateness, however. 
The market failures that result from harm to competition frequently include 
loss of inventiveness or technical progress, and the patent system ideally 
accomplishes its goals by metering a tradeoff between exclusion and access. 
The latter requires competitiveness and the free mobility of assets. The result 
is a complex set of rules that reflect the relationship between these two 
systems, with one frequently required to accommodate the other.43 
Nonetheless, a “tradeoff” is necessary only if there is something to trade 
off. For much of our history the courts have applied aggressive antitrust rules 
to patent practices when the antitrust rules themselves did nothing to further 
competition. For example, we do not need to “trade off” the competitive harm 
from patent tying arrangements with patent law in the vast majority of cases. 
The tie does no competitive harm to begin with. By the same token, however, 
there is nothing to trade off when the patent rule in question causes 
competitive harm but does nothing to further innovation. In this sense, the 
“crisis” of patent law overreaching today resembles the antitrust crisis of the 
1960s and 1970s.44 For example, in the Trebro Manufacturing, Inc. v. Firefly 
                                                                                                                     
 42 See infra notes 164–97 and accompanying text. 
 43 These rules are expressed in multi-volume treatises such as 1 HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED 
TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2d ed. 2010 & Supp. 2014). 
 44 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 
(1978); Bork & Bowman, Jr., supra note 37, at 363–64; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, 
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Equipment, LLC decision, discussed below, the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit traded off a considerable loss of market competitiveness for a 
remedy that did absolutely nothing to further innovation.45 
The most important development in patent/antitrust law in the last three 
decades is that antitrust has become narrower and much more rigorous about 
its mission to protect competition.46 At the same time, however, patent 
granting and interpretation have increasingly reflected producer capture and 
overbreadth. In addition, antitrust policy has become increasingly empirical, 
assessing practices by modeling impact on price, output, or other indicia of 
consumer welfare. In sharp contrast, patent law as applied in the courts has 
very little empirical economic content. 
A. “Beyond the Scope” 
One of the more unhelpful patent/competition rules is that a patent practice 
should be evaluated by querying whether it reaches “beyond the scope” of the 
patent grant. The formulation perpetuates the idea of the patent as a walled 
garden whose insides are largely free of scrutiny, while everything outside is 
challengeable. As noted above, Ward Bowman advocated “beyond the scope” 
as a way of demarcating the line between patents and antitrust.47 
The “beyond the scope” formulation actually originated before the 
antitrust laws were passed, in nineteenth century cases involving patent term 
extensions applied retroactively to goods that had already been purchased.48 It 
was later used to justify the judge-made first sale doctrine against patentees 
who attempted to enforce patents rights in goods that they had already sold.49 
For example, in Adams v. Burke, Justice Bradley described such post-sale 
restraints as attempts to assert rights that are “no longer within the limits of the 
monopoly.”50 After that, the formulation was used to refer to unreasonably 
broad construction of patent claims.51 In the twentieth century it was extended 
                                                                                                                     
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 31 (1976) (analyzing the “crisis” in a less 
rhetorical but equally critical way). 
 45 Trebro Mfg., Inc. v. Firefly Equip., LLC, 748 F.3d 1159, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see 
infra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 46 See generally BORK, supra note 44; HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST 
ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION (2005). 
 47 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 48 The first use of the concept was in Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 
549 (1852). See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Inventing the Classical Constitution 57 (Univ. 
Iowa Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 14-20, 2015), available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2486612, archived at http://perma.cc/S83V-QN27. 
 49 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First 
Sale Doctrine in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 487, 487 (2011). 
 50 Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 460 (1873). 
 51 See, e.g., Coupe v. Royer, 155 U.S. 565, 576 (1895) (noting that overly broad 
interpretation served to “enlarge a patent beyond the scope of its claim, as allowed by the 
Patent Office”). 
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to cover patent practices such as cross-licenses and ties. For example in 
condemning a product price fix in a licensing agreement in 1948, Justice 
Burton noted that if the terms of the license “reach beyond the scope of the 
statutory patent rights, then they must be tested by the terms of the Sherman 
Act.”52 
The “beyond the scope” idea was essentially that a patent is a type of 
monopoly defined by boundaries, identified by its written description and 
claims. Certain actions were thought to enlarge this monopoly by extending its 
power outside, or “beyond the scope,” of the patent grant. As Justice Douglas 
stated in the 1944 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co. decision, 
the law: 
denies to the patentee after issuance the power to use it in such a way as to 
acquire a monopoly which is not plainly within the terms of the grant. The 
necessities or convenience of the patentee do not justify any use of the 
monopoly of the patent to create another monopoly. The fact that the patentee 
has the power to refuse a license does not enable him to enlarge the 
monopoly of the patent by the expedient of attaching conditions to its use.53 
The “beyond the scope” formulation has led courts to two different ideas, 
both of which lack either conceptual or empirical support. One is that any 
patent practice that reaches “beyond the scope” of the patent is competitively 
harmful. The other is that a patent practice that does not reach “beyond the 
scope” of the patent is benign or untouchable. 
As a matter of competition policy, the “beyond the scope” formulation 
makes little sense. Antitrust is concerned with practices that are not authorized 
by other statutory provisions and realistically reduce output and raise price. 
Some contractual restrictions do this, while most do not, but the “beyond the 
scope” analysis adds nothing to that determination. This is why the dissenters 
in FTC v. Actavis, Inc. were wrong to conclude that a naked market division 
agreement should be regarded as lawful because it did not stretch “beyond the 
scope” of the patent.54 Naked market division, the practice at issue in Actavis, 
is not authorized by the Patent Act, whether or not the agreement goes beyond 
the scope of the patent. 
The Actavis decision suggests that the Supreme Court may be finished 
with the walled garden approach reflected in the “scope of the patent” test.55 
To be sure, that approach made some sense in the early 1970s when Bowman 
                                                                                                                     
 52 United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 353 (1948) (Burton, J., 
dissenting); see also Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 662 (1944) 
(involving patent tie affected through combination patent); United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 
80 F. Supp. 989, 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). 
 53 Mercoid, 320 U.S. at 665–66. 
 54 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2241 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Both 
Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court and the Chief Justice’s dissent also used the phrase 
“beyond the limits of the patent monopoly.” Id. at 2231 (majority opinion); id. at 2240 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).  
 55 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
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was writing. At that time, antitrust policy was unreasonably hostile toward a 
wide variety of conduct, particularly vertical practices that we regard today as 
economically harmless. The walled garden protected the patent from 
significant antitrust overreaching. But today the tables have turned, and the 
overreaching is going in the other direction. 
To be sure, as a matter of patent policy, “beyond the scope” inquiries are 
meaningful to the extent that patents grant what they grant and no more. As a 
result, nineteenth century courts rightly complained that overly broad claim 
constructions were judicial attempts to extend the patent beyond its granted 
scope.56 More recently, broad use of the doctrine of equivalents produced 
similar complaints.57 The same thing is true of attempts to enforce patents 
beyond their expiration date,58 or to enforce them against defendants who are 
clearly not infringers.59 These are all fundamentally questions of patent law, 
and the “scope” question concerns the location of a patent’s boundaries. The 
antitrust question necessarily reaches more broadly to concerns about impact 
on markets and the resulting effects on price, output, or innovation. As in the 
law of real property, the owner’s “scope” defines what he or she may do as a 
matter of property law, such as evicting trespassers, but it says virtually 
nothing about anticompetitive uses that are reachable under antitrust law. 
The “beyond the scope” formulation is a relic of a bygone approach to 
antitrust and regulation, in force at Bowman’s time, which regarded regulation 
as “ousting” antitrust from the regulated market altogether.60 Once an area was 
deemed to be pervasively regulated, antitrust law had no place. As a result, the 
scope of antitrust immunity was a set of boundaries largely defined by the 
scope of a regulator’s jurisdiction. Practices within that jurisdiction required 
oversight by the particular regulatory agency in charge, not by antitrust law. 
As Chief Justice Roberts put it in his Actavis dissent, “the scope of the 
patent—i.e., the rights conferred by the patent—forms the zone within which 
the patent holder may operate without facing antitrust liability.”61 
This approach also grew out of an era that was much more optimistic 
about regulation than we are today, regarding it as a complete substitute for 
competition law with respect to matters within its domain.62 After decades of 
                                                                                                                     
 56 See Coupe, 155 U.S. at 576. 
 57 See London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
(stating that patent law doctrine of equivalents should not be construed as “regularly 
available to extend protection beyond the scope of the [patent] claims”); see also Johnson 
& Johnston Assocs., Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 58 See Int’l Tech. Consultants, Inc. v. Pilkington PLC, 137 F.3d 1382, 1393 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
 59 Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 60 See Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 389 (1973); Pan 
Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 309–10 (1963); see also 1A 
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶¶ 244b‒244c. 
 61 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2238 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 62 See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 351 (1963) (discussing the 
holding of Pan Am., stating “that because the Civil Aeronautics Board had been given 
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exposure to ideas about regulatory capture, incompleteness, conflicts, and 
other imperfections in regulatory regimes, attitudes have changed. Today we 
look at competition issues in regulated markets much more critically and focus 
more narrowly on the issue at hand. Antitrust policy yields if the regulatory 
provision or the courts interpreting it have jurisdiction over a particular 
practice and have controlled it as “effective steward[s] of the antitrust 
function.”63 Private conduct that is not expressly authorized by the statute 
enjoys no such status, particularly if the agency itself has not asserted 
control.64 In particular, regulatory defenses to antitrust claims should not be 
taken seriously when activity that is not authorized by statute is also “neither 
compelled nor approved by any governmental, regulatory body.”65 As the 
Supreme Court observed: 
To be sure, where Congress did intend to repeal the antitrust laws, that intent 
governs, . . . but this intent must be clear. Even when an industry is regulated 
substantially, this does not necessarily evidence an intent to repeal the 
antitrust laws with respect to every action taken within the industry. . . . Intent 
to repeal the antitrust laws is much clearer when a regulatory agency has been 
empowered to authorize or require the type of conduct under antitrust 
challenge.66 
B. Regulation and Three Areas of Patentee Conduct 
As an alternative to “beyond the scope,” it is more useful to divide 
patentee conduct raising competition issues into three areas. The first is pre-
issuance conduct involving the patent application and prosecution process, all 
of which is under the intensive supervision of the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) and its examiners, as well as the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit, and occasionally the Supreme Court. The second area 
concerns post-issuance conduct that is expressly authorized by the Patent Act, 
or occasionally, some other federal statutory provision. The third concerns 
post-issuance conduct that is not authorized by the statute. 
1. Pre- vs. Post-Issuance Practices 
The regulatory approach just described suggests powerful differences 
between patentee activity that occurs prior to patent issuance and that which 
                                                                                                                     
broad powers to enforce the competitive standard clearly delineated by the Civil 
Aeronautics Act, and to immunize a variety of transactions from the operation of the 
antitrust laws, the Sherman Act could not be applied to facts composing the precise 
ingredients of a case subject to the Board’s broad regulatory and remedial powers”). 
 63 Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
413 (2004). 
 64 See 1A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶¶ 241, 243. 
 65 Nat’l Gerimedical Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378, 389 (1981).  
 66 Id. 
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occurs after. Prior to issuance, the patent process is subject to intensive public 
agency scrutiny—far more, in fact, than is the conduct of many private firms 
under regulatory oversight. Patent applications must be filed with the USPTO. 
During the patent prosecution process, the applicant may rewrite some 
portions of the proposed patent, add or subtract claims, or even divide complex 
patents into two or more. At every stage, however, the decision whether or not 
a patent will issue—and its final text—is given to a government official. To be 
sure, the USPTO might issue too many patents or permit overly broad or 
vague claims, but these are not matters of antitrust concern. It is not antitrust 
law’s purpose to police shortcomings in other regulatory agencies. 
One possible exception is the Walker Process doctrine, discussed below, 
which can make it unlawful under the antitrust laws to enforce a patent 
obtained by fraud or inequitable conduct during the patent prosecution 
process, provided that the enforcement action threatens to create or maintain a 
monopoly.67 The doctrine is applied very sparingly, however, and with good 
reason. Patent law contains its own provisions that discipline improper 
conduct in the patent prosecution process, ranging from invalidation to the 
award of attorney’s fees against patent infringement plaintiffs who abuse the 
process.68 Once again, the Federal Circuit may be too generous to patentees in 
this area.69 But that is not an antitrust problem. 
In any event, Walker Process is not about pre-issuance conduct as such. It 
is concerned with infringement actions, which occur post-issuance. The 
relevant question is whether the infringement plaintiff sued with an objectively 
reasonable expectation of success, measured from the time that the 
infringement lawsuit was filed.70 
Once a patent goes “out the door,” so to speak, the amount of USPTO 
supervision changes dramatically, from very high to almost non-existent. The 
USPTO does have jurisdiction for re-examination, payment of maintenance 
fees, and a few housekeeping matters. By and large, however, an issued patent 
is completely in the control of its owner, subject to express limitations in the 
Patent Act. It is treated for antitrust purposes much as any business asset. No 
one supervises licensing and transfer practices, although there is a passive 
recordation requirement for assignments, protecting bona fide purchasers 
without notice.71 Licensing decisions, patent ties, exclusive dealing 
                                                                                                                     
 67 Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 
(1965); Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 
1998); see also 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶ 706. 
 68 See 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶ 705a. But see infra text 
accompanying notes 411–13 (suggesting that these tools are inadequate). 
 69 See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1758 
(2014) (rejecting very strict Federal Circuit standard for assessing allegedly improper 
enforcement conduct by a patent infringement plaintiff). 
 70 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶¶ 706a, 706b. 
 71 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012) (making assignments void against subsequent bona fide 
purchasers (BFPs) without notice unless recorded within three months of transfer). 
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agreements, mergers, pricing of both licenses and products, and exclusionary 
practices are all within the patent owner’s control with no regulatory oversight. 
2. Authorized vs. Unauthorized Post-Issuance Practices 
Explicit statutory authorizations are immune from antitrust scrutiny even if 
there is not regulatory supervision. Many provisions of this kind do not require 
much supervision in any event. For example, once federal law requires new 
cars to be equipped with seat belts, it cannot be an unlawful antitrust tying 
arrangement for a car manufacturer to refuse to sell an automobile without 
them.72 In such cases the specific authorization in a federal statute controls the 
more general terms of the antitrust laws. 
Just as any regulatory provision, the Patent Act removes certain activities 
from antitrust scrutiny. For example, once the Patent Act authorizes a patent 
for a given term, exclusion by patent enforcement during that term cannot be 
unlawful under the antitrust laws.73 The same thing is true of other practices 
that the statute authorizes, including exclusive and nonexclusive production 
licenses,74 ties in the absence of market power,75 simple refusals to license,76 
and patent assignments.77 
On the other hand, the Patent Act does not authorize product price fixing, 
market divisions unrelated to production licenses, predatory pricing in 
patented goods, anticompetitive acquisitions,78 resale price maintenance of 
patented goods, ties in the presence of market power, exclusive dealing, or 
infringement suits based on patents that the owner knows or should know are 
invalid or unenforceable under the circumstances. The Patent Act expressly 
permits unilateral refusals to license, but does not say anything about 
concerted refusals to licenses—although the Federal Circuit suggested to the 
contrary in its Princo Corp. v. International Trade Commission decision.79 
Nor does it have anything to say about practices that have been compared to 
tying, including package licensing, royalties attached to unpatented goods 
produced with a patented process, or agreements requiring the making of 
royalty-like payments that extend past the patent’s term.80 It nowhere 
                                                                                                                     
 72 49 U.S.C. § 30127 (2012); see also 1A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, 
¶¶ 242a, 243b(2). 
 73 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3) (2012). 
 74 35 U.S.C. §§ 261, 271(d)(2) (2012). 
 75 Id. § 271(d)(5).  
 76 Id. § 271(d)(4). 
 77 Id. § 261. 
 78 See 5 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶ 1202f . 
 79 Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en 
banc); see also Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, Concerted Refusals to License 
Intellectual Property Rights, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 21, 21–23 (2011). 
 80 See infra notes 393–400 and accompanying text. 
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authorizes payments to others to cease production in ways that would infringe 
the patent, assuming that it is valid.81 
Importantly, most of the practices in this list are not antitrust violations 
either. Indeed, far fewer practices are regarded as antitrust violations today 
than were so regarded in 1970, when the Justice Department’s list of “nine no 
nos” was issued.82 The significance of the list is that these are practices that 
can be made subject to antitrust scrutiny and condemned if a suitable threat to 
competition is established under ordinary antitrust rules. 
C. Consumer Welfare and Intellectual Property Law 
The change in attitudes about the relationship between antitrust and 
regulation was heavily driven by concerns about regulatory capture, 
particularly by producer interests. As noted previously, the idea that regulation 
should “oust” antitrust was driven by an optimistic public interest attitude 
toward regulation that subsequently came under intense scrutiny.83 An age that 
is more skeptical about regulation naturally looks with beadier eyes. Rather 
than seeing regulatory legislation as serving the public interest, we are more 
likely to view it as a response to the political pressures of organized interest 
groups, or as a set of “deals” made with the legislature. Interest groups that are 
better organized, more homogenous, and have larger individual stakes invest 
much more than large, diffuse groups whose individual stakes are small. In 
this process, consumers often come out as losers because their interests are 
diverse and individually quite small, even though there are millions of them.84 
The most effective ways to limit the effects of capture are, first, to confine 
regulatory intervention to situations where it is absolutely necessary. This 
principle applies to both antitrust law and patent issuance and enforcement. 
Second, government decision makers need to be more transparent when they 
                                                                                                                     
 81 See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013); see also infra notes 393–
400 and accompanying text. 
 82 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 83 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 307–14. 
 84 See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A 
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III (2003); 
RICHARD TUCK, FREE RIDING (2008). The economic arguments for capture theory were 
developed in Mancur Olson’s classic work. See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); see also Sam 
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 213 (1976); 
Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 
335 (1974); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & 
MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971). See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding 
Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010). For a historical 
perspective, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 308–14; Richard A. Posner, The Concept of 
Regulatory Capture: A Short, Inglorious History, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: 
SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 49, 49‒56 (Daniel Carpenter & David 
A. Moss eds., 2013). 
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remove practices from competitive constraints. Explicit legislation that is 
otherwise valid cannot be overturned simply because it is a product of capture, 
but the courts need not go beyond the statutory text and give private firms 
greater anticompetitive power than they were able to bargain for in the 
legislative process.85 
The intellectual property laws, but particularly copyright and patent, are 
among the most captured regimes in the American legal system today.86 By 
and large, Congress has listened to producers while paying little attention to 
the voices of consumers. One consequence of this is that patent law has not 
developed any equivalent to the “consumer welfare” prescription that has 
become so central to antitrust analysis. Even the dissenting Justices in the 
Actavis decision recognized the centrality of consumer welfare as an antitrust 
goal.87 
The structural problems of capture in the patent system go much further, 
however. Patent prosecution remains a largely ex parte process in which patent 
examiners and other USPTO officials listen to patent applicants first and 
foremost. While there is some limited room for opposition, most of it occurs 
from other affected producers.88 One consequence of ineffectual opposition is 
that fields become very crowded with patents whose technological 
contributions are minimal or nonexistent. Nevertheless, the cost of challenging 
or avoiding them is very high. As a result, they can deter competitive entry and 
innovation even if they do little to promote long run technical progress.89 Just 
                                                                                                                     
 85 See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term—Foreword: The Court 
and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4–5 (1984); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 534 (1983). 
 86 See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 1‒28 (2008); BOHANNAN & 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 60–160; DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT 
CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 3‒6 (2009); see also Stuart Minor Benjamin & 
Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 
17–26 (2008) (discussing special interest capture of the Federal Circuit); Christina 
Bohannan, Reclaiming Copyright, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 567, 590–603 (2006); 
Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900–
2000, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2187, 2236 (2000); Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights 
and the New Institutional Economics, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1857, 1875 (2000); Andrew P. 
Morriss & Craig Allen Nard, Institutional Choice & Interest Groups in the Development of 
American Patent Law: 1790–1865, 19 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 143, 144‒49 (2011); Liza 
Vertinsky, Comparing Alternative Institutional Paths to Patent Reform, 61 ALA. L. REV. 
501, 526 (2010). 
 87 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2238 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The 
point of antitrust law is to encourage competitive markets to promote consumer welfare.”). 
 88 See Michael A. Carrier, Post-Grant Opposition: A Proposal and a Comparison to 
the America Invents Act, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 103, 105–06 (2011); see also Bronwyn H. 
Hall et al., Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent Quality via Postgrant Opposition, in 4 
INNOVATION POLICY & THE ECONOMY 4, 115–17 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2004). 
 89 See Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J.L. & ECON. 463, 
463–66 (1995). 
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as the availability of patenting may affect the course of invention,90 so too the 
existence of heavily patented environments may serve to direct innovation 
away from these environments, at least on the part of new firms. In 
environments heavy in patent infringement suits filed by patent aggregators, 
incumbent firms often slow down or even stop innovating activity.91 In such 
cases there is no innovation–competition “tradeoff” because there is no 
innovation to trade off. 
The history of interest group theory and intellectual property policy has 
been somewhat under researched. Public choice writers attacked government 
regulatory policy concerning the railroads, food and drugs, the environment, 
corporate securities and banking, or other areas with great enthusiasm. By 
contrast, intellectual property regulation traditionally enjoyed a privileged 
position—as if it were somehow exempt from the same processes of special 
interest capture that are at work in other regulatory areas. That is starting to 
change.92 
                                                                                                                     
 90 See infra notes 191–94 and accompanying text. 
 91 See, e.g., Lauren Cohen et al., Patent Trolls: Evidence from Targeted Firms 6–7 
(Harvard Bus. Sch. Fin., Working Paper No. 15-002, 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2464303, archived at http://perma.cc 
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al., The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. 
Research Paper No. 11-45, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=1930272, archived at http://perma.cc/87BL-YUS5. 
 92 See, e.g., Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 
1747–48 (2011); Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law in the Administrative State, 42 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 127, 127–33 (2000); Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence 
in Patent Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1965, 1966 (2009); Craig Allen Nard, Deference, 
Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1415, 1417 (1995); Arti K. Rai, Engaging 
Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1035, 1036–41 (2003); Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: 
Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 2013–18 (2013); Melissa 
F. Wasserman, The PTO’s Asymmetric Incentives: Pressure to Expand Substantive Patent 
Law, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 379, 380–86 (2011). 
  Good historical work has been done on the political interest groups involved in 
making patent policy in the nineteenth and early twentieth century railroad industry. See 
STEVEN W. USSELMAN, REGULATING RAILROAD INNOVATION: BUSINESS, TECHNOLOGY, 
AND POLITICS IN AMERICA, 1840–1920, at 1‒14 (2002); Steven W. Usselman & Richard R. 
John, Patent Politics: Intellectual Property, the Railroad Industry, and the Problem of 
Monopoly, 18 J. POL’Y HIST. 96, 97–99 (2006); see also MARGARET SUSAN THOMPSON, 
THE “SPIDER WEB”: CONGRESS AND LOBBYING IN THE AGE OF GRANT 33‒69 (1985). There 
is also a growing body of scholarship on capture in the development of international IP law 
and TRIPS. See SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 1‒29 (2003); Margot E. Kaminski, The Capture of 
International Intellectual Property Law Through the U.S. Trade Regime, 87 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 977, 977–78 (2014). 
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Part of the explanation for this is historical. The PTO is not one of the 
great regulatory edifices of progressivism and the New Deal, such as the Food 
& Drug Administration, the Securities Exchange Commission, or the Glass-
Steagal Act. Rather, it has been around since the early national period. Further, 
it has historically been blessed with an aura of specialization and expertise that 
tended to emphasize the role of producers while minimizing the role of the 
courts. When the patent prosecution process did get into the courts it was 
mainly through infringement lawsuits filed after patents were issued and 
invalidity was raised as a defense. 
The absence of a consumer welfare prescription in patent law is 
troublesome. Consumer interests should be just as central to intellectual 
property law as they are to antitrust. Just as in antitrust, consumers have the 
correct set of incentives. They tend to profit from a well-functioning patent 
system, furthering innovation that expands output and increases quality and 
variety, while reducing costs. More generally, consumers profit from 
economic growth, and innovation is growth’s largest driver.93 Further, 
consumers tend to be injured by restrictive rules that facilitate exclusion or 
collusion without producing offsetting benefits in the form of increased 
incentives to innovate.94 
Over history, Congress has more-or-less consistently ratcheted up patent 
protection at the behest of producer groups. For example, in 1952 it responded 
to a series of Supreme Court rulings limiting patent coverage to acts of 
“genius” by redefining patentability in terms of merely “nonobvious” subject 
matter.95 That same year it limited the judge-made doctrine of patent misuse.96 
Then, in 1988, Congress amended the Act to provide further protection against 
patent misuse claims.97 These limitations on misuse served to limit the scope 
of antitrust liability while expanding the power of patents.98 
Even today, debates about patent reform and the proper response to the 
recent explosion of infringement lawsuits tend to be waged among producers, 
with consumer interests on the sidelines. In areas such as pharmaceutical 
patents on primary ingredients the patent system works relatively well and 
most participants oppose significant change. By contrast, firms operating in 
information technologies want reform. This has little to do with consumer 
                                                                                                                     
 93 See infra notes 158–63 and accompanying text. 
 94 See Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Consumer Welfare in Competition and Intellectual 
Property Law, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Autumn 2013, at 53, 53‒55 (developing this 
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 95 Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended 
at 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012)). On the 1952 Patent Act, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 
184–205; John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. 
L. REV. 1, 33–43 (2007). 
 96 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2012). 
 97 See id. § 271(d)(4)–(5) (expanding the list of practices not to be regarded as 
misuse). 
 98 See, e.g., Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 40–43 (2006) 
(applying the misuse rule on patent ties to antitrust law).  
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interests as such, however. Rather, the patent system as we currently have it 
has become a deadweight loss on firms operating in markets for information 
technologies, often yielding private costs that far exceed benefits.99 When 
consumer interests are recognized in the judicial process, it is in antitrust 
cases, not patent cases.100 
This history of producer capture makes statutory silence all the more 
important in areas where competition policy is concerned. A prime example is 
pay-for-delay settlements in the pharmaceutical industry, which were the 
subject of the Supreme Court’s Actavis decision.101 While the Patent Act 
authorizes production licenses, it says nothing about naked payments to keep a 
rival out of the market. As a matter of competition policy, the case against 
large pay-for-delay settlements is overwhelming. Indeed, any equilibrium pay-
for-delay settlement is highly likely to harm consumer welfare.102 What many 
of these settlements do is create small duopoly cartels between a pioneer drug 
manufacture and an agreeing generic that effectively shields the patent from 
outside challenge, no matter how weak it is.103 This is why the Supreme Court 
acted correctly when it held that such agreements could be condemned without 
necessarily inquiring into questions about patent validity or infringement. 
Significantly, however, Actavis is entirely a matter of statutory interpretation. 
As a consistent history of Patent Act capture shows, if Congress wishes, it can 
always amend the Patent Act to permit such settlements. 
An important regulatory principal about statutory construction is at work 
here. Courts are obliged to apply explicit statutory mandates even if they are a 
consequence of capture. But when capture is a realistic threat and harm is 
                                                                                                                     
 99 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 86, at 14–16, 95–119. On the divergent interests 
of producer groups, see PhRMA Commends House of Representatives, PHRMA (Dec. 5, 
2013), http://www.phrma.org/phrma-statement-house-passage-of-innovation-act, archived 
at http://perma.cc/DW9N-K7H5 (discussing pharmaceutical industry trade group opposing 
passage of the Innovation Act); CEA Welcomes Passage of the Innovation Act, CEA (Dec. 
5, 2013), http://www.ce.org/News/News-Releases/Press-Releases/2013-Press-Releases 
/CEA-Welcomes-Passage-of-the-Innovation-Act.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/J4GB-
B4QP (discussing electronics industry trade group supporting passage of the Innovation 
Act). But see David Orozco & James G. Conley, Friends of the Court: Using Amicus Briefs 
to Identify Corporate Advocacy Positions in Supreme Court Patent Litigation, 2011 U. ILL. 
J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 107, 125–26 (noting that most large firms support weaker patent 
rights). 
 100 See, e.g., In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 695 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (granting antitrust standing to consumers to challenge pay-for-delay settlement); 
see also Ritz Camera & Image, LLC v. SanDisk Corp., 700 F.3d 503, 508 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(resembling Walker Process). 
 101 See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227, 2238 (2013). See infra notes 117–
34 and accompanying text. 
 102 See infra notes 243–45 and accompanying text; see also Aaron Edlin et al., Actavis 
and Error Costs: A Reply to Critics, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2014, at 1, 7‒8, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2448530, archived at http://perma.cc 
/H28X-ZNYB. 
 103 See infra notes 121–23. 
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apparent, statutes that are silent on the issue or ambiguous should be construed 
against the special interest group that controls the process. Bad rules that run 
contrary to this group’s interests are likely to be changed. On the other hand, a 
bad decision that favors the interest group in charge is unlikely ever to be 
changed because those on the other side lack the political organization.104 
D. Antitrust Capture: The Government as Buyer 
Antitrust is hardly immune from capture, but there are important 
differences that serve to limit the role of capture in antitrust adjudication. One 
is the spare and highly general language of most of the statutory provisions. 
The Sherman Act speaks very simply of practices that “restrain trade” or 
“monopolize.”105 The Clayton Act is a little more specific, condemning tying, 
exclusive dealing, and mergers “where the effect . . . maybe substantially to 
lessen competition,” but saying very little more.106 The Robinson-Patman Act, 
passed during the Great Depression as a lengthy amendment to Section 2 of 
the Clayton Act, is an important exception, intended to protect mainly small 
family run grocery stores at the expense of larger more efficient sellers and the 
public.107 But widespread recognition of its special interest nature has led to 
suppression of its use, by both the Antitrust Division108 and the Supreme 
Court.109 The balance of the antitrust laws states a very general concern with 
competition and places the onus for interpretation on judges. Federal judges 
certainly have ideologies or preconceptions, but they are not actively lobbied, 
their ex parte contacts in a particular case are severely limited, and they have 
lifetime tenure, which shields them from the most overt political processes. 
The federal enforcement agencies are certainly more political, but one 
thing that distinguishes them from most other government agencies is their 
highly general, multi-sector mandate. Antitrust applies to all commercial 
activity affecting interstate commerce that has not been exempted. Further, the 
legal principles, such as market definition or assessment of power, apply 
                                                                                                                     
 104 For particular application to copyright law, see Bohannan, supra note 86, at 571–
72. More generally, see EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET 
UNCLEAR LEGISLATION 1‒22 (2008). 
 105 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2012). 
 106 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18 (2012). 
 107 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2012). On the legislative history and statutory intent, see 14 
HOVENKAMP supra note 21, ¶¶ 2302, 2331, 2333. 
 108 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 251‒59 (1977) 
(announcing Antitrust Division’s intent to no longer enforce the statute); see also H.R. REP. 
NO. 91-1617, at 34–35 (1970). 
 109 See, e.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 83 n.16 (1979) (noting the 
need to interpret the Robinson-Patman Act so as to minimize inconsistency with the 
Sherman Act). 
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across the full range. As a result, the idea that any particular industry can 
capture an antitrust agency is doubtful.110 
To be sure, there may be offsetting considerations. For example, the 
government is a market participant as well as an enforcer. It is a very large 
purchaser of military equipment and supplies, office equipment, vehicles and 
fuel, and pharmaceutical drugs, particularly through federally administered 
health care programs. One interesting question is whether a somewhat 
different type of capture occurs. Perhaps the government’s role as a market 
participant biases its decision making when acting as an enforcer. 
Historically, the empirical case for such distortion seems weak. For 
example, the government has always been a very large purchaser of leather 
shoes, principally for the military, but that did not stop it from using antitrust 
law in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States to protect higher-cost, smaller firms by 
restricting the efficiencies that a larger but by no means monopolistic firm 
could obtain from a merger.111 The government also frequently opposed 
vertical integration in industries in which it purchased products, even though 
the consequence was almost certainly higher prices in the markets in 
question,112 and it challenged monopolization in the aluminum industry on the 
theory that Alcoa continuously expanded its capacity in anticipation of greater 
market demand, a price and cost reducing strategy.113 Indeed, the government 
                                                                                                                     
 110 See Jonathan B. Baker, Sector-Specific Competition Enforcement at the FCC, 66 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 413, 415 & n.13 (2011); Simon J. Evenett, Competition 
Advocacy: Time for a Rethink?, 26 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 495, 498 (2006); Michel Kerf & 
Damien Geradin, Controlling Market Power in Telecommunications: Antitrust vs. Sector-
Specific Regulation—An Assessment of the United States, New Zealand and Australian 
Experiences, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 919, 931 (1999); see also STUART M. CHEMTOB, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ROLE OF COMPETITION AGENCIES IN REGULATED SECTORS 3‒7 
(2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/225219.htm, archived at 
http://perma.cc/SC3M-BVGB. 
 111 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962). For further 
information, see the district court’s opinion at 179 F. Supp. 721, 738 (E.D. Mo. 1959) 
(citing the post-merger firm’s lower costs as a reason for condemning the merger); see also 
Brief for the United States at 48, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1961) 
(No. 4) (arguing that the merger would permit the post-merger firm to “sell its own product 
at a significantly lower price than the nonintegrated independent retailer can obtain for a 
comparable product . . . . The conclusion was inevitable that the advantages the merged 
company would have over its smaller retailing competitors would be so great as to threaten 
to become decisive.”). 
 112 See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 442–43 (1920); United 
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 608–11, 640–41 (1957) 
(challenging DuPont’s partial stock acquisition of GM on the theory that GM would be 
able to obtain preferred treatment in du Pont provided automobile finishes and fabrics); see 
also United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 27–28 (1920) (condemning exclusive 
dealing under Sherman Act); United States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324, 373 (1912) 
(condemning an acquisition). 
 113 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 437–38 (2d Cir. 
1945). 
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obtained a decree that forbade Alcoa from bidding on aluminum plants that the 
United States government sold after the war, certainly reducing the amount of 
revenue that the government obtained.114 For a half-century, the antitrust 
enforcement agencies, particularly the Federal Trade Commission, engaged in 
relentless attempts to condemn efficient price discrimination practices under 
the Robinson-Patman Act. The result was clearly to increase the price of 
several products for which the government was a very large purchaser—
including petroleum, foodstuffs, vehicles, gasoline, tires, automobile parts, and 
the like. In other cases they sought rules whose higher costs would apply to 
government purchasers, whether or not the specific items in that case were 
subject to government purchase.115 This record contrasts with the record of a 
sector-specific agency such as the United States Food & Drug Administration, 
where there is some evidence that the agency has responded to high purchase 
                                                                                                                     
 114 See Herbert Roback, Monopoly or Competition Through Surplus Plant Disposal? 
The Aluminum Case, 31 CORNELL L. Q. 302, 314–18 (1946). 
 115 See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 83 (1979) (seeking to condemn 
large chain store for bargaining for lower prices from suppliers); FTC v. Borden Co., 383 
U.S. 637, 641 n.4, 643 (1966) (seeking to require Borden to charge the same higher price 
to chain stores as to individually owned stores); FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 47 
(1948) (attacking Morton Salt’s system of quantity discounts); Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC, 
359 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1966) (pursuing promotional allowances in grocery retailing), rev’d 
on other grounds, 390 U.S. 341 (1968); United Biscuit Co. of Am. v. FTC, 350 F.2d 615 
(7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 926 (1966) (similar); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 
v. FTC, 101 F.2d 620 (6th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 557 (1939); Ark. Wholesale 
Grocers’ Ass’n v. FTC, 18 F.2d 866 (8th Cir. 1927) (condemning grocers’ association 
boycott of suppliers who sold to chain store retailers at the same price as they sold to the 
defendant wholesalers); United States v. S. Cal. Wholesale Grocers’ Ass’n, 7 F.2d 944 
(S.D. Cal. 1925) (similar, Justice Department lawsuit); Joseph A. Kaplan & Sons, Inc., 63 
F.T.C. 1308, 1347 (1963) (seeking condemnation of a promotional allowance); Tri-Valley 
Packing Ass’n v. FTC, 329 F.2d 694, 703 (9th Cir. 1964) (condemning discounting in 
market acknowledged to be “highly competitive”); Standard Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263 (1945), 
modified and aff’d, 173 F.2d 210, 217 (7th Cir. 1949) (stating that there should be liability 
if defendant “sells to a wholesaler it knows or ought to have known . . . is using or intends 
to use [the wholesaler’s] price advantage to undersell [the] prices made to . . . retailers”), 
rev’d on other grounds, 340 U.S. 231 (1951); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, CHAIN 
STORES: FINAL REPORT ON THE CHAIN-STORE INVESTIGATION, S. DOC. NO. 74-4, at 78 
(1935) (documenting extent to which chain stores undersold family owned grocers). On 
automobile parts, see Mid-South Distribs. v. FTC, 287 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1961); Am. 
Motor Specialties Co. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1960); Standard Motor Prods., Inc. v. 
FTC, 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1959); see also Purolator Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 874 
(7th Cir. 1965) (automobile air filters); Alhambra Motor Parts, 68 F.T.C. 1039 (1965) 
(automobile parts buyers’ cooperative). For other studies, see Advisory Opinion No. 147, 
72 F.T.C. 1050, 1050‒51 (1967) (stating that in delivered pricing system trucks should 
return empty rather than receiving a price allowance for agreeing to carry cargo and 
opining that “it is highly doubtful that the defense of cost justification . . . would be 
available”); Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351, 394 (1948) (rejecting 
the use of cost studies to justify discriminatory prices as cost justified), rev’d on other 
grounds, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951). 
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prices for pharmaceutical drugs by reducing standards for both pioneer drugs 
and generics.116 
In sum, while the government is in fact a very large market participant, 
there is no good empirical case to be made that this has affected antitrust 
policy in the non-sector-specific antitrust enforcement agencies. For much of 
the history of antitrust law, the government promoted antitrust rules that were 
either indifferent to cost savings or imposed higher costs on the very products 
that it purchased. 
When the government participates in markets subject to the antitrust laws 
it is typically as a consumer rather than producer. Given that “consumer 
welfare” is the articulated goal of the antitrust laws, the interests of the 
government as a consumer are presumably aligned with the interests of the 
government as an enforcer; it wants what makes consumers best off. 
Perhaps this is too simplistic. When the government purchases drugs its 
vision may in fact be myopic, overwhelmed by short run costs that come out 
of the current budget. This may lead it to discount the impact of long-term 
innovation, which might benefit consumers more, but over a longer period of 
time. For example, perhaps the federal government operates as a buyer in 
pharmaceutical markets to encourage generic drug use, and this pro-generic 
bias spills into its antitrust enforcement policy as well. As a result, the tradeoff 
between immediate low prices and long run investment is negative. 
In any event, in order to make this determination we would first have to 
conclude that there is something to trade off. For example, if there were any 
actual evidence that condemning pay-for-delay pharmaceutical settlements 
reduces consumer welfare by suppressing innovation, then the government 
might be obliged to balance. Based on present information, however, the 
evidence is quite overwhelming that condemning pay-for-delay settlements 
increases consumer welfare greatly in the short run by leading to lower drug 
prices and more widespread use. The idea that condemning such settlements 
impairs the ex ante incentive to innovate and that the social costs of this 
impairment exceed the benefits of increased access has no empirical support. 
                                                                                                                     
 116 See James T. O’Reilly, Losing Deference in the FDA’s Second Century: Judicial 
Review, Politics, and a Diminished Legacy of Expertise, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 939, 956–
960 (2008); see also Donald W. Light et al., Institutional Corruption of Pharmaceuticals 
and the Myth of Safe and Effective Drugs, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 590, 592 (2013). Other 
evidence, mainly from an earlier period, suggests just the contrary—namely that FDA 
officials were overly cautious in approving new drugs because they were so concerned 
about highly publicized drug failures. See HENRY G. GRABOWSKI & JOHN M. VERNON, THE 
REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS: BALANCING THE BENEFITS AND RISKS 7 (1983). 
O’Reilly believes the change occurred during the administration of George W. Bush. See 
O’Reilly, supra, at 940. 
2015] ANTITRUST AND THE PATENT SYSTEM 491 
 
III. PATENT REGULATION AND THE ACTAVIS DECISION 
The Hatch-Waxman Act and Supreme Court’s Actavis decision, discussed 
in more detail later, illustrate these regulatory principles.117 “Pay-for-delay” 
settlements, in which a patentee pays an infringement defendant a large sum to 
stay out of the patentee’s market, appear to be a unique feature of the Hatch-
Waxman grant of secondary exclusivity to the first generic firm to challenge a 
pioneer’s patent.118 A congressional overruling of Actavis, should that occur, 
need not even take the form of a general Patent Act amendment. It could be an 
amendment to Hatch-Waxman itself, applying only to situations that the 
provision covers. In the case of pharmaceuticals, there is a strong history of 
producer control over the drug creation and approval system. Patentees in 
other markets need not worry. 
Briefly, the Hatch-Waxman Act provisions at issue in Actavis were 
designed to facilitate the entry of generic drug manufacturers into a market 
when a pioneer branded drug entered the public domain because its patents 
had either expired or been invalidated. Generic entry is more likely to occur if 
someone is rewarded for taking the first entry risk. One problem with generic 
entry is that often if everyone can enter, no one will. Bioequivalent generics 
are chemically identical, making them largely fungible with one another. As a 
result competition among generics drives prices to the competitive level, 
making immediate entry by multiple firms unpromising. The compromise 
position envisioned by the statute is to permit a single generic to enter first, 
with its own 180-day period of “shared” exclusivity with the original branded 
manufacturer.119 Such entry typically produces lower prices quickly. After the 
first generic is produced for six months, other generics can enter the market, 
driving prices down to as little as 20% of pre-generic-entry prices.120  
Congress did not foresee the possibilities of abuse that have emerged. The 
right of generic exclusivity vis-a-vis everyone except the pioneer creates a 
                                                                                                                     
 117 FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227‒29 (2013). 
 118 The majority and dissenters in Actavis debated this proposition, but the majority 
was clearly correct on the facts. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Patent 
Settlements and the Supreme Court’s Actavis Decision, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 3, 15–
16 (2014). 
 119 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2012). The Supreme Court described the process 
briefly in Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228–29. See 12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, ¶ 2046c; C. 
Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug Incentives and the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 952 (2011); Hovenkamp, supra note 118, at 
8–10. 
 120 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND 
ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS: GENERIC PHARMACEUTICALS 4 (2014), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/us-submissions-oecd-other-international-comp 
etition-fora/generics_us_oecd.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/92PV-GJYQ (updating 
statistics on pharmaceutical pricing in the wake of generic entry); see also Steven Tenn & 
Brett W. Wendling, Entry Threats and Pricing in the Generic Drug Industry, 96 REV. 
ECON. & STAT. 214, 219‒27 (2014) (comparing based on market size). 
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duopoly with absolute legal protection from challenge or new entry until 180 
days after the generic begins producing, no matter how weak the pioneer’s 
patent. If there is any doubt about a question of patent validity or infringement, 
the joint maximizing solution for the pioneer and the first entrant is to divide 
the maximum profits available under this duopoly. The price and output 
determined by a well-functioning cartel is identical to the price and output that 
a monopolist would determine.121 Under the pay-for-delay settlement, the 180-
day clock does not run because the generic is not producing anything. The 
more likely that the patent will not withstand judicial scrutiny, the greater 
amount the pioneer will be willing to pay for this agreement. By contrast, if no 
payment for delay is permitted, as the Hatch-Waxman legislation 
contemplated, then the parties will bargain for an earlier entry date, thus 
benefitting consumers more.122 
                                                                                                                     
 121 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 4.1‒.2 (4th ed. 2011). 
 122 The amount that the pioneer is willing to pay is typically many times more than the 
amount that the generic is willing to accept as an inducement to stay out of the market. 
This makes settlements highly likely to occur, whether or not payments for delay are 
permitted. See Ruben Jacobo-Rubio et al., Generic Entry, Pay-for-Delay Settlements, and 
the Distribution of Surplus in the US Pharmaceutical Industry 3 (Oct. 7, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=2481908, archived at http://perma.cc/L2KV-87TP (measuring high value of pay-for-delay 
settlements). One important finding is that pioneer drug makers value entry deterrence by 
roughly $4.6 billion, while generics value the right to enter at about $236.8 million. Id. 
This provides enormous bargaining room for an exclusion payment once the parties have 
come fairly close to an understanding about patent value. See id. at 4; see also Bruce H. 
Kobayashi et al., Actavis and Multiple ANDA Entrants: Beyond the Temporary Duopoly 3 
(George Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 14-62, 2014), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2508094, archived at 
http://perma.cc/65PX-PVGD. The authors note that if a patent is found invalid a duopoly 
exists only for the 180 days of generic exclusivity; after that other generics can enter. Id. at 
3‒4. This makes a pre-judgment settlement even more valuable for the pioneer, because 
anticipated losses from generic competition will be higher than the settlement cost. Id. at 4. 
The authors conclude, oddly, that this indicates a fuller inquiry into patent validity. Id. at 
14‒15. But their model indicates precisely the opposite. It suggests that the likelihood of a 
settlement without the need of a reverse payment is even higher. Further, generic entry will 
occur earlier if no payment is made. All things being equal, a settlement without a 
payment-for-delay is always better from consumers’ perspective than a settlement with 
one. At the same time, the model also indicates that even when no payment is made, a 
settlement can harm consumers. For example, a risk-averse generic will bargain for 
delayed but permitted entry rather than face the likelihood that the patent will be declared 
valid and infringed and they will not be able to enter at all prior to patent expiration; or that 
it will be declared invalid, and they will have only 180 days of exclusive production in 
competition with the pioneer alone. The Kobayashi model thus suggests that the Supreme 
Court, if anything, was not sufficiently harsh. The welfare effects of a settlement with a 
large reverse payment are generally worse than a settlement without a reverse payment, but 
even some of those without a reverse payment harm consumers. 
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One important thing about pay-for-delay settlements is that they are 
favored by both the pioneer and the first generic. Dividing the monopoly 
proceeds is virtually always more profitable than competing, even within a 
duopoly. The only way that the two firms could hope to duplicate this return 
would be if they fixed prices after the generic started producing. But this 
would be unlawful collusion under the antitrust laws and even a criminal 
offense. 
In defense, settlement participants point out that if the patent is valid and 
infringed, the generic would lose its lawsuit anyway and the result would be 
the patentee’s continued sole production under the patent, or the monopoly 
result. The Actavis dissenters emphasized this point.123 As a result, a pay-for-
delay settlement on an absolutely valid patent would generate a result no 
worse than litigation would achieve, provided that the duration of the pay-for-
delay settlement is no longer than the remaining duration of the patent in 
question. This is where the “scope of the patent” issue arises, because the 
settlement agreements typically terminate prior to the expiration of the patent. 
If the “scope of the patent” rule that the Actavis dissenters favored were to 
become law—with scope measured by the remaining duration of the patent—
then the equilibrium pay-for-delay agreement would postpone generic entry 
right up to the patent’s expiration.124 The patent provides a monopoly stream 
that lasts for its duration, and the joint-maximizing position for the litigating 
parties would be to take full advantage of this stream. The only indeterminacy 
is the size of the payment, which would vary with the parties’ predictions of 
the outcome of the patent litigation. 
Pharmaceutical drug patents on pioneer molecules are very robust, and for 
these we would not ordinarily expect large pay-for-delay agreements. It is no 
coincidence that most pay-for-delay settlements involve secondary or 
“evergreened” patents on new dosages, new treatments, or new combinations 
of well-established drugs.125 Some may also involve what has come to be 
known as “product hopping,” which occurs when a pioneer switches support 
away from an older version of a drug in favor of a newer version.126 Product 
hopping has produced antitrust complaints of anticompetitive design 
                                                                                                                     
 123 See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238–39 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 124 See Hovenkamp, supra note 94, at 60. 
 125 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: 
AN FTC STUDY 16 (2002), available at www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/HN4X-TSXR (summarizing cases); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The 
Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 354 
(2007). 
 126 See Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The 
Missing Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009, 1030–36 (2010); Jessie 
Cheng, An Antitrust Analysis of Product Hopping in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 1471, 1472, 1787–88 (2008); M. Sean Royall et al., Antitrust Scrutiny of 
Pharmaceutical “Product Hopping,” 28 ANTITRUST 71, 71‒72 (2013). 
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changes.127 When generic entrants actually pursue patent infringement 
litigation to completion these patents end up being declared invalid or 
infringed more than 70% of the time.128 Prohibiting large pay-for-delay 
settlements will force patentees to litigate against generics or perhaps give 
them a production license. 
The debate between the Actavis majority and dissenters illustrates two 
different approaches to the competitive analysis of post-issuance patent 
practices. As a matter of antitrust law, a pay-for-delay settlement is a naked 
market division agreement. There is no joint production or distribution, or 
sharing of technology or information. The pioneer is simply paying the generic 
to stay out of the market for the term specified in the agreement. This 
distinguishes pay-for-delay settlements from most others. Further, while 
production licenses are expressly authorized by the Patent Act, and are a 
common way of settling patent infringement cases, naked exclusion payments 
are not authorized by either the Patent Act or the Hatch-Waxman Act. 
The Actavis dissenters believed such agreements were impervious to 
antitrust challenge so long as they fell within the patent’s scope. Of course, the 
agreement would not be within the patent’s scope if the patent were invalid or 
uninfringed, but historically the courts have not considered these issues when 
analyzing settlement agreements unless there were clear abuses. If the term of 
the agreement extended beyond the life of the patent, then it would exceed the 
patent’s scope whether or not the patent was valid or infringed. 
Over a long history the federal courts have followed a policy of 
encouraging settlements of patent infringement suits. They have been reluctant 
to dive into questions of validity or infringement simply when determining 
whether a settlement should be approved. The general assumption in these 
cases, however, is that there was true adversity between the parties, the 
patentee seeking to enforce its patent and the defendant seeking to avoid it or 
limit its costs. For example, the Supreme Court has concluded that an 
important test for a settlement was whether there were “legitimately 
conflicting” litigation claims.129 That is not the case in Hatch-Waxman pay-
                                                                                                                     
 127 See, e.g., In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride and Naloxone) Antitrust 
Litig., No. 13-MD-2445, 2014 WL 6792663, at *42 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2014) (sustaining 
antitrust complaint); see also New York v. Actavis, PLC, No. 14 Civ. 7473, 2014 WL 
7015198, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2014) (granting preliminary injunction). 
 128 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 125, at vi (demonstrating that generic applicants 
prevailed in seventy-three percent of the litigated infringement cases); see also C. Scott 
Hemphill & Bhaven Sampat, Drug Patents at the Supreme Court, 339 SCIENCE 1386, 1387 
(2013). For litigated patents generally, see John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical 
Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 194, 205–06 (1998) 
(finding general invalidity rates of litigated patents in the forty to fifty percent range). 
 129 Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931); see also Asahi 
Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 991–92 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (Posner, 
J.) (“Only if a patent settlement is a device for circumventing antitrust law is it vulnerable 
to an antitrust suit. Suppose a seller obtains a patent that it knows is almost certainly 
invalid (that is, almost certain not to survive a judicial challenge), sues its competitors, and 
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for-delay settlements where both the patentee and the generic are made better 
off by the settlement than by generic production. 
The Court’s strong preference for settlement has resulted in some clearly 
anticompetitive arrangements, such as the infringement settlement in Bement 
that included a provision fixing product prices.130 Actavis restates a point that 
the Supreme Court had previously embraced but inconsistently applied: patent 
settlements containing anticompetitive provisions that are not authorized by 
the Patent Act should receive closer scrutiny than provisions that are 
authorized.131 
By contrast, the majority took an approach that was more realistic about 
the regulatory process that governs the patent systems. First of all, while the 
Patent Act expressly authorizes production licenses it nowhere permits naked 
market division agreements that are not attached to simultaneous production, 
and neither does the Hatch-Waxman Act. In most patent infringement cases 
outside the Hatch-Waxman context the infringement defendant pays a license 
fee to the patentee for a license to produce under the patent. Significantly, such 
license agreements are expressly authorized by the Patent Act and are lawful 
whether or not they are the outcome of infringement litigation. 
While the Court required rule of reason treatment for Actavis-style pay-
for-delay settlements, this meant mainly that the burden of proving power and 
anticompetitive effects were on the plaintiff; however, both could be proven 
by truncated evidence. The Court observed that a large payment for delay 
could provide good evidence of market power,132 as well as anticompetitive 
effects.133 The Court did not alter the standard rule of reason approach that 
once the plaintiff has shown power and anticompetitive effects, then the 
burden shifts to the defendant to prove a defense.134 
                                                                                                                     
settles the suit by licensing them to use its patent in exchange for their agreeing not to sell 
the patented product for less than the price specified in the license. In such a case, the 
patent, the suit, and the settlement would be devices—masks—for fixing prices, in 
violation of antitrust law.”). 
 130 See Bement v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 94–95 (1902); see also infra notes 
260–62 and accompanying text. 
 131 See, e.g., United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 175 (1963) (disapproved 
settlement agreement involving pooling plus the exclusion of third parties); Hartford-
Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 435 (1945) (horizontal customer restrictions); 
United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 277 (1942) (similar); see also Palmer v. 
BRG, Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 48–50 (1990) (per curiam) (holding that territorial division 
agreement established under trademark and copyright license agreement was per se 
unlawful). 
 132 See FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2235–36 (2013). 
 133 See id. 
 134 See infra notes 223–26 and accompanying text. 
496 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 76:3 
 
IV. PATENT AND ANTITRUST APPROACHES TO COMPETITION AND 
INNOVATION: COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
The patent and antitrust systems have different structures and different 
histories. Both affect how competition and innovation issues are handled. 
First, while antitrust law’s broad focus on competition has compelled antitrust 
courts to consider innovation issues, the reverse is rarely true. Second, the 
open-ended nature of the antitrust laws and their mandate to protect 
competition has directed litigants, their experts, and the academy to develop a 
large empirical literature on the competitive effects of various practices. By 
contrast, the patent code is much more specific and never invites such 
empirical query. As a result the empirical literature on how the patent system 
functions in relation to innovation goals is not well developed and, in any 
event, seldom employed in litigation. A critical aspect of that difference is the 
Patent Act’s general insensitivity to market diversity, even though such 
diversity affects the rate and dissemination of innovation at least as much as it 
affects the robustness of competition. Finally, the creation of the Federal 
Circuit as an exclusive appellate tribunal for patent cases has exacerbated 
myopic analysis of innovation issues. 
A. Nonreciprocal Accommodation 
At least since the passage of the Clayton Act in 1914, courts deciding 
antitrust cases have attempted to accommodate patent policy to competition 
policy. To be sure, courts are imperfect and they have sometimes wandered to 
extreme positions, but at least they have taken seriously the idea that 
competition and innovation policy are related to one another and must be 
metered together. 
To illustrate, consider the antitrust rule that a product innovation cannot be 
unlawful, no matter how much it harms competitors through its success.135 
The rule has nothing to do with patent law and is not based on any specific 
patent law doctrine. Nor does it require anything like the assertion of a patent 
law counterclaim or even invocation of the Patent Act. Rather the antitrust rule 
is rooted in antitrust law’s own appreciation that innovation is part of 
competition, requiring courts to consider them together, often protecting 
innovation even when it tends to create or prolong monopoly. Even this rule 
must be metered to the specific market, however, in order account for 
situations where the cost of design changes is very low in relation to the harm 
that a network monopolist might cause.136 Other examples include the explicit 
                                                                                                                     
 135 See, e.g., Allied Orthopedic Appliances, Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 
F.3d 991, 994 (9th Cir. 2010); see also 3B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 776 (4th ed. 2015).  
 136 See John M. Newman, Anticompetitive Product Design in the New Economy, 39 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 681, 693–94 (2012). 
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recognition in merger policy that mergers may reduce innovation by 
eliminating highly innovative competitors, or that explicit restraints on 
innovation are an important concern of competition policy.137 
Patent law simply does not have this tradition except in a few areas that 
fall into patent law’s outer boundaries. For example, patent “misuse” doctrine 
identified competitive concerns in patent licensing and enforcement, often 
exaggerating them considerably. But recent case law has virtually written the 
patent misuse doctrine out of existence.138 The Supreme Court has 
occasionally suggested that concerns about competition play a role in defining 
the scope of IP rights—for example, denying trade dress protection to 
functional uses.139 
Patent law has operated in a much more myopic universe in which 
competition policy is rarely addressed except in the small subset of cases that 
expressly include an antitrust counterclaim or misuse defense. Indeed, in some 
cases an increase in competition is considered to be the “harm” that justifies 
patent law relief—precisely the opposite of the “antitrust injury” rule that 
refuses to condemn a practice unless harm to competition is shown. One 
example is the Federal Circuit’s 2014 decision in Trebro v. Firefly. The court 
counted competition itself as patent harm justifying an injunction on an 
unpracticed patent that the plaintiff had acquired from an outside inventor.140 
Injunctions are generally denied to non-practicing entities, but in this case the 
court held that the fact that the parties were competing served to justify an 
injunction. No antitrust issues were raised, but that is not surprising given that 
patent law decision making has never developed a culture of taking 
competition issues seriously. 
Another situation where courts fail to consider impact on competition 
involves the use of “authorized generic” restrictions in settlements of patent 
infringement suits in the pharmaceutical industry. An “authorized generic” is 
one that is made by the patentee itself. No patent infringement is involved, 
because the patentee already owns the patent. An authorized generic typically 
is identical to the branded version in both active and inactive ingredients. They 
differ mainly in trademark and packaging. The courts have held repeatedly that 
a branded drug manufacturer is entitled to introduce its own authorized generic 
                                                                                                                     
 137 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES ¶ 1 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-
2010.html, archived at http://perma.cc/VN4H-JVF3; PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 900.1a, 900.1c (Supp. 2015); Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Restraints on Innovation, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 247, 252 (2007). 
 138 See Bohannan & Hovenkamp, supra note 79, at 21–23. 
 139 See, e.g., TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34–35 (2001); 
see also Thomas F. Cotter, The Procompetitive Interest in Intellectual Property Law, 48 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 506–20 (2006) (citing misuse doctrine and functionality limits 
on trade dress law as examples of competition concerns raised within IP policy). 
 140 Trebro Mfg., Inc. v. Firefly Equip., LLC, 748 F.3d 1159, 1170–71 (Fed. Cir. 2014); 
see infra notes 460–64 and accompanying text. 
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into the market.141 The authorized generic can be a socially valuable price 
discrimination device, enabling the patentee to reach higher elasticity 
customers who are price sensitive, while retaining the brand for less price 
sensitive customers. 
Even following Actavis, several decisions have upheld patent settlements 
in which a generic firm has agreed to delayed entry in exchange for the 
patentee’s promise not to enter the market with an authorized generic.142 The 
“no authorized generic” clause increases prospective profits to the generic, and 
thus can serve to reduce the size or in some cases perhaps even eliminate a 
cash payment to the generic. The literature suggests that the entry of an 
authorized generic can reduce the first generic’s output by half, and this is 
what one would ordinarily expect. The two generics are nearly identical, and if 
the firms have the same costs each would end up with roughly half of the 
market. The literature also suggests that post-entry generic prices are about 
16% lower if an authorized generic comes into the market.143 For these 
reasons the patentee’s promise not to enter with an authorized generic is very 
valuable to a prospective independent generic entrant. 
Such a promise is valuable, however, for the same reason that any cartel 
agreement can be valuable to participants: one cartel member promises to 
restrain its own output in order to get market prices up. A “no authorized 
generic” provision is actually more anticompetitive and harmful to consumers 
than a payment for delay. The payment for delay is merely a wealth transfer 
between the patentee and generic. By contrast, the “no authorized generic” 
                                                                                                                     
 141 See Sanofi-Aventis v. Apotex Inc., 659 F.3d 1171, 1174–75 (Fed. Cir. 2011); 
Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 454 F.3d 270, 271 (4th Cir. 2006); Teva Pharm. Indus. Ltd. v. 
Crawford, 410 F.3d 51, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 142 See, e.g., In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 11-5479, 2014 WL 4988410, at *26 
(D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014); In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., No. 3:12-CV-02389 PGS, 2014 WL 
4543502, at *25 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2014) (involving a provision in agreement under which 
patentee promised not to enter with authorized generic during 180-day exclusivity period 
was not a “payment” for delay and thus did not invoke Actavis doctrine); In re Loestrin 24 
Fe Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 180, 194 (D.R.I. 2014) (ruling that Actavis applied only 
to cash payments, which means that promises not to enter the market with an authorized 
generic could not be counted); In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 18 F. Supp. 
3d 560, 570 (D.N.J. 2014) (similar). Compare In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 
3d 735, 751 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (settlement agreement provision preventing pioneer from 
entering with authorized generic could be counted together with other promises in 
determining existence of large reverse payment), with In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) 
Antitrust Litig., 968 F. Supp. 2d 367, 410‒11 (D. Mass. 2013) (similar). See also Aaron S. 
Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference: Theory and Practice, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 1‒12), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=2560107, archived at http://perma.cc/2RRK-QZLK (critiquing these and other post-
Actavis decisions). 
 143 See In re Effexor, 2014 WL 4988410, at *4; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
AUTHORIZED GENERICS: AN INTERIM REPORT 1–2 (2009), available at www.ftc.gov 
/os/2009/06/P062105authorizedgenericsreport.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5LDF-9J4S. 
2015] ANTITRUST AND THE PATENT SYSTEM 499 
 
agreement is not merely a wealth transfer, it is also a cartel agreement that 
serves to reduce market output and keep prices higher than they would 
otherwise be.144 As a result, agreements restraining authorized generic entry 
should be treated more harshly than pay-for-delay settlements. After all, a pay-
for-delay settlement is not a license but, at most, an agreement to license in the 
future. By contrast, the no-authorized-generic agreement takes effect 
immediately. Because neither an IP license nor any kind of joint production is 
contemplated, these are simply naked market division agreements. 
To be sure, sometimes increased competition should count as “injury” for 
patent infringement purposes. That would be true, for example, when a 
competitor is a direct infringer of a technology that a dominant firm is 
practicing. In any event, the Patent Act’s expressly created right to bring an 
infringement action contains no exception for actions against competitors. But 
entitlement to an injunction is a matter of equitable principles and not an 
absolute right. To permit a dominant firm to acquire competing technology 
from an outside inventor and then use it to shut down a rival can cause 
considerable harm to competition without protecting any element of 
innovation, because the patent in question had already been invented by 
someone else. 
B. Uneven Empirical Research 
The unevenness of the economic literature on the antitrust and patent 
systems reflects fundamental differences in how the two systems approach 
economic policy. The theoretical and empirical literature on price theory, 
industrial organization, and competition is large and stretches across more than 
a century. The courts have generally paid attention, making antitrust the first 
area of significant judicial reliance on economic literature.145 The record 
reveals diverse impulses resulting from different economic theories, as well as 
differing ideas about the goals of antitrust law. For example, the post-New 
Deal era was dominated by an economic theory that strongly distrusted 
markets and had heightened fears about the competitive threats imposed by 
vertical integration, product differentiation, and intellectual property.146 The 
Warren Era in the 1960s was overly preoccupied with protecting smaller 
businesses from conduct that was presumed to be anticompetitive but was 
often efficient.147 The courts and enforcement agencies were generally 
following the mainstream economics of the day.148 Beginning in the 1980s the 
                                                                                                                     
 144 See Hovenkamp, supra note 38, at 25. 
 145 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of Industrial 
Organization, 68 TEX. L. REV. 105, 167 (1989). 
 146 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 206–19. 
 147 The most important contemporary critique was BORK, supra note 44, at 210–16. For 
a more compact critique, see BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 33–59. 
 148 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 206–19. 
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courts became much more explicit about their use of economic research in 
antitrust analysis. 
Patent law is a remarkably different enterprise, in which the courts receive 
little guidance from the economic literature. A principle reason for this is that 
we have historically treated patents as “property” rights rather than as an 
element of economic policy. A distinctive feature of property rights in our 
legal system is that their absoluteness provides a certain degree of immunity 
from policies about economic development. Taken too far, the idea of patents 
as property can place patents on a collision course with policies about 
economic growth. This is why it is so critical that suitable restraints be placed 
on the process of patent issuance. The property right guaranteed by a patent 
does not kick in until the patent has been granted. But pre-issuance practice is 
also the place that the patent system is woefully inadequate, because precious 
little economic analysis goes into the development of the rules for deciding 
when a patent should be issued. In any event, a patent grants whatever 
property right the Patent Act says it grants, and need not grant anything more. 
In addition, while people have a “property” right in their patents, that need not 
include rights to do things that the Patent Act does not authorize, such as fix 
product prices, tie in the presence of market power, enter into exclusive 
contracts in the product market, or obtain injunctions outside the limits of 
ordinary equitable principles. 
C. Economics and Statutory Language 
 Another reason for the differences between patent and antitrust 
approaches to economic development is statutory. In the antitrust laws the 
highly general “restraint of trade” and “monopolize” language of the Sherman 
Act, as well as the “may substantially lessen competition” language of the 
Clayton Act, explicitly invites courts to consider the market impact of various 
practices. Over time the courts have developed a wide array of tools for doing 
this. Nothing in the Patent Act invites either patent examiners or the courts to 
do anything similar. The statute itself says virtually nothing about market 
impact or “innovation policy.” As a result, the only place market analysis 
plays much of a role in litigation about patents is in competition policy 
analysis of post-issuance practices, such as tying, pooling, price fixing and 
cross-licensing, mergers, exclusion, and the like. To say this more bluntly, the 
only time patent law pays much attention to markets is when the law 
incorporates antitrust principles. 
Consider patent law’s requirement of nonobvious subject matter.149 Its 
purpose is relatively uncontroversial and completely driven by our ideas about 
the relationship between innovation, exclusion, and economic growth: we do 
not want to give exclusive rights over things that someone of ordinary skill 
                                                                                                                     
 149 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012); see KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 
(2007); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 14‒17 (1966). 
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could be expected to come up with independently. We should not permit 
people to commandeer technologies that in the ordinary course would be 
produced competitively rather than not at all. Having a strict nonobviousness 
requirement is particularly important in a regime of absolute liability for patent 
infringement such as we have—that is, where people can be held liable even if 
they did not know the technology they developed was patented by someone 
else.150 One of the reasons copyright and trade secret law have much lower 
standards of inventiveness is someone can infringe only by copying. 
 Empirically, there are useful ways to think about this problem. For 
example, if a large number of people who end up being infringers actually 
discovered or developed the technology entirely on their own, then the patent 
doctrine of nonobvious subject matter is not doing its job. In fact, the number 
of infringement suits that either allege willful infringement (fewer than 11%) 
or prove it (fewer than 2%) is extremely low.151 These numbers are quite 
telling, given that infringement plaintiffs can obtain up to treble damages by 
showing that patent infringement was willful.152 There could be important 
qualifiers, however. For example, perhaps determining how infringers came 
upon the infringing technology is difficult.153 That makes this particular query 
interesting, but hardly superfluous. 
The courts have not indicated that an empirical inquiry into the extent of 
independent discovery is even relevant to the issue of nonobvious subject 
matter, either as a general matter or in specific infringement cases. In sum, we 
do not possess a “political economy” of nonobvious technology in the way 
that, say, merger law today requires economic modeling and evidence to 
predict the likely output or price effects of a merger. In this area the empirical 
science of the patent system is far behind the empirical science of industrial 
organization.154 
By and large legal queries into nonobviousness proceed by examining 
existing boundaries, asking questions such as how the technology under 
consideration differs from earlier technology, whether something in the prior 
art anticipated the solution that the patent proposes, whether the prior art 
teaches away from the proposed solution, whether ex post conclusions of 
obviousness reflect hindsight bias, and the like. Most of this analysis has little 
                                                                                                                     
 150 See infra notes 156–57 and accompanying text. 
 151 See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. 
L. REV. 1421, 1453–54 (2009). 
 152 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). 
 153 On this point, see Robert P. Merges, A Few Kind Words for Absolute Infringement 
Liability in Patent Law 5 (July 10, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2464756, archived at http://perma.cc 
/2P3V-VQZU. 
 154 On the antitrust experience with economics since early in the twentieth century, see 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836‒1937, at 241–330 (1991); 
Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis: 1890‒1955, 94 MINN. L. 
REV. 311, 367 (2009). 
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to do with human cognitive ability and invites the complaint that far too many 
obvious patents are granted.155 It also completely ignores the question of how 
patents perform as innovation facilitators in specific markets. 
Given the large number of patents that are issued, we cannot afford to do 
much individual market impact analysis at the time of application, such as the 
antitrust enforcement agencies perform for reported mergers. Of course, if 
such analyses were performed it is very likely many fewer patents would 
issue. More importantly, however, we do not even do such analysis in 
infringement litigation, where validity is often contested on grounds of 
nonobviousness. Only 1.5% of patents are ever litigated, and only .1% make it 
to trial.156 Further, litigating a patent infringement case commits far greater 
resources in most cases than obtaining one. Because the vast majority of these 
cases are brought against apparently unknowing infringers, the case for 
absolute liability depends crucially on a high degree of certainty that patents 
are not being granted for things that in the ordinary course would have been 
developed competitively. Finally, more empirically driven approaches to 
litigation would invite development of a research database that would affect 
patent issuance practices as well. 
Both private and public antitrust enforcement has drawn significant 
resources into the economic analysis of challenged practices. Antitrust 
litigation and counseling create a market for economic experts, and this in turn 
creates a significant market for the economic study of competition-affecting 
practices.157 As a result, litigating an antitrust case under the rule of reason 
today invariably requires expert economic analysis of the effects of a 
challenged practice on competition, including market definition, ease of entry, 
probability of collusion, and the like. Patent law has very little equivalent to 
this forensic economic evaluation outside of damages measurement, which 
does use market-based tools. The typical patent infringement case reveals very 
little awareness that the participants are engaged in making economic policy, 
particularly when they make decisions about the proper scope of patents and 
their significance over the prior art. 
                                                                                                                     
 155 See Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the 
Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1452 (2006); 
Shawn P. Miller, Where’s the Innovation: An Analysis of the Quantity and Qualities of 
Anticipated and Obvious Patents, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 12 (2013); Colleen M. Seifert, 
Now Why Didn’t I Think of That? The Cognitive Processes That Create the Obvious, 12 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 489, 490 (2008). 
 156 Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 75 
(2005). 
 157 For example, the Antitrust Law treatise includes a large portion of a volume on the 
use of economic experts in antitrust litigation. See 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., 
ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 390–399 (4th ed. 2014). 
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D. Innovation, Competition, and Market Diversity 
Another critical area of difference between the antitrust and patent systems 
is in their recognition of variation among markets. Antitrust is acutely 
sensitive to issues of market structure and diversity. In many markets 
monopolization is regarded as structurally impossible because the number of 
rivals is large and entry is easy.158 Both monopolization and merger law regard 
market structure and diversity as critical.159 This is also true of the law of 
horizontal restraints under the rule of reason. We distinguish networked 
industries or industries with economies of scale or informational needs that 
justify competitor collaboration from those that do not. We also distinguish 
product-differentiated markets from markets for fungible products, as well as 
industries with high fixed costs and a heavy upfront investment component.160 
Further, these differences clearly impact not only traditional price and output 
competition but also innovation.  
Imagine an antitrust system for assessing mergers or a monopolistic 
practice such as exclusionary pricing that did not differentiate based on the 
number of firms in a market, ratios of fixed to variable costs, barriers to entry, 
flow of information, and the like.161 But that is very largely the legal patent 
system we have today, and it is increasingly clear that the operation and 
innovation value of patents is just as dependent on individual market 
characteristics as antitrust rules are.162 Patent policy is played out in a one-
size-fits-all system that is largely indifferent to industry structure, nature of 
information dissemination, or other factors that explain when patents are 
socially valuable and when they are not. Its broad protections are most 
justified in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries for patents on primary 
molecules, but they are very likely not justified in high turnover technologies 
such as electronics, computers, communications devices, software, and 
business methods. Nevertheless, the law of patents has virtually no market-
specific metering. 
For example, the literature on the extent of copying by claimed patent 
infringement defendants shows significant differences among industries. A 
relatively high percentage of patent infringement cases in chemical and 
pharmaceutical markets allege and show copying, while very few do in the 
information technologies.163 The data suggest alternative explanations, all of 
                                                                                                                     
 158 See 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 135, ¶¶ 420–423, 501–507. 
 159 See 3B id. ¶¶ 801–803 (discussing monopolization); 4 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, 
supra note 9, ¶¶ 911–915 (discussing mergers). 
 160 13 id. chs. 21–22. 
 161 On how the courts have required this analysis in predatory pricing cases, see 3A 
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 135, ¶¶ 725–730. 
 162 See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Our Divided Patent System, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=2510004, archived at http://perma.cc/N5AU-38BB. 
 163 See Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 151, at 1445. 
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which are under researched. Perhaps the nonobviousness requirement as 
currently articulated works better for chemicals than for, say, communications 
technology. That is particularly likely to be true of patents on molecules, 
which could be unknowingly duplicated only by extraordinary coincidence. Or 
relatedly, evaluating prior art is easier for chemicals then it is for, say, 
electronics. Alternatively, perhaps information about patents is disseminated 
more effectively in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries than in other 
industries. Dissemination consists of two things: being able to locate a patent 
and being able to interpret it. The data also suggest an important question: is it 
merely a coincidence that the patent system seems to be functioning much 
better in industries such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals where the 
percentage of infringement claims based on copying is high? An antitrust 
economist looking at these data would see obvious needs for differential 
treatment. The current law of nonobvious subject matter seems to work better 
in some industries than in others. 
E. Asymmetric Appellate Process 
Under our current system all cases that arise under the Patent Act are 
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 
Antitrust cases, like most others, go to the relevant regional circuit. Both, of 
course, are subject to Supreme Court review, which is rare and selective. This 
structure tends to insulate patent law from competition policy except in the 
relatively few cases that arise under the Patent Act and which also include an 
antitrust claim, such as a counterclaim. If the controls to economic growth 
have two switches, competition and innovation, the Federal Circuit very 
largely has control over one switch—a phenomenon that the Trebro decision, 
discussed above, illustrates. By contrast, the Supreme Court and (historically) 
the regional circuit courts had control over both. I believe this is at least a 
partial explanation for the divergence that has emerged between the Federal 
Circuit and the Supreme Court. A well-designed system should have the same 
courts monitoring competition policy and innovation policy, bolstered by 
inter-circuit competition. 
V. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PATENT LAW PERFORMANCE 
The idea that too many patents lack significant value is hardly new. 
Supreme Court Justice David Brewer suggested it already in the late 
nineteenth century, concluding that the system had far too many patents, many 
of which were worthless.164 Further, patent litigation had become 
unreasonably expensive and uncertain.165 
                                                                                                                     
 164 David J. Brewer, The Patent System, 3 YALE L.J. 149, 151 (1894). Brewer was a 
justice on the Supreme Court from 1889 to 1910. His opinion of patents was all the more 
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In general, the problem of patent value is beclouded by poor information. 
In fact, lack of market specific information about the performance of the patent 
system produces an unacceptably wide range of opinions about the system’s 
value and how it can be improved. In addition, we lack good empirical 
information about the welfare effects of individual patent rules. Neither 
Congress nor the Supreme Court has insisted on the development of tools that 
enable decision makers to determine empirically how specific patent doctrines 
serve as inducements or in some cases impediments toward innovation. To a 
very significant extent patent drafters, lawyers, and judges interpret questions 
of patent validity and scope in the same way that real property lawyers have 
traditionally determined boundary lines in real property cases—mainly by 
reference to a set of rules of long standing, but rarely confronting fundamental 
issues of economic policy directly. 
To be sure, economic assessments of industry performance are difficult to 
make. Views change over time, and generalist judges and lawyers may make 
erroneous decisions. These are good reasons for trying to do better, but not for 
jettisoning economic analysis from the law. Patent law will never be able to 
optimize innovation until it begins to internalize a “political economy” of the 
patent system, including the development of empirically supported 
conclusions about how patent law affects innovation. 
Economic research on innovation and the patent system can be divided 
into several parts, with overlapping boundaries. These include: 
1. The relative contributions to economic growth of innovation as 
opposed to competition under constant technology; 
2. The relationship between market structure and the rate of 
innovation; 
3. The competitive impact of post-issuance patent practices; 
4. The influence of patent issuance or strength on the rate of 
innovation, its direction, or its quality; 
5. The way that specific patent doctrines perform in the market; 
6. Private patent value under the existing system; and 
7. The social cost of restraints on innovation. 
The following discussion examines these very briefly. 
A. Innovation and Economic Growth 
The literature on the relationship between innovation and economic 
growth is significant and has been developing since the 1940s. Joseph 
Schumpeter argued in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy that innovation 
                                                                                                                     
important because he was a conservative, one of the early architects of economic 
substantive due process. 
 165 See, e.g., Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 551 (1892) (Brewer, J., dissenting) 
(dissenting from a decision upholding price regulation of grain elevators). 
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contributed much more to economic growth than competition did.166 The 
concern of this literature is with the relationship between innovation and 
growth, not with the patent system. In the 1950s Robert M. Solow’s empirical 
work modeling economic growth with and without innovation concluded that 
as much as 85% of nonfarm economic growth in the twentieth century up to 
his time came from innovation.167 Since that time the modeling has become 
more complex, and has divided into different theories of growth depending on 
whether the relevant stimulants are endogenous or exogenous.168 But there is 
very little dispute over the basic proposition that innovation is the dominant 
contributor to growth.169 
B. Innovation and Market Structure 
A second body of empirical as well as theoretical literature deals with the 
relationship between market structure and innovation. Schumpeter believed 
that monopoly was essential to robust innovation because only the monopolist 
would have both the appropriation incentives and the economic surplus to 
profit from it.170 Writing roughly a decade later and after Schumpeter’s death, 
Kenneth Arrow disagreed, pointing out that competitors have much more to 
lose from not innovating: if they do not innovate, someone else will. In 
addition, under competition firms would compete on innovation itself. Finally, 
one obstacle to invention by the monopolist is that innovation would tend to 
displace its own established technology. By contrast, competitors must 
continuously worry that if they do not develop new technology someone else 
will. As for appropriation incentives, Arrow believed the patent system would 
take care of them.171 
This Schumpeter–Arrow “debate” spawned an enormous body of literature 
in industrial organization economics, both theoretical and empirical. The 
emergent consensus is that neither Schumpeter nor Arrow had it exactly right, 
although Arrow was somewhat closer. The innovation/market structure curve 
                                                                                                                     
 166 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 81–86 (1942). 
 167 Robert M. Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function, 39 
REV. ECON. & STAT. 312, 316 (1957); see also BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 
295–98; ELHANAN HELPMAN, THE MYSTERY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 7, 34–35 (2004). 
 168 See generally PHILIPPE AGHION & PETER HOWITT, ENDOGENOUS GROWTH THEORY 
(1998); Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Endogenous Innovation in the Theory of 
Growth, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 23 (1994). 
 169 See the strong assumptions about the relationship made in THOMAS PIKETTY, 
CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 72‒109 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Belknap 
Press of Harvard Univ. Press 2014) (2013). 
 170 SCHUMPETER, supra note 166, at 81–86. 
 171 Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for 
Invention, in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 144, 156‒60 (Kenneth J. Arrow ed., 
1971). 
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is in fact an inverted “U.”172 Monopolized markets tend not to exhibit a great 
deal of innovation, but neither do highly competitive markets. Rather, 
innovation proceeds most quickly in moderately concentrated, product-
differentiated markets that have relatively large firms but also sufficient 
competition that each firm offers an innovation threat to the others. 
C. Economic Effects of Patent Practices 
A large body of literature, stretching back nearly a century, concerns the 
economic impact of various uses of patents that have already been issued.173 A 
related and also extensive law review literature looks more specifically at 
antitrust rules, but frequently invokes the economics literature.174 The 
                                                                                                                     
 172 See John T. Scott & Troy J. Scott, Innovation Rivalry: Theory and Empirics, 41 J. 
INDUS. & BUS. ECON. 25, 25 (2014); see also Philippe Aghion et al., Competition and 
Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship, 120 Q.J. ECON. 701, 701–28 (2005); Koki Arai, 
Patents, Competition Policy, and Growth, 18 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 83, 84 (2013). The 
literature is summarized in BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 9–11. 
 173 In chronological order and emphasizing historical work, see J. MAURICE CLARK, 
STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF OVERHEAD COSTS (1923); FLOYD L. VAUGHAN, ECONOMICS 
OF OUR PATENT SYSTEM (1925); ARTHUR ROBERT BURNS, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION 
11–17 (1936); THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE BOTTLENECKS OF BUSINESS (1940); WALTON 
HAMILTON, PATENTS AND FREE ENTERPRISE (1941); LAWRENCE I. WOOD, PATENTS AND 
ANTITRUST LAW (1942); OTTO RAYMOND BARNETT, PATENT PROPERTY AND THE ANTI-
MONOPOLY LAWS (1943); GEORGE W. STOCKING & MYRON W. WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND 
FREE ENTERPRISE (1951); GUSTAV DREWS, THE PATENT RIGHT IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY 
OF THE UNITED STATES (1952); BOWMAN, JR., supra note 24 at 239; see also, in 
chronological order, Floyd L. Vaughan, The Relation of Patents to Industrial Monopolies, 
147 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 40 (1930); Alfred E. Kahn, Fundamental 
Deficiencies of the American Patent Law, 30 AM. ECON. REV. 475, 483–84 (1940); 
Michael Polanvyi, Patent Reform, 11 REV. ECON. STUD. 61 (1944); Bowman, Jr., supra 
note 23, at 19; Statement of Grounds for Action, United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 46 
F. Supp. 541 (S.D. Ohio 1942) (No. 4426). For more discussion of the literature prior to 
passage of the 1952 Patent Act, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 184–91 (discussing 
patents and then antitrust). 
 174 See generally Rome G. Brown, The Right to Refuse to Sell, 25 YALE L.J. 194 
(1916); Mortimer Feuer, Patent Abuse Versus National Interest, 2 LAW. GUILD REV. 1 
(1942); Walton Hamilton, Property Rights in the Market, 1 J. LEGAL & POL. SOC. 10 
(1943); Horace R. Lamb, The Relation of the Patent Laws to the Federal Anti-trust Laws, 
12 CORNELL L.Q. 261 (1927); Philip Marcus, Patents, Antitrust Law and Antitrust 
Judgments Through Hartford-Empire, 34 GEO. L.J. 1, 36–51 (1945); F. Granville Munson, 
Control of Patented and Copyrighted Articles After Sale, 26 YALE L.J. 270 (1917); David 
L. Podell & Benjamin S. Kirsh, Patent Pools and the Anti-trust Laws, 13 A.B.A. J. 430 
(1927); Irving I. Schachtel, Patent Pools and the Federal Anti-trust Laws, 5 LINCOLN L. 
REV. 7 (1932); George H. Schueller, The New Antitrust Illegality Per Se: Forestalling and 
Patent Misuse, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 170, 172 (1950); Roscoe Steffen, Invalid Patents and 
Price Control, 56 Yale L.J. 1 (1946); H.A. Toulmin, The Patent Law and the Sherman 
Law, 1 VA. L. REV. 445 (1914); Comment, The Effect of Nonuse on a Patentee’s Remedy 
Against Infringement, 18 YALE L.J. 52, 53 (1908) (discussing the Paper Bag decision); 
Note, Patent Abuses and Antitrust: The Per Se Rule, 64 HARV. L. REV. 626 (1951); Note, 
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theoretical and empirical literature ranges over such subjects as the economic 
effects of tying, pooling, price fixing, price discrimination, the impact of 
patents on product differentiation and the resulting competition among firms, 
the use of patents by dominant firms, and the like. While this literature 
concerns the use of issued patents, nearly all of it properly falls into the 
domain of competition policy rather than analysis of the patent system. In 
most of it the internal workings of the patent system are not even discussed.175 
D. Patents, Economic Growth, and the Direction of Innovation 
A fourth issue concerns the relationship between patent issuance or patent 
strength and economic growth, and relatedly, the relationship between the 
availability of patents and the direction of innovation.176 As patent protection 
is greater, measured by either duration or breadth, the incentive to obtain 
patents increases but the dissemination of knowledge decreases. Economic 
growth depends both on sufficient incentives to innovate plus the effective 
dissemination of innovation through the economy. Finding the right balance 
presents an empirical question. 
The more general literature on patent issuance and economic growth is 
inconclusive, with most of it suggesting little correlation between a country’s 
patent system and its rate of economic growth.177 More discriminating studies 
                                                                                                                     
Patent Dedication as Antitrust Remedy: New Light on Hartford-Empire, 63 YALE L.J. 717 
(1954). For a good, brief economic analysis of the competitive effects of post-issuance 
patent practices, see LANDES & POSNER, supra note 32, at 372–402. 
 175 For a good summary of the literature prior to its publication date, see Jonathan B. 
Baker & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Empirical Methods in Antitrust Litigation: Review and 
Critique, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 386, 386‒91 (1999). 
 176 On this second point, both Arthur Cecil Pigou and Arnold Plant argued that the 
availability of patents would channel innovation toward patentable areas because 
appropriability would be greater. See ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 185 
(4th ed. 1932); Arnold Plant, The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions, 1 
ECONOMICA 30, 30‒32 (1934). The point is developed further in Baxter, supra note 24. 
One can say much the same things about trade secrets or copyrights. 
 177 David M. Gould & William C. Gruben, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in 
Economic Growth, 48 J. DEV. ECON. 323, 328–38 (1996); Walter G. Park & Juan Carlos 
Ginarte, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth, 15 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 
51, 54–56 (1997). A recent study found a correlation between the existence of a patent 
system and total factor production (TFP) growth, but also concludes that there is an inverse 
correlation between the strength of patent rights and TFP growth. See Xin Chang et al., 
Patents and Productivity Growth: Evidence from Global Patent Awards 26 (Feb. 20, 2013) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=2371600, archived at http://perma.cc/79MT-ZU3X (While patent rights lead to more 
patents, “our findings also suggest that patent rights slow the diffusion of new innovations 
throughout the economy, as we find that the effect of patents on TFP growth is weaker in 
countries with stronger patent rights. Our results suggest that finding the optimum level of 
patent protections requires the consideration of these two offsetting effects.”); see also Rod 
Falvey et al., Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth, 10 REV. DEV. ECON. 700, 
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that break industries into different groupings find positive correlations in 
markets where products are durable, investment costs are high, but copying is 
cheap, such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals.178 By contrast, studies of 
information technologies and software often find just the opposite: the patent 
system actually tends to hinder economic development.179 Some studies also 
find that the effect of patent protection in restricting the dissemination of 
knowledge outweighs its effect in inducing innovation, thus producing a 
negative correlation between patenting and economic growth.180 
None of this literature is absolutely conclusive and it has not come close to 
establishing a consensus on these issues. One startling likelihood, however, is 
that while innovation contributes a great deal to economic growth, the patent 
system may not contribute much to innovation, although the results vary from 
one market to another. 
This literature must also be qualified by another important factor, which is 
the cost of the patent system itself. Obtaining patents is costly and litigating 
them is even more costly. Further, the patent system creates risks for 
innovators and, as a result, costly duties to search. One very troubling 
conclusion for many markets is that there is not any “tradeoff” at all between 
the value of appropriation and the hindrance to dissemination. In fact, the 
appropriation value is negative because even looking at purely private costs 
and returns, the patent system costs innovators more than it is worth.181 Once 
again, chemicals and pharmaceuticals are an outlier on the positive side.182 
                                                                                                                     
700–01 (2006) (noting that at least in middle income countries, intellectual property rights 
cause more harm by restricting the dissemination of technology than they contribute to 
economic growth). 
 178 For a summary of this literature, see Michael Meurer & James Bessen, Do Patents 
Promote Economic Growth?, TECH. INNOVATION & INTELL. PROP. (Mar. 17, 2008), 
http://www.researchoninnovation.org/WordPress/?p=95, archived at http://perma.cc/TW 
C5-38VL (finding pharmaceuticals to be an outlier in a large number of diverse studies); 
see also Albert G.Z. Hu & I.P.L. Png, Patent Rights and Economic Growth: Evidence from 
Cross-Country Panels of Manufacturing Industries 2, 4 (Aug. 2012) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1339730, 
archived at http://perma.cc/MTE5-VWEB; Yi Qian, Do National Patent Laws Stimulate 
Domestic Innovation in a Global Patenting Environment? A Cross-Country Analysis of 
Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, 1978–2002, 89 REV. ECON. & STAT. 436, 450 (2007) 
(making dubious conclusions even about chemical and pharmaceutical patents). 
 179 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the 
Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 56–57 (2001). 
 180 See Lee G. Branstetter, Do Stronger Patents Induce More Local Innovation?, 7 J. 
INT’L. ECON. L. 359, 369–70 (2004); see also Andrew W. Torrance & Bill Tomlinson, 
Patents and the Regress of Useful Arts, 10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 130, 132–35 
(2009) (using simulation to come to similar conclusions). 
 181 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 86, at 120–46. 
 182 See id. at 95–120. 
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E. The Economic Performance of Specific Patent Doctrines 
An economically defensible patent system requires patent rules that can 
enable its goals. How do rules concerning such issues as patent duration, the 
requirement of nonobvious subject matter, enablement, or the doctrine of 
equivalents perform in the market? There is very little empirical study of how 
individual patent doctrines perform, although a significant “meta” empirical 
literature exists on judicial behavior concerning these doctrines.183 By 
contrast, antitrust law often adopts specific doctrines by linking them to 
market performance or expectations. One example is antitrust law’s per se 
rule, which is applied only after judicial experience indicates that certain 
practices as a class are highly likely to reduce market wide output and increase 
price.184 Another example is the “recoupment” requirement in predatory 
pricing law, which uses economic analysis and empirical study to link the law 
of predatory pricing to rational expectations about monopoly outcomes in 
specific markets.185 
Antitrust rules evaluate practices by asking market performance questions, 
often in the context of litigation, although also by relying on industry studies 
that are later used in litigation. For example, as a matter of doctrine, 
monopolization and merger law require definition of a “relevant market” in 
which the threat of monopoly or cartel behavior can be assessed. Relevant 
market queries are highly empirical and market specific, looking at such 
factors as degree and speed of substitution from inside to outside, the number 
of firms in the market and their size, and the history of new entry. For antitrust 
purposes, markets differ so much from one another that each new market 
requires its own inquiry. Doing that is costly but it is based on recognition that 
the thing we are attempting to measure is very specific to the environment in 
which it occurs. 
                                                                                                                     
 183 See, e.g., Jason Rantanen, The Federal Circuit’s New Obviousness Jurisprudence: 
An Empirical Study, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 709, 732–61 (2013); see also Ali Mojibi, An 
Empirical Study of the Effect of KSR v. Teleflex on the Federal Circuit’s Patent Validity 
Jurisprudence, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 559, 581–96 (2010). For pre-KSR literature, see 
Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness and the Federal Circuit: An Empirical Analysis 
of Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911, 912–15 (2007); see also J. Jonas 
Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and Normative 
Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 63–76 (2014) (discussing 
claim construction and scope); Dennis Crouch, An Empirical Study of the Role of the 
Written Description Requirement in Patent Examination, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1665, 1665–
68 (2010) (discussing written description); Christopher B. Seaman, Willful Patent 
Infringement and Enhanced Damages After In re Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. 
REV. 417, 439–51 (2012) (discussing willful infringement). 
 184 See 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶ 1509; 11 id. ¶ 1909b (addressing 
horizontal restraints). 
 185 See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224–
26 (1993) (developing the recoupment requirement); see also 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, 
supra note 135, ¶¶ 725–727.  
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The work that has been done on various patent doctrines suggests exactly 
the same thing—namely, that a one-size-fits-all approach is completely wrong 
headed. That is clearly true of patent duration.186 A longer patent term 
increases the incentive to patent, although by less than one might think.187 As 
William Landes and Richard Posner note, at a discount rate of 10%, which is 
probably low for patented goods with high price/cost margins, the ex ante 
value of a twenty-year patent is approximately 85% of a patent whose duration 
is infinite.188 Once they calculate what they believe to be a realistic 
depreciation rate, the number is closer to 95%.189 Just as a lease or any other 
property right with a limited term, a patent depreciates in value as it gets closer 
to expiration. A patent also depreciates in value to the extent that the demand 
for the product it covers declines, perhaps because it has become obsolete, or 
perhaps because more and closer substitutes become available as the 
technology matures. For example, if others develop alternatives to the patented 
technology over the patent’s lifetime the market for that patent will become 
increasingly competitive, and its value accordingly less. At the same time, the 
harm caused by exclusion extends over the full term. These numbers are 
frankly not very revealing about the impact of longer terms on the balance 
between incentive and dissemination of information, except to suggest that 
shorter terms give us somewhat smaller incentives, significantly reduced 
exclusionary effects, and thus more rapid dissemination of technology. Indeed, 
in some information technology areas considerable technology may become 
obsolete in the market before the patents on them expire. This makes the 
Constitution’s “limited times” prescription meaningless and indicates that the 
patent system is not facilitating the dissemination of this technology at all.  
Overall, the existing literature provides very little insight into the effects 
of either specific patent or antitrust rules on economic performance. For 
example, there is little to no empirical support for suggestions made by some 
that limiting pay-for-delay pharmaceutical settlements reduces welfare in the 
pharmaceutical industry.190 To be sure, any practice that tends to increase the 
duration of patent protection increases the incentive to patent,191 but ex ante 
                                                                                                                     
 186 See, e.g., Eric E. Johnson, Calibrating Patent Lifetimes, 22 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 269, 308–09 (2006). 
 187 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, An Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year Patent Term, 22 
AIPLA Q.J. 369, 392–93 (1994) (finding a greater incentive to innovate in most industries 
as term went to twenty years from date of application). 
 188 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 32, at 296. 
 189 Id.  
 190 Among those making this suggestion are Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey Paul Jarosch, 
Policy Reversal on Reverse Payments: Why Courts Should Not Follow the New DOJ 
Position on Reverse-Payment Settlements of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 96 IOWA L. 
REV. 57, 90–91 (2010); James Langenfeld & Wenqing Li, Intellectual Property and 
Agreements to Settle Patent Disputes: The Case of Settlement Agreements with Payments 
from Branded to Generic Drug Manufacturers, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 777, 809–10 (2003). 
 191 See, e.g., David S. Abrams, Did TRIPS Spur Innovation? An Analysis of Patent 
Duration and Incentives to Innovate, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1613, 1641–42 (2009). 
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the incentive is not all that large, as the Landes and Posner conclusions 
indicate.192 Further, that number needs to be offset by dissemination effects. 
Even incentive effects are uncertain. A likely impact of restricting pay-for-
delay settlements is to increase patentee incentive to develop new drugs that 
start the patent clock over, as an alternative to weak extensions of patents on 
old drugs.193 Further, one must consider the generally low quality of the 
extension patents that are subject to pay-for-delay settlements.194 Given the 
exclusive rights they create, the incentive to obtain them may be strong, but if 
they provide protection over developments that in the ordinary course would 
have been provided competitively, their social value is negative. 
Returning to the question of nonobvious subject matter, a court reviewing 
a performance based litigation question might consider how many independent 
inventors had developed the same technology. For example, in the Alexsam, 
Inc. v. IDT Corp litigation the defendant had sued thirteen different “stored 
value” gift card manufacturers for infringing its patent.195 That fact alone 
should have provoked a query into such questions as how many relevant gift 
card manufacturers there are, and whether they had copied this technology or 
developed it independently. If the requirement of nonobvious subject matter is 
performing as it should, we should not have a large number of independent 
developers. The Federal Circuit found that the defendant had not established 
obviousness by looking at some prior art, particularly since it failed to provide 
expert testimony on the question of whether a skilled artisan would have been 
independently motivated to combine the various prior art references.196 In 
short, the court asked a backward looking “boundaries” question when it 
should have been asking an “economic performance” question. 
Without changing the doctrine of absolute liability, a court interested in a 
performance-based rule of nonobvious subject matter might develop a 
presumption that if, say, 10% of the producers in a market are infringing, then 
                                                                                                                     
 192 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 32, at 422. 
 193 See Francesca Cornelli & Mark Schankerman, Patent Renewals and R&D 
Incentives, 30 RAND J. ECON. 197, 197–98 (1999). 
 194 See infra notes 247–50 and accompanying text. 
 195 Sua Sponte Order of Severance 1, Alexsam, Inc. v. Best Buy Co., No. 2:10cv93 
(E.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2013) (involving the Alexsam litigation); see also Unified Messaging 
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large number of claimed infringers. See Intellectual Ventures I, LLC v. Capital One Fin. 
Corp., No. 1:13-CV-00740, 2013 WL 6682981, at *5 (E.D. Va. Dec. 18, 2013) (alleging 
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 196 Alexsam, Inc. v. IDT Corp., 715 F.3d 1336, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
2015] ANTITRUST AND THE PATENT SYSTEM 513 
 
the subject of the patent must be obvious. The infringement plaintiff could 
defeat the presumption by showing that the infringers are in fact copyists or 
that the product, once on the market, is easy to copy and the infringers had 
access to it. For example, a showing that the product is easy to copy and was 
widely disseminated prior to rivals’ entry creates an inference of copying. By 
contrast, the fact that a large number of firms are infringing an electrical or 
business method patent held by a non-practicing entity is a strong indicator 
that the patent’s subject matter is obvious.197 That question will be difficult to 
answer in close cases, but not so difficult in many others. Further, it would 
actually measure what the nonobvious requirement should be measuring. Most 
importantly, it would lead to a body of empirical work guiding these 
determinations in the future. 
F. Comparative Advantage 
Legal policy makers must make decisions with the tools and information 
available to them, even if they are not perfect. At this time our knowledge 
about the relationship between antitrust law and traditional competition, while 
imperfect, is much more complete than our knowledge about the relationship 
between patent law and innovation—and more particularly, about the impact 
of particular patent doctrines on innovation. In that setting it is not irrational to 
condemn a practice that is highly likely to decrease welfare via collusion or 
exclusion in the shorter run based on nothing but an unsupported hunch that it 
might also increase innovation. 
VI. RESTRAINTS ON INNOVATION 
One important corollary to the observation that innovation contributes 
much more to economic growth than does competition under constant 
technology is that restraints on innovation can do much greater harm than 
restraints on simple competition.198 To an extent, the Patent Act itself or the 
courts interpreting it restrain innovation when exclusion effects outweigh the 
incentive effects. Several of the studies previously mentioned have observed 
that possibility. A well-known example is broad use of the patent law doctrine 
of equivalents to shut down technologies that are actually inventions in their 
own right. For example, in Wright Co. v. Herring-Curtiss Co. (Wright v. 
Curtiss), the Wright brothers were able to get a very broad interpretation of 
their patent that shut down the superior technology contained in the Curtiss 
airplane.199 The Wright brothers’ design employed flexible fabric covered 
                                                                                                                     
 197 See, e.g., Market-Alerts Pty., Ltd. v. Bloomberg Fin., LP, 922 F. Supp. 2d 486, 
488–89 (D. Del. 2013) (involving business method patent claim by non-practicing entity 
filed against multiple stock trading companies). 
 198 See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 238–57. 
 199 Wright Co. v. Herring-Curtiss Co., 204 F. 597 (W.D.N.Y. 1913), aff’d, 211 F. 654, 
655 (2d Cir. 1914); see Merges & Nelson, supra note 32, at 890–91. 
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wings and a series of cables that twisted, or “warped,” them in order to steer 
and level the plane.200 By contrast, Curtiss’s alternative used hinged ailerons, 
capable of being used with rigid metal wings, and similar to the technology in 
current use.201 While the practical result of Wright v. Curtiss is controversial, 
it may have delayed the development of a military-worthy United States 
aircraft until after World War One was over.202 The government eventually 
pressured the parties to cross license.203 Another is the Supreme Court’s 1908 
Continental Paper Bag Co v. Eastern Paper Bag Co. decision, which once 
again relied on a broad interpretation of the doctrine of equivalents to shut 
down a dominant firm’s competitor, who was in fact using a different 
technology than the dominant firm was using.204 
Only some restraints on innovation come through the patent system itself, 
however. Most are the result of conduct for which the Patent Act is largely 
irrelevant. Examples include Microsoft’s successful use of its market power to 
force Intel to cease development of a microchip capable of efficiently 
processing Java’s multi-language instructions. Microsoft feared that efficient 
translation and processing of different computer languages would weaken the 
hold of its Windows operating system by making it easier for non-Windows 
systems to be compatible.205 Another example was a cartel among American 
automobile manufacturers to suppress the development of low emissions 
automobile technology.206 A further example was the temporarily successful 
efforts of Allied Tube to withhold legal approval to plastic electric conduit, a 
lower cost and technologically superior alternative to Allied’s steel conduit.207 
And yet another example was a market dominant newspaper’s use of 
exclusivity threats to deter the advance of radio advertising, a nascent 
competing technology.208 To my knowledge no one has ever attempted to 
                                                                                                                     
 200 Wright, 204 F. at 600–01. 
 201 Id. at 609. 
 202 Merges & Nelson, supra note 32, at 890–91. 
 203 Mfrs. Aircraft Ass’n v. United States, 77 Ct. Cl. 481, 485 (1933) (detailing the 
government “suggestion” of cross-licensing). 
 204 See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 427‒30 (1908); see 
also infra notes 455–56 and accompanying text. 
 205 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 17–18, 28–29 (D.D.C. 1999), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 253 F.3d 34, 73–78 (D.C. Cir. 2001). See generally ANDREW I. 
GAVIL & HARRY FIRST, THE MICROSOFT ANTITRUST CASES: COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014). 
 206 See In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equip., 52 F.R.D. 398, 401–02 (C.D. 
Cal. 1970). 
 207 Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 496–97 (1988). 
But see SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc., No. 1:14-cv-191, slip op. at 7 (E.D. Va. 
July 15, 2014) (dismissing for lack of agreement complaint that defendants manipulated 
standard-setting process for electric saws so as to exclude plaintiff’s invention that stopped 
a saw blade upon contact with human skin). 
 208 Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 152–53 (1951); see Spencer 
Weber Waller & Matthew Sag, Promoting Innovation, 100 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 
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catalog such events completely, and certainly not to estimate their social 
impact, but it is almost certainly large.209 
Aside from the anti-innovation aspects of some patent rules, as discussed 
above, the problem of innovation restraints is best analyzed through the 
antitrust system. First of all, a restraint on innovation is an “output” restraint, 
just as much as a restriction on the number of units of a good to be produced. 
As a result it can readily be modeled through the ordinary tools of price 
theory, which typically regard it as leading to higher prices if the innovation 
would have reduced cost; or a shift in the demand curve if the innovation 
would have made a product more attractive. Some innovations, such as the 
plastic conduit in the Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc. 
decision, do both of these things at the same time. 
The presence and ubiquity of restraints on innovation suggests that legal 
policy take them more seriously. Patent law has an important role to play here, 
principally in ensuring that overly broad interpretations do not serve to restrain 
rather than incentivize innovation. For example, a developing concern about 
the activities of non-practicing patent assertion entities is that they may be 
restraining innovation by deterring firms from innovating in the areas where 
Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs) have large portfolios.210 To the extent that is 
true, the fix will very likely have to come from patent law rather than antitrust. 
VII. USING PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW TO ASSESS INNOVATION-
AFFECTING ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT 
This section offers some preliminary considerations for assessing 
antitrust/patent conflicts. Then we turn to the most commonly occurring 
conduct areas, delineating the proper role of antitrust for each. 
A. Principles for Resolving Antitrust/Patent Conflicts 
1. Pre-issuance conduct involving patents is generally not 
addressable under the antitrust laws, although pre-issuance 
conduct may be relevant to certain forms of post-issuance 
exclusionary behavior, such as the filing of unreasonable 
infringement suits. The patent system is a largely complete and 
effective regulator of pre-issuance conduct, and it is not antitrust 
law’s purpose to police other federal regulatory regimes. 
2. A practice that is expressly authorized by the Patent Act cannot 
be the basis of an antitrust claim, provided that the conduct in 
                                                                                                                     
2015) (manuscript at 7), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=2479569, archived at http://perma.cc/7U3T-VBS9. 
 209 For more substantiated accounts, see BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 
238–57; Hovenkamp, supra note 137, at 249–52. 
 210 See infra notes 465–75 and accompanying text. 
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question falls within the authorization. This proposition is nothing 
more than a general rule of statutory construction: specific 
statutory authorizations in a federal statute should control general 
prohibitions, such as those contained in the antitrust laws. 
3. Post-issuance practices that are not authorized by the Patent Act 
should be evaluated under ordinary antitrust rules, which take 
both static competition effects and innovation effects into 
account. Saying that a practice is subject to the antitrust laws, 
however, is not to conclude that it violates them. 
4. Active production under a patent license can indicate that a 
restraint is “ancillary,” justifying rule of reason treatment,211 but 
it is important to distinguish restraints in the licensing market 
from restraints in the product market. 
5. Innovation affecting conduct falls within the domain of antitrust 
just as much as patent law, with the important limitation that 
antitrust applies only to innovation affecting conduct that is also 
anticompetitive. While the patent law’s own system sometimes 
works to restrain innovation, it is not antitrust law’s place to 
second-guess the way that Congress, patent officials, or judges 
make or interpret patent law. For example, judicial recognition of 
an overly broad doctrine of equivalents,212 a judge-made rule, 
may restrain innovation, but policing the behavior of federal 
judges is not an antitrust function. By contrast, most post-issuance 
restraints on innovation are privately created and completely 
within antitrust law’s reach. 
6. The range of “agreements” covered by the antitrust laws is 
broader than the range of "licenses" authorized by the Patent Act. 
This principle is particularly important for assessing large 
industry-wide arrangements that include cross-licenses but may 
also be subject to other agreements or agreement facilitators, not 
all of which will be in writing. 
7. A court generally need not determine patent validity or 
infringement in order to assess the antitrust legality of a 
settlement or other license agreement. For antitrust, the relevant 
question is the objectively measured effects of the agreement and 
the parties expectations about the quality of the patent(s) at the 
time the agreement was made. A later finding of patent invalidity 
should not create antitrust liability for a settlement that was 
reasonably deemed lawful when created; nor should a later 
finding of validity serve to ratify an agreement reasonably 
regarded as anticompetitive. This is consistent with the general 
principle that economics takes an ex ante rather than ex post 
                                                                                                                     
 211 On the rule of reason, see infra notes 221–22 and accompanying text. 
 212 See infra notes 456 and accompanying text. 
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approach to decision making. Further, requiring judicial inquiries 
into patent validity and infringement in order to evaluate a 
settlement agreement brings back in the very questions that the 
disputing parties were seeking to avoid at the time of their 
settlement.213 
B. Product Restraints vs. Patent Restraints 
A simple patent license covers the use of patents, not the production of 
products. The difference is important for two reasons. First, many patents 
cover only a component of a product, and the patent may have alternatives or 
be amenable to inventing around. Secondly, nothing in the Patent Act 
authorizes market division or price fixing of products, but only the licensing of 
patents. As the number of patents becomes larger and their individual coverage 
smaller, the distinction between patent restraints and product restraints 
becomes all the more important. For example, under the Patent Act a maker of 
outdoor grills who has patented a unique igniter may license the igniter 
technology to a competing grill maker and specify the geographic area in 
which that patent can be used, perhaps limiting competition with itself in 
certain areas. The Patent Act expressly permits domestic geographic 
restrictions on a patent license.214 What the Patent Act does not authorize, 
however, is an agreement under which the patentee limits the territories in 
which the licensee can sell any outdoor grills whatsoever, whether or not they 
practice the patent.215 That would be a product market restraint and it is fully 
subject to the antitrust laws.216 The distinction is important because there may 
be a robust market remaining for outdoor grills that do not have the igniter in 
question. Indeed, the igniter may do little more than create a product 
differentiation that some consumers prefer but not others. Second, there may 
be alternative technologies that get the same job done, or it may be possible 
for the second firm to invent around the patent, a practice that patent law 
generally encourages. 
Most antitrust condemnations of restrictive licensing agreements have 
involved restraints with a significant impact in the product market. At the 
same time, however, only a subset of product market restraints violate the 
                                                                                                                     
 213 See Edlin et al., supra note 141; Hovenkamp, supra note 38, at *10.  
 214 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012). 
 215 As a matter of patent policy, the exhaustion, or “first sale,” doctrine might refuse to 
enforce such a restriction imposed in a patent license if the good in question was sold. See 
Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 664–67 (1895) (refusing to enforce 
territorial restriction imposed via patent license on good after sale); Adams v. Burke, 84 
U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 456–57 (1873) (same). 
 216 See, e.g., Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 448 F.2d 872, 880–81 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding 
that resale price maintenance of patented product constituted both a per se Sherman Act 
offense and patent misuse); Solvex Corp. v. Freeman, 459 F. Supp. 440, 442–48 (W.D. Va. 
1977) (similar but with vertical territorial restraints). 
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antitrust laws. For example, suppose that the patentee of the grill igniter 
licenses it and specifies the price at which the grills must be sold. Assuming 
that the patentee does not make grills itself, this would be resale price 
maintenance (RPM), a vertical practice that is governed by the rule of reason 
and most often lawful.217 Alternatively, a grill manufacturer might create a 
dealership network to sell the grills, giving dealers an express or implied 
license for patented technology, and might also impose dealer location 
restrictions on dealer sales of the grills themselves. But these would be vertical 
nonprice restraints, which are covered by the rule of reason and are usually 
lawful.218 
One interesting aspect of pharmaceutical pay-for-delay settlements is that 
typically the patent and the product are coterminous, at least as a practical 
matter. This is because drugs falling under the Hatch-Waxman Act must be 
“bioequivalent” in order to qualify for abbreviated FDA testing. A generic 
firm invoking the statute does not typically have the option of inventing 
around the patent, for the resulting drug would not be bioequivalent. Pay-for-
delay settlements such as the one in the Actavis case effectively create a 
market division in the product market, an area where antitrust scrutiny has 
historically been justified.219 One might object that the only way one can have 
a patent license restriction on a bioequivalent drug is to have product market 
restriction as well. The argument might carry some weight but for the fact that 
a pay-for-delay settlement is not a license at all for the delay period, because 
under it the generic firm is not authorized to produce anything during that 
period. As a result it cannot be characterized as a restricted production license 
of the kind that has generally received benign treatment under the antitrust 
laws.220 
C. Modes of Antitrust Inquiry  
Courts analyze most antitrust claims under the rule of reason, which 
requires the plaintiff to show initially that the defendant has sufficient market 
power and that the challenged practice injures competition by facilitating 
either collusion or anticompetitive exclusion. At that time, the burden of proof 
                                                                                                                     
 217 When RPM was unlawful per se, it was frequently used to condemn RPM on the 
product contained in license agreements. See United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 
241, 247–52 (1942) (bifocal lens blanks ground with a patented process); Ethyl Gasoline 
Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 442–43 (1940) (gasoline containing patented 
additive); Cummer-Graham Co. v. Straight Side Basket Corp., 142 F.2d 646, 647 (5th Cir. 
1944) (patentee of basket-making machine could not impose RPM on unpatented baskets 
made with the machine). Since 2007, resale price maintenance has been addressed under 
antitrust law’s rule of reason. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 
U.S. 877, 907 (2007). 
 218 Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47–59 (1977). 
 219 See FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237–38 (2013); see also supra notes 120–30 
and accompanying text. 
 220 See supra notes 210–18 and accompanying text. 
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shifts to the defendant to provide evidence of a justification, or legitimate 
objective.221 The plaintiff can counter, however, by showing that the same 
objective could have been reached by a less restrictive alternative.222 
 Within each of these elements of proof there may be additional 
presumptions. For example, a high market share of a properly defined relevant 
market creates a presumption of market power, but the presumption can be 
defeated by proof of easy entry.223 While computation of market share is 
historically the most common way of establishing power, there are others.224 
The Actavis majority correctly concluded that a high pay-for-delay payment 
itself could create a presumption of market power, for only a firm with power 
would have the ability to make such a payment.225 The Supreme Court then 
went on to apply the rule of reason in the conventional way. Once the plaintiff 
had provided sufficient evidence of power and competitive harm, the burden 
shifted to the defendant to show a justification. 
In the process Actavis rejected a “quick look” approach urged by the 
Federal Trade Commission. The Supreme Court, Justice Breyer in particular, 
has never supported the view that antitrust analysis should be divided into 
three discrete silos, with “quick look” in between the rule of reason and the per 
se rule. Rather, he observed, appraising reasonableness in antitrust analysis 
requires a “sliding scale” that varies the inquiry with the question—a phrase 
taken from the Antitrust Law treatise.226 As the Court observed, a “quick look” 
was inappropriate in Actavis because the likelihood that a reverse payment 
would bring about anticompetitive effects: “depends upon its size, its scale in 
relation to the payor’s anticipated future litigation costs, its independence from 
other services for which it might represent payment, and the lack of any other 
convincing justification.”227  
The Court did not make patent validity or infringement an issue in the 
antitrust analysis. Nor did it assign the burden of proof on any issue. It would 
be reasonable, however, to require that once the plaintiff established a large 
payment in relation to anticipated future litigation costs, the defendant should 
be required to come forward with information about collateral services and 
their value, as well as other convincing justifications. This information would 
most likely be within the defendant’s control. At that point the plaintiff could 
                                                                                                                     
 221 See 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶¶ 1502, 1507; cf. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. 
FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 786–88 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 222 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶ 1505. 
 223 See 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 135, ¶ 801; see also Cal. Dental Ass’n, 
526 U.S. at 788. 
 224 See, e.g., 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 135, ¶ 521 (addressing direct 
proof of market power by estimating residual demand). 
 225 See FTC v. Actavis, 113 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013); see also PHILLIP E. AREEDA & 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 520 (Supp. 2014). 
 226 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237–38, (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 780 
(quoting 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶ 1507)). 
 227 Id. at 2237. 
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still show that the same objectives could have been achieved by a less 
restrictive alternative. 
In contrast to the rule of reason, antitrust law’s per se rule condemns a 
subcategory of agreements simply upon proof that they have occurred, not 
requiring proof of market power or actual competitive harm. Today the per se 
rule is largely reserved for price fixing, naked market divisions, and naked 
concerted refusals to deal (boycotts).228 Once we have decided that the 
antitrust laws can be applied to a practice involving patents, ordinary antitrust 
analysis should determine whether the per se rule or the rule of reason should 
be used. That is to say, this is an antitrust question of law,229 not a patent law 
question. 
The involvement of patents may indicate rule of reason treatment in an 
antitrust case, mainly because the development and dissemination of 
technology are both “ancillary” practices with potential economic benefits. For 
example, while a naked product market division agreement is unlawful per se, 
an agreement embodied in a patent license or cross license may reveal that the 
firms are sharing a common technology. But this is simply a way of saying 
that the rule of reason governs “ancillary” restraints, and legitimate technology 
sharing is a form of ancillarity. Identifying the potential for gains and harm is 
the purpose of the rule of reason. 
Actavis is exceptional in this sense because a pure pay-for-delay settlement 
is not a license during the delay period but a naked market exclusion that is 
ordinarily unlawful per se under the antitrust laws. Further, nothing in the 
Patent Act or Hatch-Waxman Act authorizes pay-for-delay settlements. On top 
of that, many pay-for-delay settlements involve such attenuated adversity 
between the parties that they are best regarded as “settlements” in name 
only.230 
To that extent Actavis’s insistence on a rule of reason still embodies an 
element of the “beyond the scope of the patent” inquiry. The restraint at issue 
would have been harmless if the patent were valid and infringed, and the issue 
is what to make of a very large payment that sends a strong signal of patent 
invalidity. By contrast, practices such as naked product price fixing are 
unjustified whether or not the patents in question are valid and infringed.231 
The two most salient facts about Actavis’s antitrust analysis are, first, that the 
Court applied the rule of reason, but second, that it recognized and applied the 
long-standing practice in antitrust cases that even the rule of reason involves 
presumptions designed to focus the relevant inquiries.232 
                                                                                                                     
 228 See generally 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ch. 15; 11–13 id. chs. 19–
22. 
 229 The choice of rule is a question of law, although factual determinations concerning 
ancillarity may be needed. See 11 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶ 1909b. 
 230 See infra note 251 and accompanying text. 
 231 See infra notes 258–59 and accompanying text. 
 232 See 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶ 1507. 
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D. Settlements 
Most patent infringement suits settle prior to trial.233 The settlements often 
result in production licenses, which the Patent Act authorizes in any event. 
These would ordinarily be lawful even if there were no infringement litigation 
to be settled.234 When the settlements include provisions that the Patent Act 
does not authorize, then closer judicial scrutiny is appropriate.235 Patents enjoy 
a statutory presumption of validity, and at the time of a pre-trial settlement this 
presumption has typically not been upset.236 In general, the courts look closely 
at settlement agreements that include restrictions on the product price,237 
market division of the product,238 or concerted refusals to deal with 
outsiders.239 Purely vertical settlements are generally approved, with some 
exceptions for exclusive agreements.240 
The previously discussed “beyond the scope” formulation241 for patent 
practices retains some vitality in judicial opinions involving antitrust 
challenges to patent settlements. In practice, the formulation has come to mean 
that a settlement is permissible if its terms are no more exclusionary than a 
finding of patent validity and infringement would have been. The important 
thing about most of these disputes is that there is true adversity between the 
parties. By contrast, adversity is severely limited in the unique subset of 
settlements in Hatch-Waxman cases involving pharmaceutical drugs, where 
the joint maximizing course is typically for the two parties to divide the 
market for as long as the law permits, taking advantage of the Hatch-Waxman 
provision to exclude everyone else.242 
                                                                                                                     
 233 See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 
1495, 1501 (2001). 
 234 See 12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, ¶ 2046b. 
 235 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931) (noting policy of 
encouraging settlements); see also IP ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 20, § 5.5 & 
Example 10 (“Settlements involving the cross-licensing of intellectual property rights can 
be an efficient means to avoid litigation and, in general, courts favor such settlements.”). 
 236 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012); see also United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 
287, 318–19 (1948) (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating the presumption of validity in 
assessing a patent settlement but nevertheless striking down resale price maintenance and 
price-fixing provisions). 
 237 United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371, 373–76 (1952); United States v. 
Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 274–77 (1942); United States v. Huck Mfg. Co., 227 F. 
Supp. 791, 793–94, 803 (E.D. Mich. 1964) (approving the arrangement), aff’d per curiam, 
382 U.S. 197 (1965); United States v. Krasnov, 143 F. Supp. 184, 197–99 (E.D. Pa. 1956) 
(striking down cross-licensing agreement accompanied by product price fixing), aff’d per 
curiam, 355 U.S. 5 (1957). 
 238 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 324 U.S. 570, 574 (1945) (clarifying 323 
U.S. 386 (1945)). 
 239 See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 195 (1963). 
 240 See infra notes 377–79 and accompanying text. 
 241 See supra notes 48–66 and accompanying text. 
 242 See supra notes 242–47 and accompanying text. 
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Pay-for-delay settlements are sometimes thought to be unique because the 
market division does no more than protect what a valid and infringed patent 
would have protected in the first place—namely, the patentee’s right to 
exclude the generic. Those defending the agreements have suggested that an 
agreement whose duration runs short of the time remaining on the patent might 
actually benefit consumers by permitting quicker generic entry than a valid 
patent would permit.243 The problem with that argument, however, is that 
there is no equilibrium agreement that would satisfy those conditions without 
harming consumers.244 As noted above, under the dissenter’s “scope of the 
patent” approach the equilibrium point would be an agreement that delayed 
generic entry just short of the full patent term.245 
The availability of a pay-for-delay settlement under the Hatch-Waxman 
Act creates one of the more perverse anticompetitive incentives in the patent 
system. Such settlements are virtually unknown in patent law outside the 
context of Hatch-Waxman.246 The owner of a pioneer drug whose patent is 
about to expire is incentivized to create a secondary or extension (evergreened) 
patent that is just strong enough to get by a patent examiner.247 Evergreened 
patents of this nature have a very high failure rate.248 It does not matter how 
weak the patent is, however; it simply has to be issued. At that point the 
patentee can enter into a pay-for-delay settlement that ratchets the patent’s 
anticipated success probability up to 100% because no one can challenge the 
patent for the duration of the settlement. The result creates a largely 
impregnable market division because the patent and the product in a pay-for-
delay settlement are coterminous: one cannot make the product without the 
patent.249 
As noted previously, some have argued that rules disfavoring pay-for-
delay settlements might reduce the incentive to develop new drugs.250 The 
only empirical support for that claim is that a longer protection period provides 
a greater incentive to get a particular patent, but says nothing about overall 
effects on innovation or the social cost of a longer period of exclusion. On the 
                                                                                                                     
 243 See Barry C. Harris et al., Activating Actavis: A More Complete Story, 28 
ANTITRUST 83, 83 (2014). 
 244 See Edlin et al., supra note 102, at 7. 
 245 See supra notes 123–26 and accompany text; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 38 
(manuscript at 10). 
 246 See Hovenkamp, supra note 118, at 15–16. 
 247 Kate S. Gaudry, Evergreening: A Common Practice to Protect New Drugs, 29 
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other hand, the short-run cost/benefit analysis is overwhelmingly negative. 
The consistent record of drug prices shows sharp declines upon generic 
entry.251 In any event, the remedy for a patent period that is too short is 
congressional action lengthening the patent term, not tacking of a bad patent 
onto a good one. 
The Actavis decision creates some unacknowledged tension with the 
Patent Act’s statutory presumption of validity, which gives the challenger the 
burden to prove invalidity.252 In 2011, the Supreme Court agreed with a long 
line of cases that this presumption could be defeated only by clear and 
convincing evidence.253 At the time of a pay-for-delay settlement a patent has 
typically not yet been declared invalid; although there are a few exceptions.254 
Nevertheless, the Court’s opinion is driven by an assumption that a high pay-
for-delay settlement suggests patent weakness. The fact is that the Patent Act’s 
statutory presumption of validity is in conflict with a reality in which nearly 
half of patents are declared invalid even under the clear and convincing 
standard.255 In any event, the Court’s holding that it is not necessary to litigate 
the patent’s validity256 is consistent with other decisions holding that 
settlement agreements can be unlawful whether or not the patents in question 
are valid and infringed. For example, patent validity is not a defense to market 
wide price fixing in the product market.257 This is most likely to be the case 
when the restraint affects the product market, and when the agreement is not 
one that the Patent Act authorizes. Both of these things are true of pay-for-
delay pharmaceutical settlements. The underlying rationale is that settlements 
as well as other licensing agreement must be analyzed ex ante, based on the 
parties’ reasonable expectations, rather than ex post by determining after the 
agreement was entered whether the patent was in fact valid and infringed. 
VIII. SPECIFIC PRACTICES IMPLICATING ANTITRUST AND PATENT LAW 
This section examines specific post-issuance practices that have implicated 
both antitrust and patent policy. 
                                                                                                                     
 251 See, e.g., JON LEIBOWITZ, FED. TRADE COMM’N, “PAY-FOR-DELAY” SETTLEMENTS 
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A. Product Price Fixing and Horizontal Market Division 
Naked product price fixing is per se unlawful under the antitrust laws, is 
condemned by competition authorities everywhere, and can be a criminal 
offense under United States law.258 At the same time, a patent production or 
use license is a buy–sell agreement that must set a price on the license itself. 
As a result there is nothing wrong with a license agreement that sets a royalty 
for the licensee’s use of a patent as a lump sum, a percentage of the sales price, 
a per unit price, or by some other means. The Patent Act expressly authorizes 
such licenses.259 
In the Bement v. National Harrow Co. decision the parties went further, 
however. They settled litigation over patents covering spring-tooth harrows by 
a cross-license agreement that also stipulated the price at which the harrows 
themselves must be sold.260 The Supreme Court upheld the agreement, 
reasoning that one element in ownership of a patent is the right to set a product 
price, which the patentee could retain.261 In 1926, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged a similar exception for an agreement under which General 
Electric licensed Westinghouse to make light bulbs under its patent and set the 
price for the bulbs.262 Congress repeatedly considered overturning this rule, 
but without success—a point that three dissenting Justices emphasized in the 
1948 Line Materials case.263 The majority condemned a market wide price 
fixing agreement contained in patent cross-licenses.264 The basic cross-
licensing agreement covered two complementary patents owned by the two 
principals, but they also agreed to license others to manufacture under the two 
patents and jointly stipulated the price of the manufactured products. 
While Bement and United States v. General Electric Co. (GE) have never 
been explicitly overruled, today the antitrust enforcement agencies largely 
ignore them.265 In a district court opinion, Judge Richard Posner, sitting by 
designation, opined that a product price fixing agreement contained in a 
license settling a patent dispute would be unlawful if the parties believed that 
the patent was “almost certain” not to survive a validity challenge.266 He also 
suggested that the “elderly and much-criticized” GE decision would not be 
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upheld today, noting that the low royalty rate (2%) plus an output escalation 
clause that served to limit production indicated that the parties were very 
dubious about the patent and also wanted to fix prices.267 In addition, they 
collectively held 93% of the light bulb market.268 In dicta in Actavis, the 
Supreme Court restricted GE in a different way, limiting it to agreements 
between a “single patentee” and a “single licensee.”269 Perhaps a patentee has 
an interest in limiting price competition from its licensee.270 Chief Justice Taft 
thought so in his GE opinion for the Court.271 The patentee could achieve the 
same result, however, simply by raising the license price. That would permit 
the patentee to keep the surplus to itself rather than sharing it with the licensee. 
Of course, the licensee might be unwilling to pay more, but that would suggest 
that the patent is worth less than the cartel markup in any event.  
Neither Judge Posner’s restriction to patents of dubious validity nor 
Actavis’s restriction to agreements between a single patentee and a single 
licensee goes far enough. First, the Actavis limitation might be a useful way of 
distinguishing GE as judicial precedent, but on the collusion question, the 
smaller number of players increases rather than decreases the competitive 
danger, provided the cartel has sufficient power to increase the price. Indeed, a 
two-person cartel in a duopoly market is typically more stable and thus more 
dangerous than a cartel composed of a larger number. 
Judge Posner’s restriction to patents of dubious validity does not address 
the full problem either. To be sure, including a license in a worthless patent 
may be a cover for price fixing. But the problem goes far deeper: a product 
price fix in a patent license agreement attributes the entire value of a 
monopoly market position to the patents covered in the license agreement. To 
illustrate, suppose that office staplers can be sold competitively at a price of 
$5.00, but that a monopolist or well-functioning cartel would charge $7.00, or 
40% higher.272 Suppose that the manufacturers of these staplers identify a 
minor patent covering one manufacturer’s stapler. They form a cross-licensing 
agreement for that patent, stipulating that each of them will charge $7 for 
staplers. They have in fact merged the legal question about patent validity and 
infringement and the economic question of patent value into the cartel 
agreement. Even if the patent were completely valid it may have contributed 
little value to the staplers in question and certainly not value sufficient to 
enable the staplers to be sold at a 40% markup, the full product cartel price. 
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The empirical literature on price fixing overcharges and patent licenses 
bears this out. In successful cartels the average markup is on the order of 20% 
to 50% over the pre-cartel price,273 while average per patent royalty rates on 
licensed patents run in a range of 1–6% of the wholesale product price.274 One 
study found the median rate to be about 3%.275 Further, only valuable patents 
are licensed. Only about 1–2% of issued patents are ever litigated, and less 
than 5% are licensed.276 A significant majority of patents are not even 
maintained when renewal fees become due.277 But any patent, whether 
valuable or not, could be used as an excuse for a product price fix if contained 
in a cartel agreement that the courts permitted. Without regard to the patent’s 
value this agreement would permit the parties to set the price to the full cartel 
level. That situation resembles the one in Actavis, where the opportunity for 
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collusion eliminates most of the adversity between the parties, permitting them 
to share the cartel profits. Patent strength could then be reflected in the size of 
internal cross-licensing royalties. As Judge Posner noted in Asahi Glass, for 
example, the fact that GE and Westinghouse set a very low royalty rate 
suggests that the patent was not very strong.278 
By contrast, suppose that one of the stapler manufacturers has a patent that 
it believes really does make the staplers worth $7, or $2 more than the cost of 
production. The manufacturer could then license the patents to its competitors 
at a royalty rate of $2 per stapler. The output result in this case would be the 
same, yielding final prices of $7, assuming that both manufacturers have costs 
of $5. But this situation is far different because now we have preserved 
adversity among the parties on the relevant patent questions of validity, 
infringement, and value. If the rival stapler manufacturer does not believe that 
the patent is valid, that it is not infringing, or that the patent does not add $2 in 
value, it will not pay. It might try to invent around the patent rather than pay 
the royalty, but the ability to join a cartel would undermine that incentive as 
well. This makes this situation very different from Bement or GE.  
No provision of the Patent Act authorizes product price fixing, and for 
good reason. But should we apply the rule of reason rather than the per se rule 
to a naked product price fix contained in a patent license? That might be a 
compromise between the Bement and GE conclusions of legality and the 
antitrust rule of per se illegality. It would condemn such price fixes only in 
cases of significant power and where the price that is fixed is in some way 
unreasonable. 
The problem with a rule of reason in this setting is that it greatly 
encumbers the analysis of a problem without giving anything in return. As 
noted above, the harm from a product price fix can occur whether or not the 
patents are valid or infringed. Quite aside from questions of validity or 
infringement, they might simply not be worth much, or at least not worth 
nearly as much as the markup that the fixers agree upon. As a result, asking 
whether the price fix was no more than reasonably necessary to cover the 
value of a patent that was valid and infringed would require a very costly and 
uncertain inquiry into both patent validity and market value—precisely the 
“sea of doubt” that Judge Taft worried about in his famous defense of the per 
se price fixing rule, rejecting the defendants’ arguments for an inquiry into 
reasonableness.279 Further, in this case the patentee has a perfectly reasonable 
alternative, which is metering of the royalty rate rather than the product price. 
The patentee will simply have to convince the prospective licensee that the 
patent is worth that much. 
One qualification to this rule is the Patent Act provision that authorizes 
domestic horizontal territorial division.280 Section 261 authorizes a patentee to 
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grant a production license to another firm that covers “the whole or any 
specified part of the United States.”281 The provision is written in such a way 
that it covers both horizontal agreements and purely vertical territorial 
restraints, where the licensor and licensee are not product competitors.282 
Thus, for example, if the owner of an upstream process patent licenses it to 
numerous downstream dealers, neither patent policy nor antitrust policy has 
much reason to attack the arrangement, provided that the licensees are not 
agreeing with each other.283 As far as patent law is concerned, the practice is 
statutorily authorized. As far as antitrust is concerned, purely vertical nonprice 
restraints are governed by the rule of reason and few are condemned.284 
Problematically, however, the provision also insulates purely horizontal 
territorial restraints where the parties are competitors. These could be per se 
unlawful under the antitrust laws. In United States v. National Lead Co., the 
Supreme Court qualified § 261’s reach, holding that the Sherman Act applies 
if competing firms disguise a naked horizontal territorial division agreement in 
patent cross licenses.285 In this case the territorial restrictions were worldwide, 
taking them out of the § 261 authorization, which extends only to domestic 
territorial division agreements.286 In addition, the territorial provisions 
included licensees’ agreements with one another, as well as with licensors.287 
No provision of the Patent Act authorizes licensees to enter anticompetitive 
agreements with one another.288 
Unlike a pay-for-delay settlement, in which the generic does nothing but 
stay out of the market, § 261 creates an express authorization only for 
patentees or their assignees to grant a license.289 As a result, there will be a 
level of integration between a competing patentee and licensee, because they 
are using a common patent to produce something. An ancillary market division 
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agreement—unlike the naked territory division in National Lead—would be 
addressed under the rule of reason.290 
Finally, § 261 authorizes licenses of the patent, not the entire product in 
which the patent is embodied. To illustrate, suppose that firm A sells lawn 
mowers east of the Mississippi River that include a patented handle that 
purports to be easier to grip. A is free to license firm B, another lawn mower 
seller, to use its patent and to limit use of the handle to mowers sold west of 
the Mississippi. What A cannot do, however, is forbid B from selling any 
mowers whatsoever east of the Mississippi. Firm B is free to sell mowers 
anywhere it wishes provided that it does not incorporate A’s patented handle. 
Territorial agreements that reach to the product itself are not protected by 
§ 261. If horizontal and naked, they can be illegal per se.291 
Product and customer market division agreements stand on a different 
footing from territorial division because they are not authorized by the Patent 
Act. Such agreements usually take the form of “field-of-use” restrictions, 
under which a patent is licensed for a particular product or customer set.292 
Field-of-use restrictions permit a producing patentee to license others for 
markets that it does not wish to serve with its own production.293 Once again, 
to the extent they involve licenses that are actually producing, they are 
ancillary restraints with respect to that patent. If the restrictions are imposed 
by one firm on others the courts generally uphold them under the rule of 
reason.294 For example, in General Talking Pictures v. Western Electric Co., 
AT&T reserved the production of sound amplifiers incorporating its patents 
for commercial use to its own subsidiaries, but it licensed others to produce 
private versions.295 While agreements such as these are horizontal in form, 
because the patentee competes with the licensees, they are vertical in 
substance to the extent that the patentee behaves as the manager of the 
arrangement and is simply licensing other firms to produce in other markets. A 
close analogy in distribution restraints generally is “dual distribution,” in 
which a producer such as General Motors might own some of its dealerships 
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while entering into franchise agreements with others. After a lengthy history of 
debate,296 the courts today overwhelmingly regard them as essentially vertical 
arrangements with significant potential to increase output.297 
But some field-of-use arrangements cross the line when firms use the 
restrictions to support collusion. These are closely analogous to other 
restricted distribution systems in which the product division is instigated by a 
cartel of dealers or by one powerful dealer.298 For example, the Hartford-
Empire Co. v. United States decision involved an elaborate product market 
division agreement among competing glassmakers. The agreement, which 
settled patent infringement litigation, gave Corning an exclusive right to make 
pressed and blown glassware, while Hartford received an exclusive right to 
make other types of glass. Thatcher became the exclusive manufacturer of 
glass milk bottles, and Ball the exclusive maker of canning jars.299 All of the 
major participants owned patents that were contributed to the cross-licensing 
agreement, but the agreements themselves applied to the products, not to the 
patents as such.300 
Dividing the territory between beneficial and harmful field-of-use 
arrangements brings antitrust policy to one of its most conceptually frustrating 
issues: how to distinguish vertical from horizontal agreements in the context of 
restricted distribution. Because the Patent Act does not speak to the issue of 
product-restricted licenses, antitrust law’s rule of reason applies and the issues 
for patent licenses are not different in principle from the issues for organized 
product distribution generally. The one important difference is that organized 
distribution by means of patent licenses may involve technology sharing, 
while individual product dealers tend to be silos with relatively little inter-
dealer communication. But these are fact questions that antitrust law’s rule of 
reason is designed to address. 
B. Pooling, Cross-Licensing, and Standard Setting of Patented 
Technologies 
Pooling and cross-licensing simpliciter refer to situations in which 
product-producing firms agree to share technologies for some part of their 
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production without fixing product prices or dividing the product market.301 
The agreements can range from specific licenses for specific patents, to 
licenses for large numbers of patents, to standard setting agreements that 
involve standards essential patents (SEPs), and up front commitments to 
license the patents on “fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory” (FRAND) 
terms. In some cases, firms will simply exchange royalty-free licenses to their 
entire portfolios.302 
Licensing exchanges that do not restrict products do not often violate the 
antitrust laws. Such disputes mainly involve either patent law or contract law. 
Antitrust becomes involved when the restrictions facilitate price fixing, market 
division, or some other restraint in the product market. Pure patent exclusions 
can be anticompetitive, however, when firms manipulate the standard setting 
process to exclude particular technologies that compete with the technologies 
of members.303 Antitrust also becomes relevant when firms combine their 
patents and use exclusive cross-licenses as a device for excluding others.304 Of 
course, if a standards essential patent is truly essential to network 
functionality, then a pure patent restriction may also operate as an effective 
product restriction as well. 
A traditional view about antitrust in markets for pooling and cross 
licensing was that pooling of complementary patents is efficient, while pooling 
of substitutes is suspicious because it facilitates collusion.305 At a high level of 
abstraction, that observation seems important. Complements are ordinarily 
used together. Pooling of complements reduces the transaction costs of joint 
licensing, and also eliminates double marginalization, or royalty “stacking.”306 
By contrast, if two patents are substitutes they should be competing with one 
another and the licensee needs one of them, but not both. In that case, pooling 
is unnecessary to achieve economies and may facilitate collusion. 
The substitutes/complements argument often falls apart in practice, 
however, particularly in information technologies. First, when patents have 
large numbers of claims, as many information technologies patents do, then 
dividing them up into substitutes and complements is often impossible. Many 
patents function as both simultaneously. For example, the Princo Corp. v. 
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International Trade Commission decision involved alternative patents for 
digital and analog technologies for a portion of a writable CD system that 
located the stylus on the disc.307 A manufacturer would use one technology or 
the other, but not both, making them function as substitutes.308 However, 
practicing the analog patent required infringement of at least one claim in the 
digital patent.309 This made the patents legal complements as well because 
effectively they had to be licensed together.310 
The products that contain pooled patents might be more easily classified as 
substitutes or complements, but even that is not always clear. One problem 
with large information technology pools such as MPEG LA, which pools 
video patents for digital devices, is that the scope of many individual patents 
has not been determined at the time of licensing.311 The members of MPEG 
LA include manufacturers of personal computers, software, DVD discs and 
players, memory cards, computer displays, digital televisions, mobile video 
receivers, TV set-top boxes, Blu-Ray discs and players, digital still video 
cameras, as well as pay-per-view television technology.312 For example, a 
digital camera and a digital computer display are complements in the product 
market. One makes photos and the other displays them, so each enhances the 
value of the other. Nevertheless, these two devices very likely share numerous 
patents that cover technologies of video digitization and compression. A 
traditional DVD player and a Blu-Ray player are better classified as substitutes 
rather than complements. Nevertheless, they undoubtedly share many patents 
as well. In sum, the complements/substitutes distinction becomes useless in 
markets with any significant degree of complexity. 
In large information technology pools no one knows until after costly 
claim construction whether or not specific patents write on someone’s 
product.313 A paying licensee of the package has little economic incentive to 
examine each patent in the package for validity or infringement. Even if a 
patent in the package were declared invalid, there is no legal mechanism short 
of price regulation that would require a rate reduction. 
In such a setting the transaction cost savings from pooling make it far 
more favorable to most firms than individual enforcement or licensing.314 
                                                                                                                     
 307 See Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1322–23 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(en banc). 
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 314 See id. § 34.4c4. 
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Indeed, in markets other than chemicals and pharmaceuticals the average value 
of patents is often less than the cost of acquiring, interpreting, and litigating 
them.315 In that case, widespread pooling becomes a way for firms to “back 
out” of a patent system that is based on individual appropriation when sharing 
is a superior alternative. By sharing all of the important technology, they can 
bring themselves back into an equilibrium with far fewer patents to worry 
about, except for those held by outsiders to the pool. 
A more robust explanation for pooling in high tech markets is rooted in the 
theory of commons development, in this case the “innovation commons.”316 
The legally recognized boundaries of individual property rights are valuable to 
the extent they reduce the costs of enforcement and in the process increase the 
value of appropriation.317 The clearer boundaries are and the less costly it is to 
defend them, the more valuable individual property rights will be. 
In some cases, however, boundaries are so costly to define and defend that 
sharing is preferable to individual appropriation. Consider the examples of 
fisheries and grazing rights, which traditionally experienced a large number of 
commons dating all the way back to the Middle Ages.318 A characteristic of 
such “common pool resources” is that the cost of defining and defending 
individual boundaries is very high in relation to production value.319 One 
might imagine that the 100 fishermen owning a common pool could build 
underwater fences dividing the pool into 100 parts. But doing so would be 
tremendously expensive, might hamper the movement of the fish with 
devastating results to the yield, and produce many disputes about the proper 
location of boundary lines and assignment of parcels. Considering all these 
impediments, the fishermen obtain a much greater payoff by turning the pool 
into a commons, developing rules about how much each participant can take 
out and how much each must contribute. 
 This phenomenon is simply a special case of Ronald Coase’s The Nature 
of the Firm.320 Firms decide on an input-by-input basis how to organize their 
production, choosing the most cost-effective/highest-payoff alternative.321 The 
Coasean theory of the commons simply says that firms will choose a commons 
when the payoff to doing so is greater than the payoff to individual boundary 
setting.322 
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Patent pools have some similarities to common pool resources, but they 
are not identical. One critical difference is that the resources in a traditional 
common pool are rivalrous, or “subtractive,” while output under a patent is 
not.323 For example, fishermen on a common pool risk overfishing, which will 
deplete the pool. Each has an incentive to take too many out, while 
contributing too little to restocking and maintenance. As a result, the managers 
must impose catch limitations on individual members. These quotas look 
dangerously like cartels, however, and would be unlawful if enforced by a 
fishing group that did not share a common pool. A patent, by contrast, can be 
practiced an infinite number of times without depleting the amount that is left 
over.324 As a result, output restrictions in patent pools are more suspicious 
than they are in traditional common pool resources.325 That is a place where 
antitrust can become relevant, although for the most part large pools for 
standardized technologies do not impose product output limitations. 
Another difference between patent pools and traditional common pool 
resources has to do with the diversity of both the participants and the patents in 
the pool. A commons for grazing, fishing, or irrigation rights typically 
includes participants and rights that are fairly homogenous. Not so with many 
large patent pools, as the discussion of the MPEG LA pool illustrates.326 This 
can naturally lead to disputes about what should be included in the patent pool. 
Some manufacturers might want a smaller set of patents, or a different set of 
patents than other members want. 
This phenomenon has led to challenges to a form of “tying,” or package 
licensing, in which a licensee complains that in order to obtain a set of patents 
that it wants (analogized to the tying product) it must also take a set of patents 
that it does not want (i.e., the tied product).327 Historically the Supreme Court 
has recognized such claims under the antitrust laws, but today they generally 
fail for the reason that no injury to competition is present.328 
Competitive harm from tying occurs when a buyer is forced to take a 
dominant firm’s tied product and as a result cannot purchase that product from 
a rival.329 The “unwanted tied product” claim, by contrast, is simply that the 
buyer would prefer a smaller package than the one that is being sold.330 This 
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claim may have made some sense in a world in which pools of complementary 
patents were regarded as beneficial but pools of substitutes were not, and 
where patents and the technologies incorporating them were easily interpreted. 
By showing that a particular patent was “unwanted” the plaintiff was 
establishing that at least for its own use that particular patent was not a 
complement. By contrast, the theory makes no sense if the reason for pooling 
is to reduce transaction costs and deal with boundary ambiguities. The plaintiff 
is asking the court to do precisely the very expensive act that pooling seeks to 
avoid—namely, establishing and costing out each licensee’s individual use. 
In any event, it is not antitrust law’s purpose to force sellers to cut their 
product offerings into smaller pieces for the benefit of a customer when no 
harm to competition is present. Further, accepting the “unwanted tied product” 
rationale for an antitrust claim turns the court into a micromanager of package 
size and price.331 For example, if the licensee member of a 1000 patent pool 
protests that its product actually uses only 150 of the patents, a court would 
have to conduct a fiercely expensive claim construction in order to determine 
how many patents the plaintiff’s product actually practices. Then it would 
have to determine some pro rata formula for giving the plaintiff a price 
reduction to account for the patents it does not use. Because all patents are 
hardly created equal, such evaluations would be enormously costly if not 
heroic.332 
Patent pooling via standard setting can become anticompetitive for the 
same reason that standard setting itself might—namely, when it is used to 
exclude a superior standard for the benefit of incumbent firms who are 
committed to an established standard. One good example outside of the patent 
licensing context is the Allied Tube decision.333 The Supreme Court found a 
likely antitrust violation when a group of firms producing traditional steel 
electrical conduit manipulated a standard setting organization into 
disapproving plastic conduit, a cheaper and superior product that captured 
most of the market once the ruling was reversed.334 This story has some 
analogues in patented high technology standard setting.335 
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One important thing about technology standard setting is that antitrust 
must resolve exclusion disputes without becoming unnecessarily involved in 
the substantive standards themselves. In areas such as telecommunications, 
electrical, and medical devices, juries are simply not equipped to make such 
evaluations. But there are other things that a court can examine. For example, 
competitive harm usually will not result if those setting the standard are not 
competitors with the person being excluded. As the Seventh Circuit once 
observed, a standard setting association of boat trailer manufacturers who 
purchase rather than make their own trailer lights has no anticompetitive 
incentive to exclude a particular light for failing to meets its standards.336 As 
purchasers rather than competitors, they stand to benefit from safe, reliable 
lights, just as consumers would. Second, if the standard setting organization 
does have participants who compete with the excluded firm there needs to be 
transparency and, if possible, firewalls that exclude direct competitors from 
participating in the standard setting process for a competitor’s good.337 
C. Grantbacks and Market Regimentation 
A grantback clause in a patent license requires the licensee to “grant back” 
any patented improvements it might make to the invention.338 Patentees might 
regard such a clause as essential before they agree to a license.339 Otherwise 
they might be threatened with obsolescence in the very markets that they have 
developed.340 For example, if patent A were licensed and the licensee then 
developed a complementary improvement, B, that made A work better, the 
patentee would be stuck with the older version of A unless it were guaranteed 
access to B as well.341 Grantback clauses can be either vertical or horizontal, 
depending on whether the patentee and licensee are competing producers in 
the product market. 
The Patent Act does not mention grantbacks by name, but the Patent 
Misuse Reform Act provision applied to tying arrangements includes them. It 
speaks of a patentee who “condition[s] the license of any rights to the 
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patent . . . on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent . . . .”342 
The statute then provides that this practice should be regarded as unlawful 
only if “the patent owner has market power in the relevant market for the 
patent or patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned.”343 The 
Supreme Court has interpreted this language as requiring proof of market 
power for antitrust claims of unlawful tying just as much as for misuse 
claims.344 Clearly the same limitation should be applied to grantbacks. 
When assessed under the rule of reason, grantbacks are seldom found to be 
anticompetitive, although harm is possible in a few situations.345 
“Nonexclusive” grantbacks require that the improvement be licensed back to 
the patentee but not that it be exclusive.346 The district court found competitive 
harm in such a case when General Electric granted production licenses to a 
large number of licensees for electric lamp production and made each promise 
GE a nonexclusive license in all improvements that they made.347 The court 
believed that this could create a patent aggregation monopoly by making GE 
the only holder of all of the extant technology.348 In any event, this strategy 
would require market dominance in the primary patent, so it should be 
addressed under the rule of reason with a serious market power 
requirement.349 
An exclusive grantback requires the licensee to grant the improvement 
back to the grantor exclusively.350 Such provisions typically permit the 
innovating licensee to retain a royalty-free licensee to use the improvement 
itself, but only the original patentee can license the improvement out to 
others.351 One complaint about exclusive grantbacks is that they reduce the 
licensee’s incentive to make and patent improvements, for all it receives is a 
nonexclusive right to use, which could generate only the competitive return.352 
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The improvement is then more valuable to the original patentee than to the 
improving licensee.353 
Exclusive grantbacks can exacerbate the collective action problem present 
in the 1948 General Electric case, discussed above, by making it impossible 
for anyone other than the primary patentee to assemble the full technology 
set.354 For example, if GE owned a pioneer lamp patent and placed exclusive 
grantback clauses in the agreements of ten licensees, each might develop one 
or more patented improvements. Under an exclusive grantback clause only GE 
would be able to practice all of the improvements unless it licensed them to the 
others. In an extreme case a patentee whose patent must be licensed to every 
market participant would be in a position to acquire an exclusive right to every 
patent developed for the industry by its existing participants. If the technology 
is “rolling” with frequent ongoing patenting, such a restraint could perpetuate 
the patentee’s dominant position indefinitely. This could enable the patentee to 
restrict total market output to the monopoly level while imposing competitive 
rates of return on its licensee rivals. Once again, this is a dominant firm 
strategy that must be tested under antitrust law’s rule of reason.355 
D. Purely Vertical Practices 
A practice is purely vertical if none of the parties to any agreement are 
competitors.356 Instead, they stand in a buyer–seller relationship. As noted 
previously, most of the “nine no nos” from the 1970s era were vertical 
practices, including such things as tying, exclusive dealing, and resale price 
maintenance.357 The law in most of these areas has changed, although for 
reasons that have little to do with patent policy. In most cases no harm to 
competition can be shown. Prior to the 1990s much of the perceived conflict 
between antitrust and patent law resulted from routine antitrust condemnation 
of competitively harmless vertical practices. Today purely vertical agreements 
are addressed under the rule of reason in virtually all contexts, including IP 
licensing agreements and settlements.358 To the extent that a vertical 
settlement involves a production license to the infringement defendant, it is 
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authorized by the Patent Act in any event, provided the agreement does not 
explicitly restrain output in the product market.359 
The major antitrust concern is vertical agreements that limit the sales of 
rivals, principally tying, exclusive dealing, and similar practices.360 Tying 
arrangements are competitively benign in most cases, even when one of the 
products is patented and, significantly, even when the defendant has market 
power in the tying product.361 Exclusive dealing raises competitive concerns 
only when relatively strict structural requirements are met.362  
The Supreme Court has not strictly overruled its numerous declarations 
that tying is unlawful per se.363 In Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink, Inc. 
the Court came close, but in fact struck down only a per se presumption that 
tying of a patented product is per se unlawful without an independent showing 
of power.364 The decision is perhaps a strong signal that the Supreme Court is 
prepared to abandon the tying per se rule in an appropriate case. 
The list of vertical practices still requiring antitrust examination also 
includes a few package licenses and related practices, as well as some 
grantbacks, but only when they facilitate anticompetitive exclusion or 
collusion.365 Of particular concern are vertical restraints initiated by licensee 
cartels or powerful individual licensees.366 What these practices have in 
common is a firm that is dominant and a practice that in actual effect is 
“horizontal” in that it either limits the opportunities of rivals or facilitates 
collusion. Further, while a patentee typically has an incentive to maximize 
output by its licensees, individual licensees or cartels of licensees may have an 
incentive to reduce output to the monopoly level. Traditionally these practices 
are assessed under both § 1 and § 2 of the Sherman Act as well as § 3 of the 
Clayton Act if commodities are involved. Section 1 of the Sherman Act and 
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the corresponding Clayton Act provision both require an agreement,367 but § 2 
of the Sherman Act does not. 
One of the most important developments in the recent antitrust analysis of 
vertical practices is the courts’ movement away from agreement-based models 
of harm for supplier (licensor) imposed practices, and toward dominant firm 
models.368 This movement reflects two important realities. First, conduct 
involving exclusivity obligations imposed on downstream firms is in fact 
unilaterally imposed, notwithstanding that most of the time it is contained in 
an agreement, such as a franchise contract or an IP license. The “agreement” 
requirement adds nothing other than an explanation for the dominant firm’s 
leverage over downstream firms. In some interbrand restraint cases a relevant 
agreement is impossible to prove, such as when the seller refuses to sell 
separate components individually or refuses to sell to dealers who are already 
selling the products of competitors, or when the two products are bound 
together by technological design.369 The result is that legality too often 
depends on the happenstance of an agreement only because of the statutory 
structure. Second, vertical exclusion is a dominant firm practice, in which 
market power is much more relevant to competitive harm than the existence 
vel non of an agreement. 
I have argued elsewhere that § 2 is actually a better fit for these practices 
because they are best assessed as the unilateral actions of a dominant firm.370 
In fact, failure to insist on a reasonable showing of anticompetitive exclusion 
explains much of the antitrust overreaching that occurred in the 1980s and 
before. Having found a qualifying “agreement,” the courts were content to 
condemn the practice on a much lower market share than they would have 
required for a § 2 dominant firm case. 
Of course, exclusive patent licenses can be collusive—but this occurs 
when the licensor or licensee are competitors, or would be competitors but for 
the license. The other collusion danger is cartel agreements among licensees, 
but these are not authorized by the Patent Act and can readily be addressed 
under ordinary antitrust rules for horizontal restraints.371 
While § 261 of the Patent Act authorizes exclusive licenses, it does not 
explicitly authorize anticompetitive exclusive licenses. Does it do so 
implicitly? In other contexts the general creation of granting or transacting 
powers does not imply a right to violate the antitrust laws. For example, all 
business corporations have a power to enter into contracts or acquire property, 
but that does not imply a power to make anticompetitive contracts or 
                                                                                                                     
 367 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (using the terms “contract,” “combination,” or 
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acquisitions that violate the antitrust laws. Mere legality under corporate or 
contract law does not imply antitrust legality.372 
In any event, whether § 261 authorizes anticompetitive exclusive licenses 
is partially settled by § 3 of the Clayton Act, which reaches exclusive dealing 
and tying of goods “whether patented or unpatented,” provided that the 
requisite harm to competition is proven.373 That does not fully address the 
§ 261 issue, however, because the Clayton Act provision is limited to “goods, 
wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities . . . .”374 A 
patentee might still grant an exclusive license of a process patent, which would 
not be covered by the Clayton Act provision. By negative implication the 
Patent Act also permits antitrust challenges to anticompetitive ties, provided 
that the tying patentee has market power in the tying patent.375 In sum, the 
§ 261 authorization of exclusive licenses should be limited to exclusive 
licenses that are not anticompetitive.376 
When exclusive licensing does cause anticompetitive harm it is frequently 
at the behest of the licensee, who is the beneficiary of the exclusivity 
provision, rather than the licensor. For example, a dominant firm in a 
technology heavy product market might acquire exclusive licenses in order to 
keep rivals from having access.377 Section 261 of the Patent Act expressly 
permits IP rights holders (both patentees and assignees) to “grant and convey 
an exclusive right,” but says nothing about receiving such a right.378 Even if 
this provision protected anticompetitive exclusive selling of IP licenses, it does 
not necessarily protect anticompetitive buying. Once again, the statute should 
be read to permit only those exclusive licenses that are not anticompetitive. 
Limiting antitrust condemnation of vertical practices to those involving 
exclusion or collusion throws out two important sets of tying and tying-like 
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practices that the courts have historically recognized. The first is claims 
involving leverage, while the second involves unwanted tied products. 
The leveraging issue is often muddled by its confusion with foreclosure 
and price discrimination. In its most basic form the claim is that a person with 
a monopoly in one product can earn a second monopoly profit by tying a 
complementary good.379 Stated in this way, the leveraging claim was 
thoroughly exploded in the 1950s by Ward Bowman, who observed that 
consumers of complementary goods place a value on the package rather than 
its individual components.380 As a result, if a seller is already charging its 
profit-maximizing price for a tying product it cannot earn more by tying a 
complement and charging a second monopoly price.381 Consistent with profit-
maximization, the seller can increase the price of the second product only by 
reducing the price of the primary product.382 To be sure, tying can create 
opportunities for price discrimination, which can resemble leverage, but the 
great majority of price discrimination ties are efficient.383 
Ties and package licensing, which is sometimes analogized to tying, can 
be used for a number of purposes unrelated to exclusion or collusion. These 
include quality control, maintenance of interoperability, elimination of double 
marginalization, price discrimination, economies of joint production or 
distribution, or transaction cost savings. Many of these effects are identical 
with those of pooling. The main difference is that a pool is an agreement 
among numerous patentees while a package license contains one patentee with 
a portfolio of patents and numerous licensees.384 Most antitrust challenges to 
package licensing do not involve exclusion but rather are complaints that the 
patentee is required to take unwanted patents.385 As noted in the discussion of 
pooling, however, after years of wrestling with the issue the courts are now 
starting to see that forcing a buyer or licensee to take an unwanted product is 
not an antitrust problem.386 
In a few exceptional cases, the impact of package licensing is to exclude a 
rival by forcing it to compete with a price of zero.387 For example, suppose 
firm A licenses a package of several patents on an all-or-none basis. One of 
those patents is X, and a rival holds patent X’, a substitute that may be superior 
to X for some users. From the licensee’s perspective, however, X is already 
                                                                                                                     
 379 See Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 31 (1931). 
 380 Bowman, Jr., supra note 23, at 20. 
 381 Id. 
 382 Id. 
 383 Compare Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 25, with Einer Elhauge, Tying, 
Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 397 (2009). 
 384 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 43, § 22.1. 
 385 Id. § 22.7. 
 386 See, e.g., Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc., 675 F.3d 1192, 1195 (9th Cir. 2012); see 
also supra notes 289–305 and accompanying text. 
 387 See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 43, § 22.8. 
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included in the package and the licensee will not receive a royalty reduction if 
it does not practice X but instead switches to X’.388 Even so, inclusion of X in 
the package license is not necessarily illegal. First, there may still be costs 
associated with verifying whether licensees are practicing X, or whether or not 
they are also practicing X’. Second, inclusion of X’ in the licensee’s 
technology may create conflicts with the other patents in the package. Third, 
relief might require a court to compute the requisite downward adjustment in 
the royalty rate for a package that does not include patent X.389 
In some situations these problems can be addressed. One example, 
although it did not involve package licensing as such, was Microsoft’s “per 
processor” licensing contract with computer manufacturers.390 Microsoft’s 
standard licensing agreement for Windows required computer manufacturers 
to pay the Windows license fee on every computer it made, whether or not the 
computer actually used Windows.391 The result was that if a computer 
manufacturer wanted to install a rival’s operating system that computer would 
be subject to two licensing fees. In this case Microsoft entered a consent 
decree requiring it to abandon per-processer licensing and charge a fee only on 
computers that actually installed the Windows Operating System.392 
Would an injunction against a patent package that forbids inclusion of 
patents with competitive alternatives be procompetitive? Suppose that a 
licensor of a package of 100 patents includes one patent X. A rival patentee 
holding a substitute patent X’ claims anticompetitive foreclosure. The court 
responds with an injunction requiring the defendant to drop X from its 
package. If the court simply removes patent X from the package without 
ordering a price reduction, then whether the patentee cuts the price will depend 
on competitive constraints. If it does not cut the price, however, then all 
licensees will simply end up paying more. On the other hand, if the court must 
determine and order a price reduction, it is placed in the unacceptable position 
of price regulator of the value of that patent. Finally, the mere fact that a 
licensee practices patent X’ does not entail that it is not also practicing patent 
X—not in a world in which patents have numerous, often overlapping, claims. 
This discussion suggests two warnings about the antitrust analysis of 
vertical arrangements. The first is that courts and enforcers should be aware of 
the ubiquitous possibilities that vertical practices create for achieving 
operational and transactional efficiencies. This makes it imperative that market 
power requirements be taken seriously and that courts understand the rationale 
for a practice. A second warning is that it does no good to identify a practice 
                                                                                                                     
 388 See Grid Sys. Corp. v. Tex. Instruments Inc., 771 F. Supp. 1033, 1039–41 (N.D. 
Cal. 1991) (alleging facts that stated a Sherman Act claim). 
 389 See 10 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, ¶ 1782a2. 
 390 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1462‒63 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 
(per curiam). 
 391 Id. at 1451. 
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as an antitrust violation if the court is unable to devise an effective antitrust 
remedy, and judicial setting of prices is rarely that. 
E. Royalty “Extensions” 
Royalty “extensions” refer to practices in which the basis for royalties is 
something other than the typical percentage of cost or price, or a fixed dollar 
amount of each unit sold or each time a device covered by a valid patent is 
used. The most common and commonly litigated examples are: (1) provisions 
that require the payment of a royalty beyond the expiration date of the 
patent;393 (2) provisions that assess royalties on goods that are not covered by 
the licensed patent but that are produced with a patented machine or process; 
(3) “reach through” royalties that are attached to final products produced with 
a patented research tool or process; or (4) royalties assessed on a producing 
licensee’s entire output of some product, whether or not individual units of 
that product actually practice that patent. The courts assessing these practices 
have often relied on “scope of the patent” formulations. 
Royalty extensions are not explicitly authorized by the Patent Act, so 
antitrust analysis is appropriate. Nevertheless, the practices are almost always 
purely vertical and are anticompetitive in only a few situations. Further, most 
of them are not obviously offensive to patent policy’s concern with promoting 
innovation either. 
In Brulotte v. Thys Co., a divided Supreme Court refused to enforce a sales 
contract for a hop-picking machine that called for the payment of royalties 
beyond the date that the last patent on the machine expired.394 The patentee 
was not the seller of the machine, but rather had licensed its patents to the 
manufacturer who then used a reach-through provision to charge the license 
fee to the purchaser.395 While Brulotte was clearly not an antitrust case, it was 
not strictly speaking a misuse case either. Ordinarily misuse is asserted as a 
defense to patent infringement. In this case, however, the royalty extension 
was challenged in a state contract law action to enforce the royalty 
provision.396 In any event, Justice Douglas’ opinion for the Court used 
antitrust-like language to speak of the provision as leveraging the patent 
                                                                                                                     
 393 See, e.g., Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 30 (1964). For decisions applying 
Brulotte, often while criticizing it, see Kimble v. Marvel Enters., Inc., 727 F.3d 856, 857 
(9th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 781 (2014); Zila, Inc. v. Tinnell, 502 F.3d 1014, 
1016 (9th Cir. 2007); Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 1017 (7th Cir. 2002); 
Meehan v. PPG Indus., Inc., 802 F.2d 881, 883–86 (7th Cir. 1986). See generally 1 
HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 43, § 23.2. 
 394 Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 30. 
 395 Id. 
 396 Id.  
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“monopoly” beyond the scope of the patent.397 The dissent also spoke of the 
issue as involving patent misuse.398 
No monopoly was being extended, however. The challenger did not wish 
to produce Thys’ machines, and once the patents expired anyone could have 
done so.399 Indeed, to the extent that Brulotte, a farmer, was required to pay a 
per use royalty400 on the Thys machine, he would have an increased incentive 
to obtain a machine from a competitor. Just as was true of many patent misuse 
cases, the underlying theory was based on a conception of harm that had little 
to do with either competition or innovation. 
The majority also ignored the extent to which nominal license payments 
perform an amortization function when they are attached to patented goods. If 
I buy an automobile and agree to pay for it over ten years, the price has been 
set up front and the payments operate in satisfaction of a loan or lease. 
Monthly payments will not decline as patents expire. This ultimately reduces 
the Brulotte problem to one of contract drafting, and the relatively few 
situations that have run afoul of it largely fall into that camp.401 Otherwise the 
implications would be that if someone leased a car for, say $100 per month 
plus five cents per mile, she would be entitled to a pro rata price reduction to 
account for any patent that expired during the lease period. Justice Harlan’s 
dissent made this point rather forcefully.402 
Nevertheless, whether Brulotte should be overruled after a half century is 
debatable. The argument for reversal rests on the logic that patent “misuse” 
should be defined by antitrust principles. Brulotte’s rationale makes little sense 
on antitrust grounds because in most cases involving post-expiration royalties 
nothing is being monopolized. 
Forceful counter-arguments exist, however, although they may apply in 
only a few situations. For example, perhaps all of the sellers in a market have a 
license from the patentee that requires post-expiration royalties, and new entry 
into this market is unlikely. In that case the payment of post-expiration 
royalties could serve to raise prices across the market, harming consumers 
without serving patent policy. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Kimble v. 
Marvel Enterprises Inc. represents a related possibility. The patent in question 
was on a toy “Spiderman” hand that enabled a child to pretend to throw a 
sticky web as Spiderman did in Marvel comic books and movies.403 Once the 
patent expired another firm could employ the invention, but that would not 
                                                                                                                     
 397 Id. at 33. 
 398 See id. at 38 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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give it access to Marvel’s trademarks, which last indefinitely, or other 
intellectual property rights. As a result the patent might be worth very little to 
anyone other than Marvel, and the impact of the license fee agreement could 
be to force an overcharge on the toy indefinitely. Consumers could be harmed. 
One problem with Brulotte, however, is that while post-expiration 
royalties may be harmful in some cases, Brulotte does not require any kind of 
evaluation of market structure or post-expiration market effect. The rule is per 
se and applies in competitive and monopolized markets alike. As a result it 
does not distinguish the occasional harmful use, such as Kimble, from the 
much larger number of cases that are harmless. 
Second, one can usually evade the Brulotte trap by careful license 
agreement drafting that separates out the patent and nonpatent portions of an 
arrangement. 
Third, and more fundamentally, while Brulotte may not be justifiable on 
antitrust grounds, it may nevertheless serve a useful purpose within patent law, 
which is properly concerned about arrangements that tie up property rights 
once patents have expired. Patent law’s “first sale” doctrine performs an 
analogous function, by refusing to enforce licensing restrictions on a patented 
article after that article has been sold.404 Clearly, the concern is not economic 
monopoly, because the doctrine applies to sales of a single article. The first 
expression of the first sale doctrine was in a decision that refused to apply a 
congressionally enacted patent term extension to a machine that had already 
been sold and for which the patentee sought to apply the extension 
retroactively.405 Brulotte is really nothing more than a variant of the first sale 
doctrine, applied to post-expiration royalties. 
Finally, Congress has the power to overrule Supreme Court statutory 
decisions that it disapproves. Most particularly, twenty-five years after 
Brulotte it amended the Patent Act to make clear that refusals to license are not 
patent misuse, and that tying arrangements are unlawful only in the presence 
of tying product power.406 It said nothing about Brulotte, however. Even 
though Brulotte’s per se rule may not be justified by either competition or 
patent policy, its long duration and Congress’s failure to correct it cautions 
against a change now. 
Royalties on unpatented goods or attached to a licensee’s entire output, 
whether or not every unit embodies the licensed patents, rarely offend either 
antitrust or patent policy. Many situations operate as nothing more than per 
                                                                                                                     
 404 See, e.g., Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc. 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008); 
Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 456 (1873); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 49, 
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Hovenkamp, supra note 48, at 57. 
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Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Kimble v. Marvel Enters., 135 S. Ct. 781 (2015) 
(No. 13-720), 2015 WL 981525, at *19 n.3. 
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use royalties calculated by an alternative method. Others involve transaction 
cost savings in situations where it is difficult to identify which units of a 
licensee’s output practice a particular patent. 
For example, the owner of a large portfolio of patents covering radio 
circuitry might license them to a radio manufacturer with the royalty 
calculated as so much per radio produced, regardless of how many of the 
patents are actually used in that particular radio. This agreement clears the 
transaction at far lower cost than an alternative that would require inquiry and 
perhaps litigation over the question of exactly how many patents are practiced 
by any particular unit. Neither collusion nor exclusion is likely.407 Indeed, 
even if we believed that patent law had a concern with “extraction” as such—
that is, with obtaining elevated royalties—it is hardly clear that these royalty 
formulations extract. Most are a form of second-degree price discrimination 
that tends to collect higher royalties from higher intensity users. Whether 
licensees are harmed on balance would be extraordinarily difficult to 
determine, but certainly cannot be inferred. Virtually all such schemes serve to 
increase total output and, typically, the total number of licensees as well.408 
Output increasing practices are not good candidates for antitrust violations. 
“Reach through” royalties operate in much the same way, with the added 
attribute that they can be an effective risk-sharing device. For example, the 
seller of a research machine or tool for laboratory use might grant the right to 
use the machine without charge but demand a percentage of the sales price of 
any successful product that is developed with the machine. If the research 
venture is unsuccessful, as is often the case, then no royalty is due. If it 
succeeds, then the royalty could end up being quite high, particularly if 
demand for the invention is strong. Such a contract permits the licensor of the 
machine to participate in the risks and benefits of the research in question. As 
a general proposition, the arrangement is no more anticompetitive than if the 
research team agreed to hire a specialist or accept an investor whose 
compensation was a percentage of the return on the final product. Although 
the practice has generated some controversy in the law reviews, particularly 
                                                                                                                     
 407 See Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 832 
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because it may contribute to double marginalization or royalty “stacking,”409 
the courts have generally treated it as benign.410 
F. Antitrust and Patent Enforcement 
Merely “obtaining” a patent improperly is pre-issuance conduct that is not 
generally addressable through antitrust law.411 First, the patent system itself 
provides for comprehensive regulatory oversight with virtually all issuance 
decisions made by government officials and supervised on appeal by judges. 
Second, the patent system includes its own remedial mechanisms for dealing 
with improper conduct, mainly through declarations that a patent is invalid or 
unenforceable. This system has been harshly criticized, in part because a mere 
declaration of invalidity as punishment on a patent that was invalid to begin 
with is not really a punishment at all.412 For example, if a patent would not be 
issued if the true facts were known, then an applicant has every incentive to 
hide an essential fact when the probability of detection is less than 100% and 
the only penalty is that the patent is unenforceable. Indeed, in the case of a 
licensed patent later invalidated for inequitable conduct, the Patent Act does 
not even call for disgorgement of improperly obtained royalties.413 It is the 
rough equivalent of a criminal rule for theft that required as its only penalty 
that the thief return the stolen good. 
While lax treatment of inequitable conduct is a significant problem for the 
patent system, that does not make it an antitrust problem—unless the 
inequitable conduct before the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) is coupled 
with some post-issuance conduct as well, such as an infringement action, 
                                                                                                                     
 409 See, e.g., Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent 
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threat of an infringement suit, or insistence on licensing. Housekeeping inside 
the PTO and the patent system is a job for Congress and the oversight power 
of the Secretary of Commerce or the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 
Fixing deficiencies in the work of other government agencies is not an 
antitrust function so long as the decision-making in those agencies is entirely 
in public control. 
G. Walker Process: Objectively Unreasonable Infringement Actions 
Post-issuance enforcement conduct is another matter. The decision to 
bring an infringement suit, to threaten a suit, or to insist on a license is 
privately initiated. Here, antitrust can be brought to bear, but its limitations are 
evident. In this area the conduct is typically unilateral. This means that it must 
be addressed under § 2 of the Sherman Act, which reaches only monopoly or 
attempts to monopolize. As a result, antitrust reaches only instances of 
improper patent infringement where monopoly is threatened. 
While the Patent Act explicitly authorizes enforcement by the filing of 
infringement actions,414 it does not authorize improper, anticompetitive 
actions. In addition, access to courts and other enforcement tribunals is 
strongly protected under the United States Constitution, without regard to the 
subjective intent of the plaintiff. Objectively baseless enforcement actions are 
not protected.415 
 In Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., the 
Supreme Court held that an infringement lawsuit based on a patent that had 
been fraudulently procured could be the basis of an antitrust violation, 
provided that the structural elements of an antitrust offense were present as 
well.416 The lawsuit must be “baseless” under an objective test, considering 
whether a reasonable patentee knowing the facts would have believed the suit 
to be proper.417  
If the conduct does not threaten monopoly, then the patent may be found 
invalid, but any further discipline must come through the patent court. For 
example, the exceptional case provision in the Patent Act, discussed below, 
may shift some attorney’s fees for litigation misconduct, but the remedy will 
not go beyond that. The inadequacy of these remedies leads one to expect that 
the amount of deadweight loss caused by improper enforcement actions is 
significant, particularly where the probability of detection is low. This is the 
                                                                                                                     
 414 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3) (2012). 
 415 On the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and protection of access to the courts in antitrust 
cases, see 1 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶¶ 201–203. On patent infringement 
actions specifically, see 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶ 706. 
 416 See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174–
80 (1965). 
 417 See Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 
60–61 (1993). 
550 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 76:3 
 
reason that antitrust law has a damages multiplier—designed to offset the fact 
that violations are difficult to detect and prove. 
A good illustration of this problem is Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, in 
which the patent on a popular ice cream concoction was invalid because the 
patent applicant had lied about barring prior sales made a decade earlier at 
small fairs.418 When the patentee later filed an infringement action, the sales 
were discovered and the lower court found both patent invalidity and an 
antitrust violation. The court awarded trebled attorney’s fees to the 
infringement defendant under the antitrust attorney fee award provision.419 
The Federal Circuit reversed the antitrust judgment, however, concluding that 
the antitrust laws required something more than mere enforcement of an 
improperly obtained patent.420 It also reversed the judgment granting 
attorney’s fees as antitrust damages.421 The result is that the only penalty that 
Dippin’ Dots suffered was invalidation of its patent. The patent was already 
invalid, however. It never would have issued but for the false declaration that 
there had not been any disqualifying prior sales. Further, the court seems to 
have lost sight of the fact that clearly there was something more—the patentee 
had not merely obtained the patent fraudulently, but it also filed an 
infringement action several years later, knowing the patent to be invalid if the 
true facts were known. 
What makes the Dippin’ Dots rule particularly troublesome is that prior 
sales that bar patentability are “off record,” known to the patent applicant but 
typically not to others. The patent applicant provided a sworn statement that 
there were no barring prior sales or uses.422 This makes the problem different 
than for a patent subsequently declared invalid because the applicant failed to 
mention known prior art423 or took inconsistent positions in front of different 
enforcement tribunals.424 These failures are usually on the record and 
discoverable later, given that many more resources are poured into patent 
litigation than into initial patent procurement. 
The Supreme Court has partially corrected this imbalance by strengthening 
the Patent Act provision authorizing judges to award attorney’s fees to 
                                                                                                                     
 418 Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1340–41 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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prevailing parties in “exceptional” cases.425 The Supreme Court rejected the 
Federal Circuit’s rule that confined the use of this provision to patent 
infringement claims that were “frivolous” or “objectively baseless,” or brought 
in subjective bad faith, and that required proof by “clear and convincing” 
evidence.426 Placing these limitations on the provision largely rendered it 
superfluous, the Court concluded, because the common law already permitted 
judges to shift fees for bad faith lawsuits.427 Shifting of attorney’s fees is a 
fairly toothless remedy for a patent that has been improperly obtained but has 
been licensed out to third parties unaware of its deficiencies. Of course, all 
patents are probabilistic and judgments must be made about validity and 
scope, but they must be made with objectively measured good faith.  
The time period and knowledge requirements for a Walker Process 
violation are not the same as those for determining pre-issuance inequitable 
conduct. The Walker Process doctrine considers what a reasonable patentee 
actually knew or should have known at the time of an infringement suit, which 
could be many years after patent prosecution activity. In some cases, a patent 
may have been obtained improperly but was subsequently assigned to an 
innocent purchaser with no knowledge of the improper conduct. In other cases, 
invalidating facts may not have been known at the time a patent was obtained 
but may have come to light later. Further, Walker Process is not limited to 
questions of invalidity resulting from inequitable conduct. It can also apply to 
cases that involve valid patents that are clearly not infringed or where the 
patentee sued without inquiring about infringement.428 The courts have even 
indicated that suit on an expired patent could be a Walker Process violation, 
although it is difficult to see how a lawsuit so easily countered could ever 
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create durable monopoly power.429 Finally, unjustified threats to sue can also 
create Walker Process violations even if no lawsuit actually ensues.430  
The Dippin’ Dots holding is unlikely to be disciplined by circuit conflict, 
even though it is an antitrust holding rather than a patent law holding and the 
Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction only over the latter. Walker Process 
antitrust claims are virtually always presented as counterclaims on patent 
infringement suits, and in most cases they are compulsory counterclaims, 
which means that they cannot be separately brought.431 Prior to 2012, 
counterclaims to patent infringement actions were appealed to the regional 
circuits rather than the Federal Circuit.432 However, the Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act brought counterclaims on patent infringement suits, including 
antitrust counterclaims, into the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit.433 
Direct attack remains a possibility for third parties such as purchasers, 
however. In In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., the Second 
Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over a Walker Process style lawsuit 
brought by purchasers who claimed that they paid more for a branded drug as 
a result of an improper lawsuit intended to keep generics off the market.434 
Significantly, such a lawsuit does not “arise under” the Patent Act, and thus is 
not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. 
H. Refusal to License: Unilateral and Concerted 
The Patent Act provides that “no patent owner . . . shall be denied relief or 
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of 
his having . . . refused to license or use any rights to the patent . . . .”435 By its 
terms that provision applies to unilateral and unconditional refusals to license. 
For example, price fixing is a refusal to license except at the cartel price, and 
tying is a refusal to license unless the licensee also takes the tied product. 
These are “conditional” refusals to license, and they are subject to the ordinary 
                                                                                                                     
 429 See, e.g., Int’l Tech. Consultants, Inc. v. Pilkington PLC, 137 F.3d 1382, 1393 (9th 
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antitrust rules. Additionally, the provision does not apply to mandatory 
licensing that is incorporated into a consent decree or judgment concerning 
some other violation, such as an unlawful merger or act of monopolization.436 
The statutory provision permitting refusals to license speaks in the 
singular, authorizing a unilateral refusal to license. Extending it to concerted 
refusals to license, as the dissent in the Federal Circuit’s Princo Corp. v. Int’l 
Trade Comm’n decision would have done, reads an unnecessarily broad 
immunity into the provision, disregarding competition considerations.437 In 
antitrust law, unilateral refusals to deal are ubiquitous and rarely unlawful.438 
Reading § 271(e) of the Patent Act to apply to unilateral refusals simply states 
a policy that is consistent with United States competition policy generally. 
By contrast, concerted refusals to deal, or boycotts, are fully addressable 
under the antitrust laws, and naked concerted refusal agreements among 
competitors can be unlawful per se.439 There is no obvious reason why 
antitrust should depart from these rules when patents are involved. Naked 
restraints do not further innovation, and ancillary restraints come under the 
rule of reason, where innovation effects can be considered if appropriate. Seen 
thus, the Patent Act provision on unilateral refusals does no more than add a 
small amount of additional limitation on an antitrust rule that is already 
extremely tolerant of unilateral refusals. For example, under the Aspen Skiing 
Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. decision,440 which the Supreme Court 
severely qualified in Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis v. 
Trinko,441 a firm acting unilaterally has no general duty to deal with a rival.442 
Nevertheless, an unjustified or unexplained withdrawal from a previous 
cooperative arrangement may have “evidentiary significance” entitling a jury 
to condemn the withdrawal.443 The Patent Act provision does not contain this 
limitation. Thus, for example, a dominant firm that licensed a patent to a rival 
for a term of, say, five years, would have no obligation to renew the license 
upon expiration. 
Reading the Patent Act to exonerate concerted refusals from misuse or 
antitrust claims condones practices that should not be immunized without 
antitrust scrutiny. For example, a group of firms that cross-licenses a 
                                                                                                                     
 436 See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 43, § 6.5. For a critique, see Richard A. 
Epstein & F. Scott Kieff, Questioning the Frequency and Wisdom 
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 437 See Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en 
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networked technology but refuses to include a firm merely because it charges a 
lower price or has a superior technology would be exonerated. Or two 
automobile companies might agree to license their patents for some 
technology to one another, but agree that they will not license them to a third, 
more competitively aggressive rival. To that extent the Federal Circuit’s dicta 
on concerted refusals seem ill-advised and was probably made without 
considering the implications for competition policy. 
I. Overly Broad Remedial Demands: FRAND-Encumbered Patents 
Walker Process and lawsuits on invalid patents are not the only type of 
litigation exclusion. Overly broad requests for an injunction, particularly on 
FRAND-encumbered patents as well as lawsuits by non-practicing patent 
aggregators have also exposed serious potentials for patent abuse. It is 
unlikely, however, that these actions are antitrust violations under current law 
unless they arise to the level of litigation misconduct that Walker Process 
contemplates. In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, the Supreme Court held that 
there is no automatic entitlement to an injunction for patent infringement.444 
Since then, denials of an injunction to non-practicing entities have been 
common, although there still are a few.445 
 A FRAND-encumbered patent is one which the owner has promised to 
license on “fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory” terms in exchange for its 
designation as part of a technological standard.446 There is a growing 
consensus that injunctive relief should not be given to the owner of a FRAND 
encumbered patent, unless perhaps a firm simply continues to produce while 
refusing to pay anything. A recent three-judge panel of the Federal Circuit 
split three ways on this issue.447 
Both First Amendment doctrine and our general rules about access to the 
courts forbid applying the antitrust laws to litigation conduct unless it is 
“baseless,” measured by an objective test.448 In the current state of the law, a 
non-practicing entity that requests an injunction, or someone who asks for an 
injunction on a FRAND-encumbered patent, might lose. But until the courts 
speak more decisively these are not yet “baseless” claims, and antitrust 
                                                                                                                     
 444 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 492–93 (2006). 
 445 See Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. 
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liability should not attach to bringing them. In any event, these questions are 
predominantly legal, and once an absolute rule has been adopted it is difficult 
to believe that asserting a lawsuit in violation of it has any prospect of creating 
durable monopoly power. Fundamentally, these are problems best addressed 
through the patent system rather than by antitrust law. 
J. Patent Acquisitions: Exclusive and Nonexclusive 
The Patent Act treats patents as personal property, and they are freely 
assignable.449 While the Patent Act expressly permits assignments, however, it 
does not permit anticompetitive assignments. As a result, the courts have held 
that patent transfers are reachable under the antitrust laws, although they have 
rarely found that a patent acquisition as such is anticompetitive.450 For 
example, one court concluded that patent acquisitions are fully reachable under 
the merger provision, § 7 of the Clayton Act.451 It rejected an antitrust attack 
on Xerox’s acquisition of photocopier patents that were not yet practiced at the 
time of the acquisition, however, because there was as yet no market subject to 
diminished competition.452 
The antitrust treatment of patent rights is appropriately sensitive to the 
type of right that is being transferred. In general, even a dominant firm can 
obtain a nonexclusive license without excluding anyone else, provided that the 
license is nonexclusive in fact as well as form. Acquisitions of nonexclusive 
licenses to practice may be essential to enable a firm to stay abreast of 
technology within its industry. 
Exclusive rights are another matter. While a dominant firm needs access to 
technology in order to remain competitive, it does not need exclusive access. 
For that reason a monopolist should be limited to the acquisition of 
nonexclusive licenses of patents for technology in any market in which it has 
dominance and where market exclusion of rivals is a likely effect. 
One offsetting consideration is the rights of the patentee. The value, and 
thus the price, of a patent reflects added value to the buyer. A patent that will 
create or preserve a product monopoly will claim a higher price than one that 
is sold into a competitive market. As a result one can expect that a monopolist 
intent on maintaining its market position will be willing to pay more for an 
exclusive right than the aggregate of potential licensees will pay to produce in 
a competitive market. This is borne out by the literature on pay-for-delay 
pharmaceutical settlements, which indicates that the value of monopoly 
                                                                                                                     
 449 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012). 
 450 See, e.g., In re Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 103 F.T.C. 467, 473 (1984) (involving a 
consent order requiring nonexclusive license). 
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preservation to the pioneer patentee is worth far more than is the right of 
competitive entry by the generic.453  
While the Patent Act gives the patentee the right to transfer, it does not 
create a right to make anticompetitive transfers, any more than the power to 
buy or sell a production plant gives the owner a right to enter into an 
anticompetitive transaction. For example, a production plant might claim a 
higher price from a monopolist purchaser than a competitor, but that does not 
immunize the monopoly transaction from the antitrust laws. On this point, the 
anti-monopolization policy of § 2 of the Sherman Act and the merger policy of 
§ 7 of the Clayton Act are in accord. A patent acquisition by a monopolist or 
its purchase of an exclusive license could be an unlawful exclusionary practice 
if it denies market access to one or more rivals, even though the monopolist 
would be willing to pay more than an alternative buyer.454 By the same token, 
it can also be an unlawful merger. 
Even more threatening to a competitive economy is the dominant firm’s 
acquisition and non-use of a patent. In this case, the monopolist is seeking not 
only to protect its own productive technology from competition, but to shut 
down alternative technologies that might compete with it. In Continental 
Paper Bag Co. v. East Paper Bag Co., which did not raise any antitrust issues, 
the Supreme Court held that a dominant firm could acquire a patent in 
alternative technology that it was not using, and in effect put the patent “to 
sleep” except for the right to bring infringement lawsuits.455 Worse yet, the 
lawsuit had been sustained on a particularly broad reading of the patent law’s 
doctrine of equivalents, which permits infringement actions against 
technologies that do not literally infringe any claim in the holder’s patent.456 
As a matter of patent law, Paper Bag is difficult to justify, even more 
today given that entitlements to an injunction are governed by ordinary equity 
principles. Injunctions are typically denied on unpracticed patents, although in 
Trebro vs. Firefly the Federal Circuit recognized an exception for a firm that 
competed in the market at issue but used a different technology than the one 
covered by the patent.457 Further, the firm had acquired the patent from 
someone else.458 The court held that, even though the patent in question was 
unpracticed, the infringement plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm, a 
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requirement for an injunction, because it and the infringement defendant were 
direct competitors.459 
The Trebro decision represents the worst of both worlds—doing nothing 
to further patent policy by actually permitting a firm to remove technology 
from the market altogether, while also protecting a firm from competition in 
precisely the circumstances it should be encouraged. 
For a century or more, antitrust courts have accommodated patent policy 
in their decisions involving patent practices made the subject of antitrust 
challenge. In sharp contrast, patent law cases virtually never confront the issue 
except in the small subset of cases where antitrust counterclaims are raised. 
Does balancing of the “equities” in a patent infringement case where an 
injunction has been requested mean balancing a myopic set of factors having 
to do with injury from patent infringement, or does it require examining a 
broader set in which our preference for competitive markets is accorded 
weight as well? In Trebro, the Federal Circuit found irreparable harm because 
the market contained only three players and the infringement defendant 
FireFly was a new entrant among the three.460 The court observed that the sale 
of a Firefly harvester was likely to steal a sale from Trebro, and that at least 
one customer had switched from Trebro to Firefly.461 This theft of sales 
counted as “harm” to the Federal Circuit, even though Firefly’s technology did 
not infringe the technology that Trebro was actually using in its own 
machines.462 
But what counts as harm for purposes of patent law in this case counts as a 
social benefit for purposes of competition policy. The decision effectively 
gives dominant firms a protected right to buy up patents to technologies that 
they do not actually use, simply to keep them from being deployed in the 
market by prospective competitors. That is a great deal of harm to competition 
policy, for little to nothing in return from patent policy. 
To be sure, the facts suggest a case for antitrust, perhaps by means of a 
counterclaim. In order to do that, the infringement defendant would have to 
show a relevant market for mechanical sod cutters, which contains only three 
players, and the patentee’s market dominance. It would then have to show that 
obtaining the injunction against the new entrant under these facts constituted 
an exclusionary practice. That is where the rub comes in. A lawsuit on a valid 
patent is expressly authorized by the Patent Act and not condemned under 
antitrust law unless objectively unreasonable. Indeed, the Federal Circuit 
approved an injunction in this case. Alternatively, the infringement defendant 
could challenge the dominant firm’s purchase of the unpracticed patent as an 
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unlawful merger. If the merger were indeed unlawful, as appears likely in the 
Trebro case, it would not matter whether the infringement suit was reasonably 
brought. 
A better alternative on the facts of this case is for a court of equity to 
intervene with a patent law rule that weighs both competition and innovation 
effects. Patent “misuse” doctrine once performed that function. It is not in 
favor today, largely because it developed during a period of rather extreme 
antitrust overreaching, identifying harmless patent practices as 
anticompetitive.463 Nevertheless, just as the “antitrust injury” doctrine, which 
is not articulated in any statute, forbids plaintiffs from using the antitrust laws 
in anticompetitive ways,464 so too patent doctrine should serve to limit uses 
that harm competition while doing nothing to further innovation. Before that 
can happen, however, courts need to think of the Patent Act as a set of legal 
rules that manage innovation and competition policy, not simply as a set of 
property rules. 
K. Non-Practicing Patent Aggregators Generally 
A growing body of literature indicates that the enforcement activities of 
patent aggregators are harming innovation.465 According to one recent report, 
Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs) or “trolls” file more than 60% of 
infringement suits.466 These are firms that acquire patents in order to monetize 
them. Typically, the firms are neither producers who practice their patents nor 
inventors who develop their patents internally. 
The enforcement activities of PAEs are increasingly regarded as pure rent 
seeking, pursuing innovators who are sued for their own internal research, not 
because they have copied technology from others. For example, Mark Lemley 
concludes that the “overwhelming majority” of PAE-initiated infringement 
suits are being brought, not against copyists, but rather against those who 
developed an invention independently.467 In too many cases the aggregator of 
a large portfolio of patents brings an infringement suit against a technology 
company’s own internally developed technology and is able to extract a 
significant award. In addition, often the number of defendants is large, 
strongly suggesting that the patent is obvious.468 
This problem exists in significant part because patent infringement is a 
strict liability offense, even when the patent being infringed is not being 
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practiced. In this respect patent law differs from copyright and trade secret 
law, which require actual copying as a precondition for infringement, although 
copying can be inferred from circumstantial evidence. The strict liability 
infringement rule is particularly onerous in markets for information 
technologies where patents are easy to obtain, numerous, costly to interpret, 
and difficult to search. Further, to the extent they are not explicitly practiced, 
there are no devices that can be examined. 
These facts raise two questions, and it is important to keep them distinct. 
The first is whether we are issuing far too many obvious patents, with the 
result that people in the ordinary course of developing new ideas become 
unsuspecting infringers. The second has to do with the way information about 
patents and existing technology is disseminated. Before an innovator can 
proceed without concern about patent infringement the patents that already 
exist need to be both discovered and interpreted. To the extent that either of 
these activities is too costly we produce innocent infringers. As a general 
matter, the cost of providing notice is lower than the cost of searching—a fact 
that must be considered if we want to improve the system.469 Further, as long 
as knowledge about a patent is not required for infringement, patentees have 
no reason to supply any more notice than they can get away with. 
The strict liability rule for patent infringement has been widely criticized, 
all the more because of the recent sharp increase in PAE activity. The widely 
used term patent “troll” suggests the catching of people who are unaware that 
they have committed patent infringement until they are surprised.470 A few 
voices defend the existing scheme, at least with qualifications, arguing that 
requiring proof of copying could drastically change patent law’s incentive 
structure.471 While that argument has some force when we are talking about 
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practiced patents that are embodied in products that are widely disseminated, it 
seems much more strained when we are speaking of unpracticed patents that 
are highly complex and difficult to assess. Some compromises may be 
available. One would be to require proof of copying in cases where the 
invention is not practiced by either the infringement plaintiff or explicit 
licensees. 
Given the high number of infringement actions filed by aggregators, this is 
a ballooning crisis in the patent system, particularly when one considers that 
such lawsuits are discouraging rather than encouraging innovative activity. To 
acknowledge that is to recognize a serious disconnect between what the patent 
system should be doing and what it is actually doing. 
Using the antitrust laws in such situations presents significant difficulties, 
although they are not always insurmountable. First, the patent aggregator is 
typically not a product producer. Even if the infringement lawsuits are 
objectively baseless, the plaintiff is not practicing and as a result is typically 
not competing in the infringement defendant’s product market.472 This makes 
the case distinguishable from Walker Process, where the improper 
infringement lawsuit was being used to exclude a rival. Mounting an antitrust 
challenge to the aggregation and enforcement of a large patent portfolio, even 
if the patents are unused, would require identification of a relevant market in 
which competition is lessened. 
That is not the end of the query, however. The patent aggregator and the 
infringement defendant are in fact in a potential seller–buyer (licensor–
licensee) relationship. Consumers as well as competitors have antitrust 
standing to challenge improper infringement suits that threaten higher prices in 
the markets in which they purchase.473 
Perhaps some lawsuits by PAEs can be addressed under antitrust as well 
as patent law. The domain of antitrust is restricted, however, requiring proof of 
harm to competition as well as improper conduct. A threat of higher royalties 
would be sufficient, provided that the injury affects the market and not simply 
one firm. That is, it must at least partly be passed on to customers. To 
illustrate, an improper patent infringement suit forcing a few firms in a highly 
competitive market to pay royalties would not cause competitive harm. Such 
firms would not be in a position to pass their injury on to customers, so the 
harm would sound more in tort than antitrust. By contrast, if an improper 
lawsuit is brought against a firm or group of firms with a sufficient market 
position in their downstream product market, at least part of the royalty 
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overcharge would pass into the market itself, causing the kind of competitive 
injury that makes antitrust relevant.474 
 Even if the conduct fails to establish antitrust harm, the patent courts 
certainly have the power to discipline improper litigation conduct under either 
the exceptional case provision, which does not require competitive injury,475 
or their own equitable powers. 
IX. CONCLUSION: INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND THE EQUITABLE 
POWERS OF COURTS 
Antitrust and patent law are both incomplete and imperfect instruments for 
dealing with complex problems of the innovation economy. The American 
patent system is older than federal antitrust enforcement, but it has also been 
dominated by a property law mentality that has paid inadequate attention to the 
innovation and competition effects of patent law’s own processes. This is in 
sharp contrast to antitrust law, which has been much more proactive in 
assimilating economic knowledge into policy. 
The rise, very considerable excesses, and subsequent decline of judge-
made patent “misuse” doctrine was an opportunity lost. Patent misuse doctrine 
promised patent law something that it needed a century ago and needs even 
more today—namely, a body of rules derived from patent law itself and 
designed to make the system more consistent with its underlying goals. 
Misuse doctrine got off to a reasonably good start a century ago in the 
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co. case. The Supreme 
Court relied on patent doctrine rather than antitrust law to refuse enforcement 
of a clearly anticompetitive patent license restraint.476 Within a few years, 
however, the doctrine had gone off the rails, reaching practices such as 
variable proportion ties of unpatented commodities that were never shown to 
be offensive to either competition policy or innovation policy.477 
In an equity case, the historical remedy for a plaintiff’s inequitable 
conduct—its “unclean hands”—is to deny relief in that case. Beginning in the 
1940s, however, the Supreme Court developed a much more draconian remedy 
for patent misuse, making the patent unenforceable against anyone until the 
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misuse was “purged.”478 Of course, that may be the effect if the inequitable 
conduct serves to make the patent unenforceable as a general matter, but that is 
hardly always the case. 
Interestingly, the courts did not really need misuse to pursue what they 
believed to be antitrust violations such as tying. Already in 1909 the Supreme 
Court had recognized antitrust illegality as a defense to a breach of contract 
action.479 The Court held that a contract that was part of a price fixing 
conspiracy could not be enforced.480 There was no obvious reason that an 
antitrust violation could not be asserted as a defense to a patent infringement 
claim. Had the Supreme Court pursued that route, the law of misuse might 
have taken a different course. 
By mid-century, Congress was rightfully unhappy with the patent misuse 
doctrine, and the 1952 Patent Act limited its reach.481 The limitations were 
expanded in 1988 to preclude tying claims unless market power in the tying 
product was shown, and to clarify that a unilateral refusal to license could not 
be misuse.482 More recently the courts have construed the doctrine so narrowly 
that it barely exists,483 although somewhat more room remains for a doctrine 
of copyright misuse.484 In general, the courts have moved from a framework 
that evaluates misuse claims by considering whether the conduct extends the 
patentee’s power “beyond the scope” of the patent, to a framework that limits 
misuse to conduct that would otherwise violate the antitrust laws.485 The 
limitation makes misuse almost irrelevant. Further, it serves to take misuse out 
of patent policy where it belongs and place it within antitrust policy. The result 
has been largely to remove the federal judge’s equitable powers to limit a 
patent remedy unless the patentee is violating the antitrust laws, breaking an 
explicit provision of the Patent Act, or making clear misrepresentations during 
patent prosecution or litigation. 
                                                                                                                     
 478 See U.S. Gypsum v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1957) (holding that 
plaintiff could not recover until original misuse was purged); B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 
U.S. 495, 498 (1942) (holding patent unenforceable until misuse purged). 
 479 Cont’l Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227, 261–62 (1909). 
 480 Id. at 262 (“The plaintiff comes into court admitting that it is an illegal combination 
whose operations restrain and monopolize commerce and trade among the States . . . [but] 
a court will not lend its aid, in anyway [sic], to a party seeking to realize the fruits of an 
agreement that appears to be tainted with illegality . . . .”). 
 481 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(1)–(3) (2012). 
 482 Id. § 271(d)(4)–(5).  
 483 See, e.g., Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (en banc) (refusing to extend the patent misuse doctrine to concerted refusals to 
license). 
 484 See, e.g., Assessment Techs., LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 645, 647 (7th 
Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (using copyrighted software to “sequester” uncopyrighted data was 
a practice akin to misuse). 
 485 See, e.g., USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(Posner, J.) (stating that antitrust exhausts the full range of anticompetitive conduct, 
leaving no residual for misuse claims). 
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This story is unfortunate because room remains for more patent law equity 
doctrine regarding conduct that falls short of an antitrust violation but is 
nevertheless inconsistent with patent law’s purpose to facilitate innovation.486 
Attempts to restrict the public domain via patent practices, to restrain 
innovation by others, to engage in tortious but nonmonopolistic conduct such 
as misrepresentation,487 or to enforce patents under circumstances that harm 
competition while doing nothing for innovation still need to be countered. For 
example, a clause in a license agreement forbidding a licensee from 
developing any technology in competition with the plaintiff’s technology 
might not be a sufficient exercise of power to violate the antitrust laws, but 
patent law itself is concerned about practices that restrain innovation even if 
they are not antitrust violations.488 The same thing can be true of patent license 
agreements that forbid reverse engineering or that foreclose competing 
technologies.489 As the Supreme Court has noted, reverse engineering is an 
“essential part of innovation.”490 
One value of misuse doctrine in such settings is that the remedy can be 
limited. Rather than assessing treble damages, as antitrust does, or making a 
patent completely unenforceable, a court could simply enjoin an abusive 
practice or deny relief to the plaintiff in a particular case. 
“Misuse” is a doctrine of equity,491 nearly always raised as a defense to a 
patent infringement action. Seen in this light, the Supreme Court’s eBay 
decision provides an important rationale for rethinking misuse.492 eBay 
rejected a line of Federal Circuit decisions making an injunction more-or-less 
automatic in patent infringement actions, largely in disregard of the Patent Act 
provision.493 Rather, entitlement to an injunction against patent infringement 
should track ordinary principles of equity, including a query whether an 
                                                                                                                     
 486 For a fuller catalog, see BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 258–89. 
 487 See, e.g., Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 2d 300, 324 (D. Del. 
2013) (holding that the destruction of documents pertaining to alleged inequitable conduct 
in contemplation of patent litigation unlawful). 
 488 Cf. Lasercomb Am. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding 
copyright infringement in licensor’s clause that “[l]icensee agrees during the term of this 
Agreement and for one (1) year after the termination of this Agreement, that it will not 
write, develop, produce or sell or assist others in the writing, developing, producing or 
selling computer assisted die making software, directly or indirectly without Lasercomb’s 
prior written consent.”). 
 489 On the latter, see U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 424 F.3d 1179, 1189–
90, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 490 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160 (1989); see also 
Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Tech., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 793 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a 
restriction on reverse engineering constituted copyright misuse). 
 491 See B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 1997); 
Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 492 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 493 See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2012) (“The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under 
this title may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the 
violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.”). 
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injunction under the circumstances is in the public interest.494 The courts have 
a legitimate role in policing conduct that is not expressly authorized by the 
Patent Act and that serves to restrain innovation, sequesters the public domain, 
imposes competitive harm disproportionate to innovation effects, or that 
involves improprieties in the patent procurement process. The Trebro decision 
discussed above is a good example.495 Any examination sensitive to both 
innovation and competition concerns should have convinced a court in equity 
that the public interest demanded denial of an injunction. 
Calling the patentee’s conduct in such cases “misuse” is probably ill 
advised, given the history of that term and the criticism that has properly been 
heaped upon its use. But eBay’s equitable principles stretch far beyond 
“misuse”—a term that eBay’s majority and two concurring opinions never 
used, even as every Justice agreed that the judge in a patent infringement case 
clearly had the power to withhold an injunction.496 
Antitrust policy responded to a half century of overreaching by developing 
extremely strict rules for establishing competitive harm. Beginning in the 
1970s and continuing to this day, antitrust has undergone a revolution in 
thinking that has disciplined and narrowed its focus and made its rules more 
consistent with its underlying goals. Patent law would benefit significantly 
from such a process—one that reflects consumer interests more strongly and 
that takes our economic knowledge of innovation and its relationship to 
competition and economic growth more fully into account. Today, the one 
enormous advantage that antitrust law has over patent law is that it confronts 
the economic question of impact on competition directly and explicitly, often 
dismissing complaints when harm to competition cannot be shown. Patent law 
needs to take a page from this playbook. 
                                                                                                                     
 494 See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. In order to be entitled to an injunction the plaintiff must 
show: 
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as 
monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering 
the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is 
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent 
injunction. 
Id. 
 495 Trebro Mfg., Inc. v. Firefly Equip., LLC, 748 F.3d 1159, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see 
also supra notes 457–58. 
 496 See eBay, 547 U.S. at 394 (Thomas, J., majority opinion); id. at 394–95 (Roberts, 
C.J., concurring); id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
